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INTRODUCTION
Even the armchair analyst knows that Wall Street is awash in
nonpublic outside information. Institutional investors, tender
offerors,1 stock exchange professionals, 2 investment bankers, govern-
ment officials, and columnists, 3 among others, regularly receive in-
formation that cannot be classified as inside information but never-
theless is unavailable to most investors. Outside information is the
new frontier of securities regulation.4
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws,5 and in
particular rule 10b-5,6 have long proscribed trading in securities,
1A tender offeror, planning to bid forty dollars a share, might buy 500,000
shares at twenty before disclosure of his impending offer, saving himself ten million
dollars. In addition to buying shares for himself, the bidder might share his infor-
mation with banks and insurance companies in exchange for financing and with
management as part of a "total" compensation package. Advance information
about major transactions other than tender offers provides a similar opportunity for
exploitation of outside information. See, e.g., Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d
314 (5th Cir. 1959); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
2 Market makers, floor traders, specialists, block positioners, odd-lot dealers,
and others on the floor of the exchange possess information about the supply of
and demand for shares that is not generally available. See generally SECtRrrms
AND EXcHANcE CommIssIoN, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcurrEs MAPEETs,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 161-71, 208-20, 225-26 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as SEC SpECIAL STUDy]; SE:cum s AND ExCHANc COMMISsIoN,
BEPORT ON THE FEAsrBIrTY AND AvyssABIhITy OF THm CoMPLETE SEGREGATION
OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALm AND BRoKm 11-50 (1936) [hereinafter cited as
SEC SE:GREcATIoN REPORT].
a A state employee might trade on the basis of an advantageous highway con-
tract to be awarded in the future. A market analyst might relay to a well-known
financial columnist adverse information about a company disclosed in Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, sell the company short, and then cover "on
the news." See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
4 Recent articles and comments illustrate the increased attention that outside
information has received. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAnv. L. REv. 322 (1979);
Morrison, Silence is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic Market Information, 8 SEc.
REG. L.J. 211 (1980); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL Srtm. 801 (1980); Note, The Ninth Circuit Expands the 10b-5
Net to Catch a Columnist-Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 29 DEPAuL L. REv. 287 (1979);
Comment, The Application of 10b-5 to "Market Insiders": United States v. Chiarella,
92 H v. L. Rnv. 1538 (1979); Comment, Rationalizing Liability for Nondisclosure
Under 10b-5: Equal Access to Information and United States v. Chiarella, 1980
Wis. L. REv. 162.
5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78n(e), 80b-6 (1976).
SRule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
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either by corporate insiders 7 or tippees, 8 on the basis of nonpublic
information that belongs to and emanates from the corporation
whose securities are traded ("inside information"). In a number of
recent cases,9 however, courts have expanded the "disclose or ab-
stain" 10 requirement to reach nonpublic information created by
and belonging to sources outside the issuer ("outside information").1
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC pursuant
to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act],
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). For general commentary on the rule, see A. BRoMmERG,
SEcunrrLs LA.w: FRAuD--SEC R=rar 10b-5 (1974); 3 L. Loss, SEcurrls lEcu-
LA-oN 1445-74 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, supra, at 3556-3647 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
7Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act defines insiders as directors, officers, and 10%
beneficial owners. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976). The SEC and the courts have ex-
panded the insider category for rule 10b-5 purposes to include anyone with privi-
leged access to corporate information. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
8 See, e.g., In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
9 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd
445 U.S. 223 (1980) (tender offer information); Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., 564
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977) (information concerning seller of securities); Frigitemp
Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 281-83 (2d Cir. 1975)
("market information") (dicta); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956)
(information concerning property exchanged for securities); Flynn v. Bass Bros.
Enterprises, 456 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (tender offer information); Oppen-
heimer & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 12319 (April 2, 1976), [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FzD. SEC. L. RE_. (CCH) 780,551 (discontinued SEC action
against broker who acted on advance knowledge of forthcoming news story). See
also ALI Fa.n. SEC. CODE § 1603(b) (3) (Mar. 1978 Draft) (referring to "fact[s]
of special significance," which need not be inside information).
The uncertainty created by these cases has attracted greater concern in light of
structural changes in the stock market that have made use of outside information
more prevalent. Today, over 70% of the transactions on the New York Stock Ex-
change are made by institutional investors who have come to rely almost exclusively
on a small number of analysts and brokers. The vast majority of large block trades,
by institutions and others, is now handled by only three block trading firms. The
concentration of so much market power in so few hands gives valuable outside
information not only to these actors, but also to stock exchange professionals who
can observe their activities first hand. See generally L Fmmm, M. BLum &
I. Cnocm,=r, MtrruAL FUNms AND OTmER IN sTTrumToNAL INv oRs: A NEW
PERSPECT=VE (1970).
10 The "disclose or abstain" rule requires persons with inside information about
the value of an enterprise's securities to disclose that information or refrain from
trading. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Brudney, supra note 4, at 322.
'lAlthough some commentators have suggested a dichotomy between inside
information and "market information" (i.e., information about the market for a
company's securities as distinct from information about its assets and earning power),
market information that emanates from the issuer is inside information, and informa-
tion about assets and earning power obtained from SEC filings is outside informa-
tion. The same information can therefore be either inside or outside information.
A market researcher or columnist who concludes from published information that
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Persons who possess such information are neither insiders nor tip-
pees of insiders. Broadly defined, outside information includes
perceptive credit analysis based on public information, superior
market research, or an investor's intuitive "feel" for the market.
When a trader investigates a company and the market for its stock
by studying published investment advice, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filings, industry statistics, or other sources of
public information, and then performs his own analysis, that
analysis itself becomes information. If he trades on the basis of
his analysis, he is using a form of outside information. Outside
information also includes nonpublic information obtained from
corporate sources other than the issuer, such as confidential informa-
tion concerning a tender offeror's plan to make a bid for the is-
suer's stock.
If a trader has invested substantial resources into gathering
and analyzing outside information, and especially if he plans to en-
gage in significant market action, such as a major purchase, he
will possess clear informational advantages over other investors.
Courts in the past have concluded that rule 1Ob-5 ordinarily does
not proscribe such activity or require disclosure of outside informa-
tion under these circumstances. In Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC
Chairman Cary distinguished inside information from the "percep-
tive analysis of generally known facts" that every investor is per-
mitted to exploit.12 In General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries,
Inc., Judge Friendly stated that he knew of "no rule of law.., that
a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary
relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circum-
stances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale." 13
According to Professor Loss, even "an insider is under no obligation
to give the ordinary investor the benefit of his superior financial
analysis." 14
a certain company is ripe for a takeover bid, the person making the tender offer,
an employee of the tender offeror who misuses the information, and even a stock
market specialist or broker who observes preparations for the tender offer, all use
outside market information when they trade in target securities. By contrast, the
target executive who learns of the impending offer by virtue of his employment
uses inside market information when he trades in target stock. The important
factor is not the type of information, so long as it is material, but its source.
1240 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961).
13403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)
(citations omitted).
143 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1463 (2d ed. 1961). See also SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969) ("Nor is an insider obligated to confer upon outside investors
the benefit of his superior financial or other expert analysis by disclosing his edu-
cated guesses or predictions"); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84, 92 (E.D.
[Vol. 12.9:1307
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Recent cases, however, have questioned the reach of these tradi-
tional rules. By suggesting that possession of outside information
may trigger a duty to disclose,15 these decisions have focused atten-
tion on the often conflicting goals of securities regulation. A
principal concern of the securities laws, particularly of the antifraud
provisions, has been the prevention of fraud and overreaching,8
and of the loss of public confidence in the securities markets that is
believed to accompany such practices. 17 Of equal importance, how-
ever, has been the desire to ensure efficient capital markets and to
encourage entrepreneurial market research.' 8 The tension between
these policies has led to contradictory approaches to outside infor-
mation, as illustrated by the opinions in Chiarella v. United States.19
In Chiarella, the SEC brought a criminal action under rule
lOb-5 against a journeyman printer who traded in corporate secu-
rities on the basis of confidential information obtained from a
source outside the issuer. During 1975 and 1976, Vincent Chiarella,
a "mark-up" man at a Wall Street financial printing shop, helped
prepare documents for five companies planning takeover bids. The
names of five tender offerors and target companies were coded to
preserve confidentiality, but in each instance Chiarella cracked the
code and purchased target shares. When public announcement of
the tender offer drove up the price of target stock, Chiarella sold
"'on the news" for profits totalling over $30,000.20
Although Chiarella was neither an insider nor the tippee of an
insider, the SEC found his conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant
criminal prosecution. In denying Chiarella's motion to dismiss the
indictment, District Judge Owen recognized that the case presented
a "novel application" of rule lOb-5, but found Chiarella's alleged
conduct a fraud upon both the tender offeror and the selling share-
Mich. 1972) ("Plaintiff's superior expertise and understanding of the field in which
the investment was made are not sufficient to create liability"); Goodwin v. Agassiz,
283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933) ("[The law] cannot undertake to
put all parties to every contract on an equality as to knowledge, experience, skill
and shrewdness").
'5 See cases cited in note 9 supra.
10 See Brudney, supra note 4, at 334 & n.42; Scott, supra note 4, at 805-09.
17 See Brudney, supra note 4, at 334 & n.46; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy,
An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121
U. PA. L. REv. 798, 816-17 (1973).
's Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 17, at 816-17. See generally
Note, The Eflicient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regula-
tion of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977).
19450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder]
F D. SEC. L. RE,. (CCH) If 98,024 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
20 445 U.S. at 224.
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holders.21 Chiarella argued that his purchases were no different
from those of tender offerors and that he should be treated no
differently. Judge Owen agreed that the tender offeror could buy
target stock without disclosure, subject to the requirements of the
Williams Act,22 but distinguished such purchases from Chiarella's
on the ground that tender offerors' purchases "have a presumptively
legitimate business purpose," while Chiarella's were "solely for
personal profit." 23
On appeal, the Second Circuit questioned Judge Owen's reason-
ing, but affirmed Chiarella's conviction.2 Observing that both the
tender offeror and Chiarella were motivated by "personal profit,"
the court concluded that "'business purpose' [could not] be dis-
positive of liability under Rule lOb-5." 25 Instead, the court pro-
ceeded from the premise that rule lOb-5 requires "relatively equal
access to material information." 26 Conceding that Chiarella was
not an insider 2 7 the court sustained the conviction on the ground
that Chiarella fell into a new category of "market insiders," hold-
ing that "[a]nyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly receives
material nonpublic information may not use that information to
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to dis-
close." 28 Judge Meskill dissented from what he considered a
drastic expansion of section 10(b).29
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. 30 Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell rejected the Second Circuit's "equal access"
and "market insider" theories and declined to construe section 10(b)
as creating "a general duty between all participants in market trans-
actions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion." 31 When Congress wished to regulate use of outside infor-
21450 F. Supp. at 97.
22 1934 Act, §§ 13(d) & 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
23 450 F. Supp. at 97.
24 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978) (Kaufman, CJ.).
25 Id. 1368 n.15.
26 Id. 1365 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
27 588 F.2d at 1364.
28 Id. 1365 (emphasis in original). The court distinguished tender offerors
from Chiarella on the grounds that tender offerors do not regularly receive non-
public information concerning any stock but their own and therefore are not
regularly in receipt of "market information," tender offerors create rather than
convert confidential information, and tender offerors accept greater economic risk.
Id. 1366-67.
29 Id. 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
so 445 U.S. at 222.
8lId. 233.
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mation, it did so by enacting "detailed and sophisticated!"
legislation, such as that governing the activities of specialists 32 and
the making of tender offers. 33 In the absence of circumstances that
independently require disclosure, such as legislation or the existence
of a fiduciary relationship,34 the Court held that rule 1Ob-5 does not
give rise to an obligation to disclose outside information. There
could, therefore, be no duty to disclose outside information where
"a complete stranger [purchases from] . . sellers only through
impersonal market transactions." 35 The Court sidestepped the
government's argument that Chiarella's theft and use of information
belonging to his employer independently violated rule lOb-5, be-
cause in its view that theory was not adequately presented to the
jury.86
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that theft of non-
public information is by itself sufficient to trigger an "absolute
duty" 3 7 to disclose, a theory he believed had been presented prop-
erly at trial.38 Justice Blackmun also dissented, in an opinion
joined by Justice Marshall. Endorsing the "equal access" theory
spurned by the majority, Justice Blackmun argued that rule lOb-5
imposes an affirmative duty of disclosure whenever "structural dis-
parity in access to material information" provides an investor with
a trading advantage that cannot be duplicated by others through
legal means.3 9 Although they agreed with the results reached be-
low, none of the dissenters adopted the reasoning of either the
district court or the court of appeals.
Despite its outcome, Chiarella is not a manifesto for unre-
stricted trading on outside information. One finds in the Court's
five opinions neither unqualified approval of such trading nor a
secure means of avoiding potentially draconian liability. Although
a bare majority held that there is no duty to disclose outside infor-
32Id. See 1934 Act, §11(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §78k(a)(1) (1976). See also
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 99, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 179, 276-77; SEC SPEcI-L STUmy, supra note 3, pt 2, at 57-59;
S. ROBBiNs, ThE SacRTrrnrs M~nKr 191-201 (1966).
331934 Act, §§13 & 14 (The Williams Act), 15 U.S.C. §§78m, 78n (1976
& Supp. III 1979).
34The Court viewed the prohibition against use of inside information as
grounded in fiduciary duty. 445 U.S. at 227 n.8.
35 Id. 232-33.
36 Id. 236. In addition to the majority opinion, four justices wrote separate
opinions. Justices Stevens and Brennan each wrote brief concurrences. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented.
37 Id. 240.
38 Id. 243-44.
39 Id. 251.
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mation in the absence of special circumstances, such as applicable
legislation or the existence of a fiduciary relation, the majority did
not limit the class of circumstances that could trigger such a duty.
Four Justices, moreover, either believed that such special circum-
stances were not required, or that they existed in Chiarella.40 But
for the majority's surprisingly narrow construction of the charge to
the jury, Chiarella might well have gone to jail. Those who trade
on outside information do so at their peril.41
This uncertainty, while discouraging borderline attempts to
evade the law, may also chill important market activities. Even
those who rely on published information at times may enter un-
certain territory. Must a hedge fund planning securities purchases
large enough to affect market prices make disclosure before imple-
menting the plan? Must a famous economist refrain from selling
before giving a speech he knows will depress the value of securities
he owns? 42 Can an investment banker buy large blocks of stock
on the basis of its market research, publish the results of that re-
search, and meet the demand so created by selling from inventory
for an apparently certain profit? Can the inventor of a revolution-
ary camera place an order to buy Kodak stock and sell Polaroid
after agreeing to sell his invention to Kodak? Can a General
Motors employee or associate buy stock in a supplier before General
Motors announces award of a major contract? Can General
Motors? 43
401d. 238 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. 239 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. 245 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
41 See, e.g., Some Reflections on Rule 10b-5 and Market Information
Remarks by P. Loomis, Second Annual ALI-ABA Course of Study, in San Fran-
cisco, at 3 (May 6, 1976) ("it is troublesome not only to lawyers, but also to busi-
nessmen, that you cannot say with complete assurance what the law is, or that it will
be the same tomorrow as it was today") (on file with the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review). At one point, the SEC suggested that it wished to proceed
in this area by rulemaking. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10316 (August 1,
1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 179,446. That project
failed, leading the Second Circuit to conclude that "the SEC has despaired of
providing written guidelines ...... SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10
(2d Cir. 1977).
42 See, e.g., Herman & Hertzberg, Interest Rate Surge Batters Bond Prices,
Adds Pressure to Further Elevate Prime, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1980, at 44, col 1
("bond prices slumped early yesterday, reacting to a gloomy interest-rate outlook
by Henry Kaufman, chief economist of Salomon Brothers").
43 Corporations, their associates, and their employees continuously create or
receive from countless outside sources information that may affect dramatically the
fortunes of competitors, customers, and suppliers. Advance information accessible
to even the itinerant salesman about new products, new contracts, accidents,. bank-
ruptcies, and other events may have great value to someone trading in the stock of
companies only indirectly affected. News reports that a customer is preparing a
treble damage antitrust claim, or that a bank has withdrawn credits necessary for a
company's sole marketmaker to avoid insolvency, or that a newspaper has erred in
[Vol. 129:1307
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This Article reviews aspects of modern capital market theory
in a search for answers to the questions posed by trading on outside
as contrasted with inside information. The Article contends that
economic theory, and in particular the efficient capital market
hypothesis, does not conflict with the premises of federal securities
regulation, but indicates that the need to preserve incentives re-
quires some limitations on the duty to disclose outside information.
It also contends that the desire to protect investors and promote
confidence in the securities markets by preventing fraud, overreach-
ing, and other illegitimate or unfair uses of information does not
justify broad application of the disclose or abstain rule to outside
information. Instead, it suggests a narrower approach based on
common law precedents, and concludes that incorporation of com-
mon law fraud rules into rule 1Ob-5 produces results consistent
with both economic efficiency and non-economic goals. The Article
relies on this common law approach to rationalize existing case
law involving uses of outside information by tender offerors and
those with whom they deal, as well as by government officials,
columnists, market professionals, and broker/advisors.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION
Given the economic importance of the national securities
markets, economic theory seems an obvious source of clues to
answer the questions raised by Chiarella v. United States.4 Many
economists have focused on the value of promoting allocationally
efficient capital markets and therefore have opposed regulations
that might interfere with existing incentives to the systematic col-
lection, use, and incorporation into stock prices of relevant infor-
mation. Some oppose even the registration and insider trading
reporting a suppliers backlog only begin to suggest the possibilities. Outside
information also can appear more serendipitosly-for example, when a traveller
observes an explosion at a company's only plant, frost in the Brazilian coffee fields,
or cutbacks in Saudi Arabian oil production, and trades in affected securities. See,
e.g., Disclosure of the Impact of Possible Fuel Shortages on the Operations of
Issuers Subject to the Registration and Reporting Provisions of the Federal Secu-
rities Laws, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10569 (Dec. 20, 1973), [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) fi 79,607. See also Laidlaw v. Organ,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817) (trading on advance news of the Treaty of Ghent
in 1814 brought to New Orleans by the British fleet); Lipton, Market Information,
in P ACTiSiNG LAv INsTnnr, Fnxri ANNuAL INsrrruTE ON SEcUnrrms REGcULA.ON
287, 298 n.41 (1974) (post-Institute textual volume) (Nathan Rothschild's trading
on advance news of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, brought to London by carrier
pigeon).
44450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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provisions of the federal securities laws as unjustified burdens on
the entrepreneurial efforts necessary to sustain free and efficient
markets.
These conclusions depend, in part, on neoclassical welfare
economics, which posits the goal of the capital markets as a pareto
optimal resource allocation.45 Ideally, pareto optimality occurs
under conditions of perfect competition,46 when many fully in-
45 An allocation is pareto optimal if there exists no reallocation that would
make even one person better off without making anyone worse off. See V. PARETO,
THE MmrD AND Socix'y (Bongiorno & Livingston trans. 1935). Although perfect
competition and an efficient market are often thought to be the surest means of
attaining pareto optimality, perfect competition and efficiency are neither necessary
nor sufficient for pareto optimality. A pareto optimal allocation is in theory possible
despite taxes and transaction costs which make perfect competition and efficiency
impossible. Perfect competition and efficiency may produce a privately optimal but
publicly suboptimal allocation of resources when externalities cause a divergence
between private and social costs and benefits. Public and private pareto optimality
is the ultimate goal of economic analysis and policy.
46Perfect competition means rivalry among large numbers of buyers and sellers
when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) no market actor possesses monopoly
power (i.e., each actor is a price taker facing a flat demand curve and each actor
supplies goods and services at minimum average cost); (2) each actor receives
simultaneously with every other actor complete and costless information about
existing prices and technology; (3) markets are frictionless (i.e., there are no
transaction costs or taxes, all assets are perfectly divisible and marketable, and there
are no constraining regulations); (4) all investors can borrow or lend unlimited
amounts of capital at a common and exogenously determined riskless rate, there
are no restrictions on short sales, and there are no barriers to arbitrage; (5) all
investors and potential investors share the same time horizons and homogenous
expectations about the means, variances, and covariances of returns among all assets
(i.e., about the implications of any given piece of information for security prices),
and (6) all investors are risk-averse, single-period, expected-utility-of-terminal-
wealth maximizers who trade on the basis of the mean and variance of the dis-
tribution of returns. Markets in which these requirements are not completely
fulfilled, such as those in which there are transaction costs or taxes, may still exhibit
aspects of perfect competition.
An allocationally efficient market is a market that channels scarce resources to
their most productive uses. Perfect competition will, by definition, cause prices to
continuously reflect all available information and thereby provide reliable signals for
resource allocation. Perfect competition is sufficient but not necessary for alloca-
tional efficiency. Transaction costs and taxes do not make impossible an efficient
allocation of scarce resources.
An allocationally efficient capital market may also be defined as one that
efficiently transfers funds between lender/savers and producer/borrowers by gen-
erating prices that continuously equate the marginal rates of return (adjusted for
risk) for all lenders and producers. Securities prices establish a market-based rate
of return. If that rate of return is, for instance, ten percent, all projects promising
a risk-adjusted return greater than ten percent will be undertaken as savers lend and
producers borrow at ten percent. Lenders who have exhausted all such projects
will lend their excess funds to producers at ten percent because that rate is higher
than what they can expect to earn on the remaining projects available to them.
Producers who have projects promising returns greater than ten percent, but not
enough funds to exploit all these opportunities, will borrow at ten percent and will
pursue investment projects in declining order of return until they reach an invest-
ment project promising only a ten percent rate of return, at which point they will
borrow no more. The marginal rate of risk-adjusted return is then the same ten
[Vol. 129:1307
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formed market actors continuously buy and sell securities. Under
these conditions, securities prices should continuously reflect all
available information, leading to greater accuracy in the pricing of
individual securities and to a more efficient allocation of resources.
When stocks and their prospects for success or failure are evaluated
by a process that reflects all available information, investors can
more rationally compare competing companies. Given existing
levels of risk aversion, investment funds will migrate to those com-
panies and projects that seem most likely to succeed. This con-
tinual redirection of capital from less promising to more promising
pursuits benefits the investor and society as a whole because both
maximize welfare by allocating scarce resources to investment op-
portunities promising the greatest return.
47
Security prices that reflect all available information also en-
hance rational capital budgeting by individual companies. When
investor purchases cause a firm's stock price to rise, the firm's
price/earnings ratio increases, and the firm can obtain more capital
from the stock market for each increment of earnings if it decides
to issue new stock. Similarly, investor purchases of a company's
outstanding debt will lower the interest rate required to sell new
debt. This reduction in the cost of capital resulting from in-
vestor purchases of the company's securities occurs even if the
company does not plan to issue new securities, because corpo-
rate treasurers will rarely pay more for alternative sources of
capital.48 When investors who see promise in a company bid up
the price of its securities, they enable it to pursue its various
projects more intensively by using less expensive capital. Making
percent for all lender/savers and producer/borrowers, all projects promising a risk-
adjusted return greater than the market rate, and none promising a lesser return,
are undertaken, and scarce savings are therefore allocated to projects promising the
greatest returns. When prices reflect all available information, the market rate of
return provides the most efficient allocation of capital. See, e.g., Mendelson,
Economics and the Assessment of Disclosure Requirements, 1 J. Coiw,. Conu'. L.
& SEC. REG. 49, 50-51 (1978); Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased
Markets, and "Martingale" Models, 39 J. Bus. 242 (1966); Samuelson, Proof that
Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUs. MANAcm&ENT REv. 41
(Spring 1965).
47 See, e.g., CHAnLES RrvER AssocrATEs, AN ANALYSIS OF CAPrrA.L MA=KET
iMPERFECTIONS 310 (1976) (capital markets allocate "capital funds among invest-
ment projects and... risk among investors") (on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review).
48 See, e.g., H. KIPE, THE SEC AND CoRPO srE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION
IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 123 (1979); S. ROBBINS, supra note 32, at 48 (1966);
Lintner, Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices and the Supply of Capital to
Corporations, 44 REv. EcoN. & STATISTIcS 243 (1962); Modigliani & Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Aii. EcoN.
REv. 261 (1958). See also Mendelson, Payout Policy and Resource Allocation, 116
U. P. L. REv. 377 (1968).
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capital less expensive to promising companies and more expensive
to failing companies improves efficient resource allocation by direct-
ing scarce resources to those who can best use them.
The continual impoundment of all available information into
stock prices is essential to this process of efficient capital allocation.
One way that the federal securities laws seek to promote an efficient
capital market is through an elaborate system of compelled disclo-
sure, enforced primarily by reliance on registration and reporting
requirements under the Securities Act of 193349 (1933 Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 10 (1934 Act), as well as rule lOb-5. 1
In order to achieve pareto optimality, however, compelled disclo-
sure alone is not enough; the law also must encourage systematic
collection, analysis, and use of information that is disclosed.5 2 The
amount of market research actually undertaken and the level of
market efficiency achieved thereby correlate with the certainty and
size of the rewards obtainable through research.53 This analysis
suggests that the securities laws should preserve incentives to market
research by recognizing in the collector of outside information a
right to trade without disclosure, and to earn profits at the expense
of the less informed.54 Although the common law recognized such
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. I1 1979) [hereinafter cited as "1933
Act"].
50 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
51 For the text of rule 10b-5, see note 6 supra.
5
2 See, e.g., S. ROBBINS, supra note 32, at 47-54.
5
3 Rational analysts will search for new information until the incremental costs
of searching equal the discounted value of the information to be discovered. See
B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. CorrL=, SzcuBIwr ANALYSIS: PitNcirms AND TE-CH-
NIUEQS (4th ed. 1962); Boudreaux, Competitive Rates, Market Eficiency, and the
Economics of Security Analysis, 31 FINANCIAL ANALYsrs J. 18 (March/April 1975);
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. Bxv. 1, 62-69
(1980); Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 213, 213-18
(1961).
In a competitive economy, news that market participants in one industry earn
above average profits will induce others to enter that industry until increased
competition has driven profits down to competitive levels. Resources will be
reallocated until there is no difference in risk-adjusted profit between different
industries. Resources will be utilized within a particular industry until costs equal
revenues and no further profits can be earned by diverting additional resources to
that industry. Vigorous competition among securities analysts ensures that in-
formation whose value exceeds the cost of discovery will generally be found, but
that few security analysts will consistently find enough valuable information to earn
above average profits. Over the long run, analysts will uncover only enough valuable
information to match the cost (including average profits) of discovery. Insiders,
however, may have monopoly access to information that permits monopoly returns.
54 Government could reward market researchers more directly by compensating
them with government funds. But even if there were a reliable method of
measuring performance, such a program would present an administrative nightmare.
In addition, although a compensation program might at first seem consistent with
the belief that everyone benefits from an efficient capital market, in fact, market
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;a right, prominent economists have argued that the system of com-
pelled disclosure enforced by the SEC has interfered with its exer-
.cise, and in doing so has robbed the market of needed incentives
,to enterpreneurial activity.55
A. Issuer Disclosure Requirements
Stigler's review of the 1963 SEC Special Study of Securities
.Markets 16 fired the opening salvo in this debate.5 7 Stigler char-
.acterized the report as a "promiscuous collection of conventional
beliefs and personal prejudices." 58 Even accepting the SEC's
premise that the paramount goal of securities regulation is the
protection of "innocent" " investors, Stigler's quantitative analysis
.of pre- and post-1933 new issues led him to conclude 60 that the
SEC "had no important effect on the quality of new securities
sold to the public [and had not saved] . . . the purchasers of new
issues one dollar." 61 Viewing the SEC as an aid to cartelization
.and a useless clog on free market processes, Stigler believed that
market efficiency was a means of investor protection far superior to
compelled disclosure.
2
Stigler's assault on the orthodoxy of federal securities regula-
tion prompted a vigorous response from Friend and Herman. Con-
,ceding that SEC regulation increases transaction costs, Friend and
Herman argued that Stigler had vastly exaggerated its costs while
minimizing or ignoring its benefits.63  Benston moved the debate
-traders, both sophisticated and unsophisticated, receive additional benefits not shared
by the general public. Better informed traders can keep any profits they make.
Less informed traders can at least be assured that so long as they pay the market
-price in an efficient capital market they will get exactly what their money is worth
because they will rarely-if at all-pay a price different from that which an actor
-with perfect information would pay.
55 See text accompanying notes 197-206 infra.
56 See note 2 supra.
57 Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
:See also G. SmTGER, THE CrrzEN AND Tns STATE: EssAys ON REGULATION (1975);
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI.
:3 (1971).
58 Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 120
,(1964).
59 Id.
60 Id. 120-24.
,0 Id. 124.
62 Id. 124-30.
83Friend & Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382,
_394-96 (1964). Calling Stigler's study "a triumph of ideology over scholarship,"
Friend and Herman argued that Stigler had both omitted and misinterpreted
important evidence. Id. 382. Once his errors were corrected, they believed the
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into the realm of accounting theory when he published econometric
studies showing that the securities laws wasted resources by requir-
ing costly disclosure of information that investors did not want and
could not use profitably. 4 He argued that an unregulated market,
not compelled disclosure, would provide an optimal amount of
relevant information. 5 Other research appeared to support Bens-
evidence showed that the SEC had helped unsophisticated investors by reducing the
prevalence of "stock-market pools, bucket-shop operations, misuse of inside in-
formation and other types of manipulation and fraud," all of which Stigler had
allegedly ignored. Id. 388. See also Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. & 73d
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pts. 1-17 (1933-34) (the Pecora hearings). Although
Stigler had interpreted the reduced volatility in the performance of new issues
following effectiveness of the 1933 Act as evidence that the SEC had excluded new
companies from the market, Friend and Herman argued that reduced volatility
resulted from decreased manipulation and improved disclosure. Friend & Herman,
supra, at 390-91. These two explanations are not necessarily inconsistent. If
investors are risk averse, improved disclosure will prevent especially risky companies
from coming to market.
64 Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44
AccotrNTLG Rtv. 515, 531-32 (1969). See also G. BE sToN, CORPORTE FINAN-
cr DiscsosuRa n Tm U.K. ArN Tm U.S.A. (1976); Benston, The Costs and
Benefits of Government-Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, in
CORPORATIONS AT Tm CaossaoADs: GovERNANcE AND BEFom 37 (D. DeMott ed.
1980); Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, in EcouoMac Poucy AND THi REGULATION OF CoRPoaAT SEcurI-
TrEs 23 (H. Manne ed. 1969); Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market:
An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. EcoN. REv. 132
(1973).
65 See, e.g., Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Require-
ments, 44 AccourrNc REv. 515, 516 (1969). Benston attributed the paucity of
suits against accountants prior to 1933 to the relative absence of fraudulent financial
statements, not to the absence of means of redress. Id. 518-19. Finding that the
market discounted the contents of official SEC documents even before they were
filed, and that mutual funds and other investors who intensively studied such reports
did not outperform the market, Benston concluded that SEC-mandated disclosure
was distorted by a conservative bias and was in any event "too late .. . to be
relevant." Id. 522-23. The burden of such disclosure, he believed, had discouraged
many companies from raising capital in the public markets. Id. 524-28. In later
work, Benston reaffirmed his earlier findings and extended his analysis to the 1934
Act, concluding that the disclosure provisions of the 1934 Act did not reduce fraud,
require disclosure of useful information beyond what was already disclosed, enable
investors to better predict future security price movements, or improve the fairness
of or investor confidence in the trading markets. Benston, Required Disclosure
and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
63 Am. EcoN. REv. 132, 152-53 (1973). The lack of discernible effects, however,
could be explained by the tendency for the increased cost of disclosure to the firm
to be counterbalanced by a decreased cost of capital resulting from increased
investor confidence. See CHArLEs Rrvmn AssocrAsT, supra note 47, at S-24.
Friend and Westerfield challenged Benston's conclusions. They argued that
the correlation between changes in reported accounting data and stock prices was
statistically significant and that the 1934 Act improved estimates of expected return,
reduced risk and volatility, and increased efficiency. Friend & Westerfield, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: Comment, 65 Am. EcoN. REv. 467, 468-71 (1975).
But see Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Rejoinder, 65 Am.
EcoN. REv. 473 (1975) (rebuttal of Friend & Westerfield). For another critique
of Benston's work, see Backer, Comments on "The Value of the SEC's Accounting
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-ton's analysis. 6 More recently, Kripke has argued that the average
investor does not understand SEC-mandated disclosure but relies
instead on professional advice, and in any event cannot use SEC
information profitably even if he does understand it.67 Like Benston
and Stigler, Kripke concludes that an unregulated market will
-provide optimal disclosure as investor representatives, such as under-
writers, bargain with issuers for disclosure of valued information. 8
.Disclosure Requirements", 44 AccomnrG REv. 533, 534-36 (1969). See also
Friend, Economic Foundations of Stock Market Regulation, 5 J. CONTEmp. Bus. 1
(Summer 1976); Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 Am.
EcoN. REv. 212 (1972); Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of
Securities Markets, in EcoNoMIc Pouicy ANDr=su RECurLArsoN OF CoRPoRATE
SEcum's, supra note 64, at 186 (arguing that compelled disclosure increases
efficiency, reduces unanticipated risk, and improves "economic performance of
.markets for new and outstanding stocks").
66 Conedes contended that an unregulated market would provide an optimal
amount of investment information without the SEC, because private collectors would
meet market demand and would do so more efficiently than the government could.
, Conedes, Dopuch & Penman, Disclosure Rules, Information-Production, and Capital
Market Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast Disclosure Rules, 14 J. AccoUNTING
EsE.Amcn 89, 98-106 (1976). Gonedes argued that the SEC had engaged in
-overkill by requiring disclosure of financial ratios and other information that dupli-
cated information already disclosed elsewhere. Gonedes, Capital Market Equilib-
rium and Annual Accounting Numbers: Empirical Evidence, 12 J. Accouwrnc
EEAscH 26 (1974). He concluded that SEC regulation had not in any way
improved upon the efficiency provided by free market forces. Gonedes, A Note on
Accounting-Based and Market-Based Estimates of Systematic Risk, 10 J. FINANC. L
.& QUANTITATIwE ANrALYsIs 355 (1975); Conedes, Corporate Signaling, External
Accounting, and Capital Market Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income, and
Extraordinary Items, 16 J. AccoumnNo RESEr-CH 26, 28, 75 (1978); Conedes,
Information-Production and Capital Market Equilibrium, 30 J. Fm. ANcE 841 (1975);
Gonedes, Risk, Information, and the Effects of Special Accounting Items on Capital
Market Equilibrium, 13 J. AccoUNTcr. RESEARCH 220, 250 (1975). Meltzer con-
tended that the securities markets accurately transmit investment information,
leaving little additional value to be gained by the SEC regime of forced disclosure.
'The SEC's regulation of market professionals, Meltzer believed, departed from
principles of market efficiency by encouraging cartelization, discouraging competi-
-tion, and hobbling the activities of floor traders, specialists, market-makers, and
- other market professionals. Meltzer, On Efficiency and Regulation of the Securities
Industry, in EcoNoMIc Poricy AND THE REcULATION oF CORPORATE SEcuarriEs,
supra note 64, at 217.
67 H. KnrmxE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DiscLosuRE: REGULATIoN Ix SEAaCH
-OF A PURPOSE, 14-16, 284-86 (1979).
6s In private placements, for example, investors demand and obtain only such
information as they deem relevant, saving the issuer and society the cost of pro-
viding information, required by the SEC, that no one wants or uses. H. KnrKE,
supra note 67, at 120-25. Because SEC disclosure concerns only historical infor-
mation, Kripke believed it was irrelevant to a sophisticated investment decision.
Id. 97. The negativism employed to avoid liability further distorted reality. Id.
15. SEC-mandated disclosure, Kripke thought, should be future oriented; it should
disclose not only historical costs but also current values and cash flow, especially
in times of inflation; it should be comparative, presenting relevant information
- about the industry and the market as a whole, in addition to financial information
z about the company, and it should provide information useful for assessments of
relative risk. Id. 25-27. See also Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities
Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAw. 293 (1975); Kripke, The Myth of the Informed
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Contrary to Benston's and Kripke's arguments that firm-
oriented disclosure based on historical cost accounting conveys no
new or useful information beyond that already reflected in stock
prices, however, other studies indicate that changes in expected ac-
counting values influence stock prices. Despite the failure of
historical cost accounting to reflect accurately a company's true
prospects, investors detect distortions and extract valuable informa-
tion from reports of the type Kripke thought were useless.69 Gonedes
and others have concluded that SEC-mandated disclosure of account-
ing numbers at times transmits new information upon which in-
vestors act.70 Market prices also respond to a variety of forces in
addition to accounting figures. To say, however, that financial in-
formation alone does not determine stock prices is not to say that
such information has no effect or is useless when disclosed.
71
The argument that compelled corporate disclosure does not
improve upon the level of disclosure that otherwise would be pro-
vided by market forces also overlooks important evidence. Even
those who argue for more lenient disclosure requirements do not
imagine that all material information would be disclosed gratui-
Layman, 28 Bus. LAw. 631 (1973); Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some
Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151 (1970).
69 See note 71 infra & accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., Gonedes, Corporate Signaling, External Accounting, and Capital
Market Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income and Extraordinary Items, 16
J. Accousmrrsc REsEA.cH 26 (1978); Ross, Implications of Modern Finance Theory
and Signalling Theory, in IssuEs IN FiNAcL.L REGULA- ION (F. Edwards ed. 1979).
See also J. Lonm & M. H AMITON, THE STOcK MAR=ET: THEoRIES AND EvmENCE
157 (1973); Friend & Westerfield, supra note 65, at 468.
71 Newly published accounting data is only one variable among many influ-
encing individual investment decisions. Those decisions also depend on world
events, changes in government policies, independent market changes, the indi-
vidual's particular financial and tax situation, and other factors that do not appear
in published data and therefore defy measurement. Investors who act solely on
official accounting data at the time it is published are perhaps too few to exert a
significant impact on market prices.
Although portfolio theory stresses the performance relationships among groups
of stocks, instead of focusing solely on the potential gain in one stock, efficient
diversification cannot take place in an informational vacuum. The theory of efficient
diversification depends on the existence of accurate information about the com-
ponents of alternative portfolios. Construction of an optimal portfolio therefore
requires, inter alia, the very information that the SEC requires be disclosed. Other
things being equal, a portfolio manager who can use SEC filings will better diversify
than the manager working without such information. See, e.g., Beaver, Kettler &
Scholes, The Association Between Market Determined and Accounting Determined
Risk Measures, 45 AccOUNTNG REv. 654 (1970); Beaver & Manegold, The Associa-
tion Between Market-Determined and Accounting-Determined Measures of Sys-
tematic Risk: Some Further Evidence, 10 J. F NANcr L AND QuANTrvE AALyss
231 (1975); Gonedes, Evidence on the Information Content of Accounting Numbers:
Accounting-Based and Market-Based Estimates of Systematic Risk, 8 J. FNANc.ct,
& QuANTITATIvE ANALYSIs 407 (1973). See also Niederhoffer & Regan, Earnings
Changes, Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Prices, 28 FINANcIAL ANALYsTs J. 65 (May/
June 1972).
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tously without the SEC.72 By forcing disclosure of information
that otherwise would be withheld, and thereby increasing the
amount of accurate information in the marketplace, required dis-
closure increases market efficiency. Economies of scale in produc-
ing and distributing information make the issuer, even when it
operates under governmental compulsion, rather than private in-
vestors, the cheapest collector and disseminator of information.
Far from crowding out private collectors and transmitters of infor-
mation (such as research services), the regime of required disclosure
subsidizes them. Because research services often rely on disclosures
contained in SEC filings, and often cannot, at a reasonable cost,
regularly obtain reliable information through other means, aban-
donment of required disclosure would reduce both the number of
competing information disseminators and the absolute amount of
information conveyed to the market. Finally, required disclosure
improves the quality of other disclosures. 73 Despite these limita-
tions, the work of Stigler, Benston, and Kripke requires a fresh look
at the economic rationale for compelled disclosure in general.
B. Information as a Public Good
A second strand in the literature has relied on microeconomic
theory to analyze the process that brings valuable information to
market. Stigler applied marginal cost pricing theory to the search
for and production of information concerning market price. Argu-
ing that price dispersion reflected buyer and seller ignorance, he
attempted to show that buyers and sellers would expend resources
searching for the best price until the expected value of additional
searching equalled its cost.74 Although Stigler's conclusions were
not startling, his work did focus attention on information as an
72 See Gonedes, Dopuch & Penman, supra note 66, at 101. See also Mendelson,
Economics and the Assessment of Disclosure Requirements, 1 J. Comp. Cor. L.
& SEC. REG. 49, 53-55 (1978) (noting corporations' use of various accounting
devices to distort disclosure and opposition by other banks to voluntary disclosures
by Bank of America, and concluding that "there is really nothing in the free market
system that will induce management to supply the optimal amount of information
[and no] ... motivation for management to reveal any of their own manipulative
schemes or fraud"). The argument that a free market in information would lead
automatically to optimal disclosure through the bargaining of corporate officers with
investors ignores inefficiencies in the market for investment information. Because
a monopolistic exploitation of valuable information often promises greater returns
than a free market sale, there is too often insufficient incentive for the dissemination
of information. The possessor of inside information, for instance, will obtain better
returns by using that information in trading than by trying to sell it to others.
7 3 See generally text following note 160 infra.
74 Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 1. PoL. EcoN. 213 (1961). See
also Johansson & Goldman, Income, Search, and the Economics of Information
Theory: An Empirical Analysis, 11 APPTm EcoN. 435 (1979); McCall, The
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economic good, akin to other commodities, such as corn, pork
bellies, or gold. Following Stigler's lead, economics of information.
theorists asked whether a market which, by hypothesis, normally
produced an optimal amount of other commodities also produced
an optimal amount of investment information.
Arrow concluded that an unregulated market allocated a sub-
optimal amount of resources to research and invention because
information is a "public good," like national defense, lighthouses,
clean air, weather broadcasts, bridges, and open spaces, for which
the market could not simultaneously provide optimal production
and consumption. 5 An unregulated market will not provide opti-
mal production of public goods because producers of such goods-
cannot realize their full valueTh A producer of oil or an owner of
land, for instance, can sell some of his product to one customer
and some to another. One sale will not destroy the market. In
contrast to these (and most other) commodities, however, pure
public goods are nonappropriable, indivisible, and nonexclusive, all.
of which reduce their potential return. Sale of a pure public good
to one person is, to some extent, sale to everyone; the seller cannot
effectively divide up his product and sell it incrementally, excluding
those who will not pay the price he demands. The national defense
cannot feasibly withdraw protection from people who do not pay
their taxes, the lighthouse cannot be shut off for ships that do not
contribute to its upkeep, and the air cannot be left polluted for
those who oppose environmental protection. Because potential
consumers of public goods can use them without paying for them,
each potential user will conceal his preference and the owner will
have great difficulty charging anyone for the good.77 Public goods
Economics of Information and Optimal Shopping Rules, 38 J. Bus. 300 (1965);
Weitzman, Optimal Search for the Best Alternative, 47 ECONOMETICA 641 (1979).
75 Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
NATroNAL BuREAu oF ECONOMIC IE:sEARcH, TnE RATE AND DIECTION or IN~.
vENTVE Acnvrry: ECONOMIC Am SocIAL FACTOnS 609 (1962). See also Arrow,
Higher Education as a Filter, 2 J. PuB. EcoN. 193 (1973); Arrow, Limited Knowl-
edge and Economic Analysis, 64 Am. Ecow. REv. 1 (1974); Arrow, The Future
and the Present in Economic Life, 16 EcoN. INQuIrY 157 (1978); Arrow & Lind,
Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. EcoN.
REv. 364 (1970).
76Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
supra note 75, at 615-16. The earliest writers on public goods stressed the owner's
inability to exact payment as the primary attribute of public goods. See, e.g., J. S.
Mi.r., PIUNcIPrs oF PoLrbCAr ECONOMY (6th ed. London 1865); A. Pou,
EcoNoMNcs OF Wx.&am 183-84 (4th ed. 1962); H. Srncwicx, THE PRINcipLEs OF
POIrlcAL ECONOMY 406 (3d ed. 1901).
77R. MusGnAvE, THE THEOay OF Puntc FrNAxcC 80 (1959). See also
Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods, in PUBLIC ECONOMiCS (J. Margolis & H.
Guitton eds. 1969).
[Vol. 129:1307"
OUTSIDE INFORMATION
must be enjoyed by all, regardless of willingness to pay, or enjoyed
by none.
While most private goods are produced under conditions of
increasing or constant marginal cost, so that significant increments
of resources are consumed in serving additional customers, pure
public goods are costless to reproduce and distribute. The benefits
of increased use of pure public goods will therefore always outweigh
the cost.78 Under conditions of pareto optimality, where price
-equals marginal cost, use of pure public goods would be free.
Producers of public goods, however, must charge some price to
cover their costs, or they will not produce. Charging a price greater
than marginal cost will prevent many who could pay the marginal
cost from sharing the benefits of the good.79 While nonappropri-
ability will lead to underproduction, the attempt to charge a price
exceeding marginal cost of use also will cause welfare losses through
suboptimal utilization of whatever public goods are produced.
Legal protection for producers may reduce the risk of underpro-
duction, but it will exacerbate underutilization. Alternatively, the
government can hold the price down to marginal cost either by
subsidizing private firms or by producing the public good itself.80
The theory of pure public goods, however, does not always
describe what actually happens in the marketplace. Producers can,
for instance, build fences around open spaces, scramble weather
7sArrow, supra note 76, at 616-69. In a classic series of articles that initiated
the modem public goods debate, Samuelson argued that the primary attribute of a
public good is that one person's consumption does not reduce another's; instead,
one quantity of the good is produced and shared in common by all. See Samuelson,
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. EcoN. & STATISTICS 387 (1954).
See also Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. EcoN. &
STATISTCS 332 (1958); Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public
Expenditure, 37 REv. EcoN. & STATIsTics 350 (1955).
79 Because their production costs are relatively constant at different levels of
distribution, sharing public goods neither increases the cost of production nor
decreases the value received by others. Economic theory suggests that consumers
should be permitted to use a good whenever they can pay at least the marginal
cost of its use. If the owner of an investment newsletter, for example, charges
ten cents per copy, people who would pay nine cents will not purchase. Becanse
the owner could profitably sell newsletters at any price above variable cost, which
may be a penny per copy, total social welfare is reduced by the value of the
newsletter to people who would pay something between variable cost and ten cents.
80 Arrow's suggestions have provided the theoretical foundation for proposals
ranging from government financing for research and development to the creation of
an exemption to § 4(2) of the 1933 Act and rule 144 in the case of securities
issued by high-technology companies. See CHARLEs Pmu AssocrA ms, supra
note 47. See generally authorities cited in note 75 supra. See also [1980] 571 SEC.
BIEG. & L. RE'. (BNA) A-13 (easing of regulation of venture capital companies
-under Investment Company Act of 1940); Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1980, at 17, col. 1
(loosening of restrictions on sale of unregistered securities by venture capital
companies).
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broadcasts, and restrict entrance to roads, bridges, and public hospi-
tals. After excluding certain consumers, producers can segment the-
market and price discriminate, charging each purchaser only what
the good is actually worth to him.8' Consumers may attempt to,
conceal their true preferences, but there are very sophisticated ways.
of finding out what they are . 2  In addition, incentives exist for
individuals to join and pay fees to organizations that produce public
goods in socially optimal amounts.s3 Demsetz has argued that when-
ever the benefits gained by provision of public goods outweigh
transaction and production costs, the private sector will provide the-
good at an optimizing price.84 He concludes that where the market
does not provide the good, one can infer that total costs of produc-
tion, distribution, and payment are greater than any benefit
received.85
81 Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 293-
(1970).
82 See, e.g., McMillan, The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey, 55 EcoN. Eec. 95
(1979). See also Mori, Revealed Preference for Public Goods, 65 Am. EcoN. REv.
978 (1975).
83 M. OLSON, TnE LoGIC OF CoLEctrvE AcTnoN (1965); Stigler, Free Riders-
and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL
J. EcoN. & MANAGEMENT Sci. 359 (1974). See also Getz & Huang, Consumer
Revealed Preference for Environmental Goods, 60 REv. EcoN. STATIsTmCs 449
(1978); Guttman, Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior, 68 Am.
EcoN. Rzv. 251 (1978).
84 Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & EcoN.
11 (1964).
85 Pursuit of optimality does not necessarily require that goods be given away
if the marginal cost of their distribution is zero. The marginal cost of production
will always be positive, particularly if measured prior to any production. Although
pareto optimality requires that goods be sold at a price equal to marginal cost,
marginal cost in this context is the average marginal cost of production and dis-
tribution, not that of distribution alone. Particularly in the case of large fixed
investment goods, a focus on marginal cost of distribution alone may have more
theoretical elegance than practical relevance. Once the bridge is built, the
marginal cost of the first and all subsequent crossings is virtually zero. Choosing a
time before construction in setting the marginal price calculus, however, produces
a marginal cost for the first user equal to the total cost of the bridge, for the
second user a marginal cost equal to half that, and so forth. Accordingly, if the
marginal cost calculation is made before there are any fixed costs, it will exceed
zero to the degree prospective fixed costs are characterized as a type of marginal
cost. Even after the bridge is completed, moreover, marginal cost will not be
zero. Bridges must be maintained, and when the bridge becomes congested,
additional use imposes an indirect cost on other users. In addition, if production
and distribution are subsidized, and the public good is given away, overproduction
and overutilization may result, shifting resources from other more valuable uses to
the public good. Charging for public goods at least provides some idea of their
value to the public, information that may be useful when the time comes to
enlarge the bridge or to build another. See Davis & Whinston, On the Distinction
Between Public and Private Goods, 57 Am. EcoN. REv. 360, 367 (1967); Demsetz,
supra note 84, at 21.
[Vol. 129:1307T
OUTSIDE INFORMATION
Coase's study of the British lighthouse system further illustrates
the limitations of a purely theoretical public goods approach to
real market problems.88 Lighthouses epitomize the pure public
good. The lighthouse owner cannot collect tolls from passing ships
by threatening to shut the light off for those who do not pay. Once
the lighthouse is constructed, the marginal cost of increasing use is
zero. One might conclude that private industry will never build
lighthouses, and if it does, that the attempt to recover all costs will
place a suboptimal burden on the unlucky ships that pay the toll.
Government, apparently, is the only solution. Coase found, how-
ever, that private industry had built British lighthouses and had
devised an ingenious system of collecting fees for their use com-
mensurate with value received, before the lighthouses were taken
over by the government.
87
Securities information, like most information, is a hybrid good.
It is nonappropriable, because profitable appropriation and use
necessarily reveals the information to others, at least in part. The
purchase of securities without disclosure of nonpublic information,
for instance, will drive the price of the security higher. One cannot
even negotiate for the sale of information without disclosing some
part of it. Information is indivisible and nonexclusive because sale
to one is, to some extent, sale to all. Once information is disclosed,
the original owner may not be able to prevent others from obtaining
the information and using it for themselves.8 In addition, once col-
lected, information, like weather reports, can be distributed at
virtually zero marginal cost, creating social benefits exceeding social
costs.8 9 Yet there will be inadequate motivation to invest in infor-
mation production if the product cannot be reduced to legally pro-
tected property. These public aspects of information production
lead Arrow and others to recommend active government interven-
tion in the market for securities information.
90
86 Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974).
87 Id. 364-65.
88 See, e.g., Grossman & Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price Systems,
66 Am. EcoN. REv. 246 (1976); Grossman, The Existence of Futures Markets,
Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities, 44 REv. EcoN. S=tU.
431 (1977).
89The classic definition of pareto optimality, moreover, requires that in-
formation be free and available to all. See notes 45 & 46 supra and accompanying
text.
9oSee, e.g., sources cited in note 75 supra. But see Hirshleifer & Riley, The
Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J. EcoN. Lrr.
1375 (1979); Hirshleifer, Where Are We in the Theory of Information?, 63 Aa..
ECON. REv. 31 (1973); Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information
and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. EcoN. REv. 561, 564-65 (incorrectly
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Securities information, however, also exhibits some character-
istics of private goods. Although trading discloses some informa-
tion content, it also permits the owner of nonpublic information to
realize much of its value.9 1 Information can be made appropriable
in other ways as well, such as through patent laws, trade secret laws,
copyright laws, and private contracts. Sellers of nonpatentable
ideas-such as investment advice-have devised a variety of con-
tractual protections. Marginal cost, moreover, is not necessarily
close -to zero before the information is created, or even afterward,
if updating is necessary. The Chicago school therefore sees invest-
ment information as a commodity like any other for which market
forces are presumed to provide optimal production and distribution.
Because securities information exhibits a public aspect but never-
theless may achieve roughly optimal production and distribution in
a free market regime, both the Arrow and the Chicago school
analyses are applicable. A thoughtful securities policy need not go
so far as to require government subsidies for information produc-
tion, but it should reflect a heightened sensitivity to unjustified
interference with existing incentives to private information pro-
duction.
92
C. Apolgia for Insider Trading
The economics of information attained its most controversial
synthesis in the work of Professor Manne.93 Manne argued against
all restraints on the exploitation of investment information. Eco-
nomic reality, in his view, demanded that rule lOb-5's prohibition
against insider trading be discarded as a useless barrier to the
efficient production, distribution, use, and impoundment into stock
assuming that investor trading does not affect resource allocation: "the community
as a whole obtains no benefit, under pure exchange, from either the acquisition or
the dissemination (by resale or otherwise) of private foreknowledge") (emphasis
in original).
9 1 See also Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. R3v. 470 (1969) (trading
will not necessarily disclose information content because the trading may be
motivated by extraneous circumstances and is therefore an ambiguous signal; when
an investor buys on secret information, his buying pressure will raise price
temporarily, but the price will eventually drop again unless the information is
disclosed).
92 Cf. F. MAcHLuP, KNOWLEDGE: ITS CREAnoN, DISTIBUTION, AND ECONOMIC
SIGNnPcANcE (1980); F. MAcHLup, THE PaoDucnTo AND DsmmnoN OF
KNOWLEDcE Ix THE UNrIED STATES (1962) (arguing that patent protection is
required to encourage optimal investment in new ideas, but that patents will
necessarily hinder optimal utilization of information once produced; and concluding
that enlightened policy requires a balancing of these two goals).
9 3H. MANNE, INSIDER TRAir AND THE STOCK MAn-r (1966).
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prices of valuable information." Focusing on the corporate man-
ager, Manne argued that insider trading gains were a necessary
incentive and just desert for enterpreneurial activity inside the
corporation.95 The ban on insider trading could not be justified
on the ground of investor protection because insider trading did
not injure investors generally and in fact hurt virtually no one.9e
Manne, however, assumed that insiders would trade only on
positive information and did not consider carefully the case of
investors who purchased while insiders were bailing out. 7 He
understated the degree to which insiders might actually delay or
manipulate disclosure in order to maximize a trading advantage.9s
He ignored the extent to which even long-term investors time trades
with an eye on short-term price fluctuations. 99 He failed to explain
how the spoils of insider trading could be restricted to entrepreneurs
in amounts commensurate with the value of their contribution. 100
Finally, he directed insufficient attention to the economic benefits
of a rule imposing on corporate management a duty of undivided
loyalty to stockholders.01 '
94 Id. 77-93.
0
5 Allow the corporate executive to trade on inside information, Manne asserted,
and you encourage him to create information worth trading on. Id. 111-45.
96 Id. 93-110. Arguably, potential purchasers injured by the "unfair" com-
petition of the inside buyer would have a better claim to compensation than sellers
who sold at a higher price as a direct result of that competition. Conversely,
buyers who buy from the insider pay a lower price than they would have paid if
he were not selling.
97 See id. 150-53.
08 See id. 104, 151-52.
99 See, e.g., Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis.
L. Rzv. 720, 723 n.16; Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider
Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1447 (1967); Wu, Corporate
Insider Trading in the Stock Market, 1957-1961, 2 NAT'L BNicr= REv. 373, 378
(1965).
100 Persons in the corporate hierarchy with no connection to the entrepreneurial
function will inevitably obtain and use inside information, usually while the genius
inventor is still in the laboratory.
10 1 See H. MANNE, supra note 93, at vii. Manne's unorthodox views sparked
a barrage of critical reviews. See, e.g., Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading:
A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAm. L. REv. 621 (1970); Manne, A Re-
joinder to Mr. Ferber, 23 VAND. L. REv. 627 (1970). See also Marsh, Book Review,
66 McH. L. REv. 1317 (1968); Mendelson, supra, note 91; Painter, Book Review,
35 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 146 (1966); Schotland, supra note 99; Weston, Book
Review, 35 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 140 (1966). Although these reviewers questioned
various aspects of Manne's economic analysis, the primary source of opposition was
a generalized concern for fairness in the securities markets, entirely apart from
considerations of economic cost-benefits. See, e.g., Ferber, supra. Manne re-
sponded to his critics in Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VA,,m.
L. REV. 547 (1970).
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Other criticisms might be made, but Manne's economic argu-
ments have some validity. The principal flaws in his analysis, more-
over, do not apply to outsider trading, where no problems arise
concerning conflicting loyalties, identification of the corporate
entrepreneur, manipulation of corporate information, or bailouts.
Although Manne's focus was on insider trading, his conclusion that
trading on nonpublic information produces a net social good, to
the degree it is valid, applies a fortiori to outsider trading.
D. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
The efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) has moved
neoclassical equilibrium theory from ought to is. Economists agree
that securities regulation should promote an efficient allocation of
resources by encouraging swift impoundment of all available in-
formation into stock prices. ECMH theorists, however, go one step
farther and assert that market processes already do this: the efficient
capital market is in their view a goal that already has been
achieved. 10 2  The ECMH asserts that the national capital markets
102 See Fama, Eficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FINANcE 383 (1970). See also Note, The Eflicient Capital Market
Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29
STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977); Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the
Eflicient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 1077 (1977). Definition of an efficient market as one that continuously reflects
all information suggests several tests of efficiency. Most tests of capital market effi-
ciency have tried to measure the speed with which stock prices react to news of
changes in corporate prospects. Another test, suggested by Friend, examines short-
term price continuity on the theory that price continuity is evidence of continuous
incorporation of information into stock prices. If information reached the market
only in fits and starts, stock price patterns would exhibit sudden dislocations. Once
some continuity has been observed, however, this test cannot provide refined
results. Although the absence of any continuity may be evidence of inefficiencies,
it is impossible to say how much continuity is required to support a finding of
efficiency. Even in an efficient market, new developments may appear discon-
tinuously. Conversely, factors having nothing to do with a rapid response to
information may smooth price trends, thereby inaccurately suggesting efficiency. A
third test, also suggested by Friend, measures the degree to which the stock market
maintains equivalent rates of return on investments of the same risk, as required by
the efficient allocation theory and the capital asset pricing model. See note 160
infra. If the market reflects all information, it will channel funds to companies
commensurately with their promise for success, and investment opportunities sharing
equal risk and return will obtain funds at the same rate. Measurements of
equivalency in cost of capital between investments of the same risk and return
therefore can provide a gauge of market efficiency. See I. FRIEN, M. BLtMM &
I. CRocrrT, supra note 9, at 92; Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance
of Securities Markets, in EcoNoMIc POLICY AND TEZREGUI.1TON OF CORPORA E
SEcumis, supra note 64, at 185, 190. Risk, however, is notoriously difficult to
measure apart from actual returns, ex ante and even ex post. Finding that rates
of return maintain a constant relationship over time, moreover, does not necessarily
mean that the underlying prices on which equivalent rates of return are based
are always efficient. See, e.g., J. KEYNEs, THE GmqmAL THmoRy OF EMPLOY-
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are perfectly efficient in the sense that they continuously reflect all
relevant information, both public and nonpublic. Research at-
tempting to verify this hypothesis cannot, of course, examine the
price impacts of all potentially relevant information. Empirical
tests of the ECMH have therefore focused on the speed and ac-
curacy with which market prices respond to items of information
widely recognized as significant.
Empirical studies of the ECMH purport to show, in ascending
order of weak, semi-strong, and strong form tests, that stock prices
continuously reflect (1) all information about past prices and trends,
and their value in predicting future prices; (2) all available public
information as it is generated, even to the point of anticipating the
import of new information prior to its public announcement and
dissemination, and (3) even nonpublic information, such as infor-
mation possessed by insiders, as soon as it is developed, whether or
not it is publicly disclosed.10 3 The weak form efficiency studies
conclude that chartists and others who study past trends waste their
time because existing prices continuously incorporate whatever in-
formation such studies might produce. If, for instance, past trends
suggest that a certain stock always gains in the winter, existing prices
will continuously reflect the discounted value of that information,
and no one who discovers it on his own can outperform the market
by trading on it. Semi-strong form studies conclude that investors
who maintain an up-to-the-minute watch on new developments, by
reading newspapers, listening to the radio, or consulting the ticker,
also are wasting their time because market prices will reflect any
new information before they can trade on it. The investor who
buys a stock simultaneously with the announcement of a dividend
increase will, for instance, pay a price that reflects the information
value of the increased dividend and will not outperform the market.
Finally, strong form studies argue that even the insider who uses
inside information will not outperform the market because he will
IENT, INTEREST AT-M MON'xY 159 (1936) (arguing that investor expectations
with respect to the future perceptions of other investors can lead to consistently
inefficient pricing with no relation to underlying productive values). If underly-
ing prices are not efficient, equivalent rates of return prove inefficiency. Disequilib-
rium transactions-transactions that do not take place at a price reflecting all in-
formation-are in theory the best evidence of inefficiency. Neither theory nor
practice, however, provide a reliable means of identifying disequilibrium transac-
tions.
103 This typology of information follows that originally suggested by Fama.
See E. FAmA, FOuNDATiONS OF FINANcE (1976); Fama, supra note 102. See also
Fama & Blume, Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading, 39 J. Bus. 226 (1966);
Fama & MacBeth, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J. POL. EcoN.
607 (1973).
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trade at prices that already reflect what he thinks is secret informa-
don.
From Wall Street to Main Street, both sophisticated and un-
sophisticated investors have believed that careful research and analy-
sis, quick reactions, or access to corporate secrets could produce
handsome trading profits. Not only the intuitive feeling that a
special advantage put one ahead of the crowd, but also anecdotal
evidence confirmed the widespread perception that passive price
takers could at best stand still, while those with privileged infor-
mation outperformed the market and accumulated fortunes. The
underlying principle of the ECMH, however, is not counterintuitive.
Investors are a devoted army of researchers who keep the market
continuously informed. By trading, millions of sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors continuously transmit to the marketplace
valuable information from every corner of the economy. The
presence in the market of insiders and of large numbers of wealthy
and extremely well-informed investors adds further to the accuracy
and speed with which stock prices incorporate all available infor-
mation. Those with sizeable investments in the stock market will
devote significant resources to the development of sophisticated
market strategies, and their trading will incorporate their research
into market prices.
Because the ECMH holds that all valuable information in-
stantaneously flows into the market via trading, it follows that no
one can possess better information than that already incorporated
in stock prices. By hypothesis, a perfectly informed trader, who
has access to every available information source and means of
analysis, will value securities at their existing market prices. Re-
search, investigation, mathematical analysis, and tapewatching can
never earn supracompetitive profits because these activities will at
best produce only some information, while the stock price will
incorporate that information along with all other information.
Efforts to identify undervalued stocks, whether by fundamental or
For general descriptions of the ECMH literature, see T. COPELAND & J. WESTON,
FiNACIA.L THEORY AND CORPORATE PoLIcy 196-248 (1979); Srumns ni TiH
THEORY OF CAI'ITAL MAnxETs (M. Jensen ed. 1972); B. LEv, FiNANcIAm STATE-
mNT ANALysis: A NEW APPROACH (1974); J. Lo=E & M. HAMILTON, supra note
70, at 70-97.
For dissenting views, see T. DYcKMxA, D. DowNEs & R. MAGEE, ET'sCsNT
CAPrrAL MA:axTs AND ACCOUNTmN: A CnmcAL ANALysis (1975); Murphy,
Efficient Markets, Index Funds, Illusion, and Reality, 6 J. PORTFOLIO MANAGEMMNT
5 (Fall 1975); Zeikel, On the Threat of Change, 31 FiANC Lc ANALYsTs J. 17
(Nov./Dec. 1975) (arguing that information seeps into the market only gradually,
as some investors act more quickly than others who must rely on sophisticated as-
sistance to interpret new information properly).
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technical analysis, or by any other means of research, are costly, but
cannot promise better performance than a passive pricetaking
strategy. The investor can hope to outperform the market only if
he can obtain and use information and analytical tools he knows
others do not possess and therefore are not yet incorporated into
security prices.
Paradoxically, although an efficient market depends on in-
formed trading in the aggregate, the ECMH suggests that the wise
investor should devote no resources to a will o' the wisp search for
undervalued stocks, but should instead pursue efficient diversifica-
tion at the desired level of risk.104 Instead of trying to beat the
market, and absorbing significant transaction costs that doom the
effort to failure, the sophisticated investor should invest in an index
fund containing a weighted portfolio of securities. He will then
do almost exactly as well as the market, with minimum trans-
action costs, which is the best anyone can expect under the ECMH.
The proliferation of index funds and the steady increase in the
monies committed to them over the past decade provide some
measure of the degree to which the ECMH has gained acceptance
among both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. 105
Taken at face value, the ECMH throws into doubt traditional
justifications for almost every phase of securities regulation. Ac-
cording to the ECMH, because valuable information is continu-
ously and instantaneously reflected in market prices, the existing
system of compelled disclosure is largely superfluous. The SEC
and the securities laws waste resources, by requiring issuers and
traders to spend money disclosing information that already is re-
flected in stock prices and by attempting to police such disclosure.
In addition, because trading on inside information will not provide
an advantage, and because no one who trades on the basis of market
104 See, e.g., Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management
Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLum. L. REv. 721 (1976); Cohen, The
Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971); Langbein &
Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, I Am. B. FOUNDATIONRESEARCHr
J. 1 (1976); Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law: II,
2 Amd. B. FoUtDATIoN REsAncH J. 1 (1977); Pozen, Money Managers and Securi-
ties Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 923 (1976).
1o See, e.g., Dreyfus, Tying Your Investment to the Indexes, MoNEY, June
1976, at 144; Ehrbar, Index Funds-An Idea Whose Time is Coming, FoRTuNE,
June 1976, at 144; Gray, Index Funds & Market Timing: Harris Trust's Approach,
115 Tn. & EsT. 314, 315 (1976); Treynor & Black, Plan to Use Security Analysis
to Improve Portfolio Selection, 46 J. Bus. 66 (1973). Index funds attempt to
approximate the "market" return by purchasing stocks in proportion to their relative
value in the market See Black & Scholes, From Theory to a New Financial Product,
99 J. FNNCE 399 (1974). Cf. Murray, PBCC to Look at Assets of Terminated
Plans, Am. BANERi, Feb. 11, 1976, at 19 ("an index fund is a formula for a solid,
,consistent long-term loser").
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prices can be cheated, the ECMH suggests that there is no need to
regulate insider trading. If market prices incorporate all available
information, the outsider who trades at the market price will have
the functional equivalent of complete knowledge, which includes
and is superior to whatever nonpublic information the insider
possesses.10 Instead of disadvantaging ordinary investors, insider
trading contributes to market efficiency and thereby protects out-
siders by providing another way for valuable information to come
to market. The ECMH therefore suggests that insider trading, and
a fortiori trading on outside information, be actively encouraged
rather than discouraged.
1. Weak Form or Random Walk Studies
The best-known examples of the ECMH literature are the so-
called "random walk" studies, beginning with a 1900 doctoral dis-
sertation by Bachelier.1' 7 Bachelier found that French commodity
prices provided unbiased estimates of future commodity prices, in
the sense that they favored neither purchasers nor sellers, but ac-
curately reflected all information available when futures contracts
106 According to the ECMH, inside information will confer an advantage only
when the insider knows that no one else has the information. Such occasions will
be extremely rare, if they occur at all. Even the accountant who first prepares the
books showing a profit increase cannot be sure that no one has traded ahead of
him on the same information. His assistant, for instance, may have accurately
extrapolated from interim figures. Similarly, the insider who witnesses an industrial
accident can never be sure that someone else did not also see it. If even one
other person trades ahead of him, the market price will begin to incorporate the
inside information. The insider can never be certain that the market price does
not already reflect whatever information he possesses. If it does, but he believes
that it does not, his purchases will drive the price beyond what the information
warrants and he will pay more for the stock than it is worth. Eventually, the
price will return to the level dictated by the information apart from his misguided
buying pressure. Transaction costs will compound his loss. According to the
ECMH, the insider who buys on inside information will not fare as well as the
unsophisticated seller who has sold to him on the premise that the existing price
fully reflects all available information. Similarly, an investor who trades on the
basis of a foolproof method of analysis will lose money to the degree that his
method of analysis is not as novel as he believes. Cf. B. LEv, supra note 103, at
242:
Any prediction model or method of financial analysis that becomes publicly
known will quickly lose its usefulness because the value of the derived
information (e.g., predictions) will already be reflected in security prices.
Analytical tools are therefore self-destructive in efficient markets unless
kept secret, and even then their useful life is relatively short. Therefore,
ingenuity, originality, and secrecy are necessary conditions for successful
financial analysis. Efforts should be continually made to design new
models and tools and to obtain access to new information sources. In
short, the objective is to transform publicly available information to inside
information by the application of original tools and techniques.
107 L. Bachelier, Theory of Speculation, in TmE RANDoM CHARACTM oF STocK
MAxl-r PracEs 17 (P. Cootner ed. 1964).
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were made. Commodity speculation in France was therefore a "fair
game": neither buyers nor sellers could consistently expect to earn
profits. Futures prices changed only in response to unanticipated
information, which is generally random. If current prices reflect
all available information, including the information value of past
price changes, and thereafter fluctuate randomly, analysis of past
price patterns is worthless. 0 s
Although Bachelier's work carried important implications for
securities analysis, random walk theories received little attention
until 1959, when a physicist provided a mathematical proof showing
that securities prices fluctuate randomly.10 9 Examining the relation-
ships between weekly, daily, and lagged daily price changes of New
York Stock Exchange listed stocks, subsequent econometric studies
discerned only a slight serial correlation among price movements
over successive periods.110 Another set of studies tested the random
walk by examining the degree to which "filter" trading schemes
could outperform the market."' Because filter schemes rely solely
on past price patterns as guides to future trading, the ability of any
filter scheme to generate above average returns would provide strong
evidence against the validity of the random walk theory. These
studies generally found that refined filter schemes could generate
slightly above average returns before transaction costs.112 Once the
108 See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1981, at 23, col. 4.
109 Osborne, Brownian Motion in The Stock Market, 7 OPERATIONS RESEARCH
145 (1959).
110 See, e.g., Moore, Some Characteristics of Changes in Common Stock Prices,
in THE BINom CHAnACTm OF STocK MAR PRICES, supra note 107, at 139
(finding serial correlation coefficient of 0.03 for daily price changes, and similarly
small coefficient for lags; finding also a slightly greater tendency for runs in daily
changes to persist). See also C. GRANGER & 0. MORGENSTEr, PnnrcrABirrv OF
STOCK MAR=T PRcs (1970); Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21
FnrAcLr.L ANALYsTs J. 55 (Sept./Oct. 1965); Fama, The Behavior of Stock
Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34 (1965); Godfrey, Granger & Morgenstern, The
Random-Valk Hypothesis of Stock Market Behavior, 17 KYFLos 1 (1964); Granger
& Morgenstern, Spectral Analysis of New York Stock Market Prices, 16 KY.KLos 1
(1963).
" A typical x/y filter rule instructs the investor to buy a security when the
price advances from a lowpoint at least x%; sell and go short when the price declines
at least y% from its highpoint; maintain the short position until the security moves
up x% from a previous low and then buy again. All moves of less than x% or y%
are to be ignored. Filter rules depend on historical evidence suggesting that when
a stock moves up x%, or down y%, the movement will continue.
112 These profits were earned by exploiting short-term serial dependencies in
price changes. See, e.g., Dryden, Filter Tests of U.K. Share Prices, 1 APPLIED
EcoN. 261 (1970); Fama & Blume, Filter Rules and Stock Market Trading, 39
J. Bus. 226 (1966); Osborne, Periodic Structure in the Brownian Motion of Stock
Prices, 10 OPERATIONS RESaR-CH 345 (1962). See also Ambachtsheer, Portfolio
Theory and the Security Analyst, 28 FNANc AL ANALYSTS J. 53 (Nov./Dec. 1972);
Jensen, Random Walks: Comment, 23 FNANCILAL ANALYsTs J. 77 (Nov./Dec.
1967); Levy, Random Walks: Reality or Myth, 23 FrNANcrAL AN.LYsTs J. 69
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transaction costs of the many trades required by the filter strategy
were subtracted, however, the filter schemes used generally did not
outperform the market or a simple buy-and-hold strategy.1 18
At most, these weak form studies show a fair game, and not a
random walk.1 4 Other studies suggest significant departures from
randomness and the fair game in the contexts provided by particular
companies, short-term trading, seasonal patterns, exogenous market
effects, and on exchanges other than the New York Stock Ex-
change." 5  Price dependencies in these areas indicate that the
national capital markets are not equally efficient with respect to all
transactions. In addition, when Black tested the Value Line stock
ranking system, which is based almost entirely on ten years of
(Nov./Dec. 1967); Levy, The Predictive Significance of Five-Point Chart Patterns,
44 J. Bus. 316 (1971). The filter studies do not validate the random walk
hypothesis, but instead show that investors using filter and chartist techniques have
lost most supracompetitive profits after transaction costs, as one would expect under
competitive conditions. As soon as enough investors recognize a pattern promising
extra profits, their trading on the pattern will alter it.
113 These findings, however, have not daunted the efforts of chartists. See,
e.g., Ehrbar, Technical Analysis Refuses to Die, FORTuNmE, August 1975, at 99;
Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1981, at 23, col. 4. These studies, moreover, were performed
prior to the advent of discount brokerage; they do not indicate whether technical
analysis might now produce superior profits even after transactions costs.
1 4 The random walk studies have relied on three different theories to describe
the time series behavior of prices: (1) the fair game model; (2) the martingale
or submartingale, and (3) the random walk. In a fair game, the expected return
on an asset, represented by its discounted value or price, will on average prove to
be its actual return. A fair game implies that expectations incorporated into prices
are not biased but are the most reliable indicators of future value, and that investors
who speculate against existing prices therefore cannot consistently earn supracom-
petitive profits. Speculators will win and lose when unexpected fluctuations occur,
but over the long run they will not earn more money than the investor who simply
buys and holds at existing prices. After transaction costs, they will earn less.
By contrast, where expectations incorporated into prices are consistently biased,
speculators who recognize that bias can consistently earn supracompetitive profits.
A martingale is a fair game in which tomorrow's price is expected to be the same
as today's price. A submartingale is a fair game in which tomorrow's price is
expected to be greater than todays price. In a submartingale, both a speculating
portfolio and a buy-and-hold portfolio will realize the same positive return before
transaction costs. Random walks are fair games in which (1) all returns are taken
from a return distribution whose characteristics (e.g., mean, variance, skewness, den-
sity, and kurtosis) do not vary over time regardless of available information and (2)
all returns are statistically independent. Although the existence of a random walk
necessarily implies the existence of a fair game, not all fair games amount to a
random walk. The random walk studies have generally found slight serial covari-
ances between one-period returns that are consistent with a fair game but incon-
sistent with a random walk. See generally T. CoPELAND & J. WESTON, supra note
103, at 204-07; Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34 (1965).
115 See, e.g., Dryden, supra note 112 (trends in United Kingdom Share prices);
McDonald, French Mutual Fund Performance: Evaluation of Internationally-Di-
versified Portfolios, 28 J. FINAcE 1161 (1973) (ineffciencies on French Bourse);
Solnik, Note on the Validity of the Random Walk for European Stock Prices, 28
J. FINANCE 1151 (1973) (particular companies on foreign exchanges); Thiel &
Leenders, Tomorrow on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 38 J. Bus. 277 (1965).
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published data, he found that the Value Line system generated
superior returns before, and in some years after, transaction costs." 06
Black's findings directly contradict the assertion that analysis of
past price movements cannot generate supracompetitive profits.1lT
2. Semi-strong Studies
Whereas the random walk or weak form of the ECMH asserts
that past security prices are of no use in predicting future prices,
the semi-strong form asserts that current prices reflect not only the
information value of past prices, but also the value of all public
information, continuously and instantaneously. Whereas the ran-
dom walk theory asserts that technical analysis of past prices is
worthless, the semi-strong ECMH asserts that fundamental analysis
of companies is worthless as well."" To some extent, the random
walk model stands or falls with the semi-strong ECMH. Prices
will not move randomly if new information is not instantaneously
impounded. Rather, price dependencies will arise and trends will
persist while the new information slowly seeps into the market;
successive changes will move in the same direction because each
change will reflect the same influence. Instantaneous and complete
incorporation of new information into prices, however, will ensure
randomness.
The semi-strong tests attempt to show that security prices ad-
just rapidly to, and often anticipate, information filed with the
SEC, published in the press, or otherwise disseminated to the
public. In the first and still the classic test of the semi-strong
hypothesis, Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll examined 940 splits in
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 19 They found that
splits generally occurred after the issuer's dividend payout and that
116 Black, Yes, Virginia, There is Hope: Tests of the Value Line Ranking
System, 29 FnqANcrAL ANALYsTs J. 10 (Sept./Oct. 1973). See also A. BERNEmAmD,
INVSsTmN nw CosisoN STocKs (1975) (investor who purchased only stocks receiv-
ing Value Line's highest recommendation would have outperformed market by over
160% from 1965-1974); Peterson, Are Financial Ratios Worth the Effort?, 2 J.
Pona oLo MANAEMENT 51 (Fall 1975); Shelton, The Value Line Contest: A Test
of the Predictability of Stock Price Changes, 40 J. Bus. 251 (1967). The Value
Line phenomena might also be explained by the market impact of the reports
independent of their validity.
117 In addition, Ying has shown that even if price changes are independent of
each other, they are not independent of volume changes, suggesting that analysis
of historical price and volume data can earn supracompetitive returns. Ying, Stock
Market Prices and Volumes of Sales, 34 EcoNolmnucA 676 (1966).
118 The leading authority on fundamental analysis is B. GnAEA42, D. DODD &
S. Corrr.s, supra note 53.
"19 Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Neo
Information, 10 INT'L EcoN. REv. 1 (1969).
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:stock prices rose relative to the market index over several months. 120
Public announcement of a split did not significantly affect prices.
Because stock splits, by themselves, do not create new value or alter
cash flow, but are merely paper transactions which increase the
number of outstanding shares, the failure of stock splits to affect
prices (after correction for dilution) is not surprising. The evi-
dence suggested that prosperity and increases in dividend payout
generally cause an increase in market price and that a long con-
tinued increase could lead to a split. Management usually decided
to split after a period of prosperity and rising prices, perhaps in
order to keep share prices within range of small investors, rather
than after a period of falling or steady prices. As the evidence also
showed, prices will continue to rise after the split only if the
dividend payout continues to rise.
Fama and his colleagues, however, hypothesized that news of
splits leaked to the market ahead of formal announcement, and that
this leakage, rather than improved earnings and dividends, caused
the antecedent price rise. They further hypothesized that price
rises did not result from investors' reactions to advance news of
the split per se, but rather resulted from investors' perceptions that
advance news of a split was a signal from management that the
company would sustain increased earnings. 121 Because investors
apparently anticipated the information content of the split, no one
could profit by trading on its announcement. 122 The authors con-
cluded that the market is highly efficient with respect to news of
stock splits in the sense that by the time the split is actually an-
nounced, the stock price has already incorporated this information
and it is too late to trade on it.123 A more plausible explanation
for the available evidence, however, and one which recognizes that
splits are effects and not causes, is that most companies will increase
(and no company will decrease) dividends while planning a split,
and prices therefore will rise right up to the time of the split, which
probably will not occur unless prices do rise.124
120 Id. 2.
121 Id. 3-4.
122 Id. 16-19.
123 Id. 17-20.
124Although the greater magnitude of the negative as contrasted with the
positive average residuals following the split might lend further support to the
conclusions of Fama and his colleagues by suggesting that the positive informa-
tional value inherent in a split is exhausted before the split occurs, there are other
explanations for this phenomenon. Viewed in the abstract, splitting has no economic
effect In practice, however, splitting imposes very real costs on both the company
and its shareholders, costs that can be expected to lead to a decrease in price.
The company, of course, must bear the administrative costs of the split. Although
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If public distribution of annual earnings statements does not
affect prices, one might conclude that the market already has an-
ticipated their content-which would support the semi-strong
ECMH.125  Ball and Brown found that ten to fifteen per cent of
the price change attributable to changes in anticipated earnings
occurred during the month of the annual report, with the bulk of
price changes occurring earlier.126 They concluded that the infor-
mation content of annual earnings statements had largely leaked to
the market prior to announcement via more timely media such as
interim reports, statements by company officials, and insider trad-
ing; profitable trading on such information after transaction costs,
therefore, was virtually impossible. Ball and Brown, however,
found more significant price adjustments where anticipatory ex-
pectations were contradicted by earnings reports. 27 Any support
small traders who formerly could not trade in round lots may be able to after a
split, thereby reducing their transaction costs, the increase in shares owned will
inflate transaction costs for very small traders (who are still unable to purchase
round lots) and for very large traders (i.e., for all traders who will trade only odd
lots or round lots both before and after the split). Contrary to popular belief,
stock splits do not move the issuer's price into an "optimal" price range that maxi-
mizes liquidity. Stock splits reduce liquidity. Following a split, trading volume
is proportionately lower than before the split, brokerage commissions are propor-
tionately higher, and bid-ask spreads are higher as a proportion of the bid price.
See Copeland, Liquidity Changes Following Stock Splits, 34 J. FnTANCE 115 (1979).
Another weakness in the work of Fama and his colleagues stems from their assump-
tion that dividend increases or decreases will affect price in an efficient market.
Other research has shown that in an efficient market the rate of earnings retention
as opposed to dividend payout should have no effect on the market price of securi-
ties. See Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 412-15 (1961). See also Black & Scholes, The Effects of
Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns, J. FnriAr-
crAL EcoNoMncs, May 1974, at 1, 18-19. If the market focuses on dividend
decisions rather than on underlying economic realities, allowing firms to mislead
the market and generate price changes merely by altering dividends, the market is
not efficient.
125 But see Mendelson, supra note 46, at 52 ("If investors' errors in anticipa-
tions were randomly distributed with mean zero, the subsequent price changes
would be randomly distributed around mean zero and a simple examination of the
price changes at the time of information releases would suggest that the information
contained nothing new.").
126 Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers,
6 J. AccOUNTING BRsEARecH 159, 169-77 (1968).
127Even in an efficient market, there will be room for some profit before
transaction costs because there is always an irreducible component of uncertainty
with respect to any advance information. Prices will never fully anticipate advance
information, but will reflect only its discounted value prior to official confirmation.
The act of confirmation is therefore an important economic event removing this
discount. While the price may climb to 99%i in anticipation of news that will show
that the stock is worth 100, the price will not actually reach 100 until official
announcement. See, e.g., Rubinstein, Securities Market Efliciency in an Arrow-
Debreu Economy, 65 Am. EcoN. REv. 812 (1975) (arguing that prices will never
fully reflect all information if fully reflected information means information whose
arrival in the market creates no incentive to revise portfolios, and concluding that
1981]
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these findings provide for the semi-strong ECMH is undermined
by Beaver's study of the effects of earnings announcements on stock
trading volume. 128 Finding that the average trading volume for
sample securities increased 33%/ during the week when earnings
were publicly announced, Beaver concluded that the content of
these announcements was not fully anticipated and that they there-
fore generally conveyed new and relevant information.129
Scholes attempted to determine whether the adverse price im-
pact of large secondary offerings should be attributed to price
pressure caused by a sudden increase in supply or to a negative
inference concerning the issuer derived from the seller's decision
to sell. 13 Because he found no relationship between the size of
the offering and the magnitude of the price decline, Scholes argued
that increased supply was not responsible for the decline. He con-
cluded that the decline was attributable to the negative inference
raised by insider sales. This hypothesis received apparently strong
support from evidence showing that the size of the resulting price
declines was greatest for sales by corporations and corporate officers,
somewhat smaller for sales by mutual funds, and smallest for sales
every announcement, anticipated or not, leads to revision of portfolios because
speculators will close out speculative positions when their anticipations are finally
confirmed or disproved).
128Beaver, The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements, 6
J. Accom ca tlEsEAncH 67, 77-78 (1968 Supp.).
129 Id. 74. See also Ying, supra note 117; sources cited in notes 70-71 supra.
Even proof that no gains are possible by trading on annual or interim earnings
announcements, were it provided, would not show that no profits are possible by
trading on monthly statements, or on the announcement of new acquisitions, new
personnel, new markets, new products, or new contracts. At most, the semi-strong
literature suggests that it does not pay to trade on culminating or "key" announce-
ments because they are usually the third or fourth announcement of the same
information and because they attract so much attention that the market is likely to
be extremely efficient at incorporating such announcements into prices. Many
investors will respond to key announcements instantaneously, and so will stock prices,
making even sudden earnings changes useful only to the swift, usually those on the
floor of the exchange. The market is less efficient with respect to less prominent
announcements, such as contract changes, and there the potential profits from
trading on publication are much greater, leaving little new information on which
to trade when the new contract produces increased earnings for the annual report.
The ECMH assertion that prices reflect all relevant information is essentially
tautological. Economists define relevant information as information that influences
price and allocation decisions. Information not affecting these decisions is, by
hypothesis, irrelevant. That the market responds quickly to announcements econ-
omists consider significant enough to study, however, does not mean that the market
responds quickly to all relevant information. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1970, at
1, col. 4 (investor consistently outperformed market by studying all SEC filings
upon release; when missile company reported in 8K loss of construction bond,
which breached federal contracts, for instance, investor sold stock short at 38 and
watched it drop to 5). See notes 158-59 infra.
1'0 Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and
the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972).
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by banks, estates, and individuals.131 The full price decline, more-
over, usually occurred within six days after the offering, when the
identity of the vendor must be publicly disclosed.132 ECMH
theorists concluded from Scholes' study that the price decline prior
to official identification of the vendor demonstrates that the market
anticipates the negative information implicit in large insider sales,
making profitable trading on the basis of the vendor announcement
impossible and lending further support to the semi-strong hypothe-
sis. More plausible interpretations, however, are available. The
1933 Act requires registration and disclosure of the vendor's identity
twenty days before the distribution if the vendor is the issuer or a
person in a "control relationship" with the issuer.133  Even in situa-
tions not requiring registration, brokers, investment bankers, and
other parties often know who the vendor is and will disclose his
identity to interested buyers. In addition, other studies have
shown that it is possible to outperform the market by trading on
section 16(b) reports published by the SEC, demonstrating that
any anticipatory effect is less than complete. 34
According to the semi-strong forms of the ECMH, investors
should not be able to earn supracompetitive profits by trading on
news of block trades. In their examination of price activity sur-
rounding block trades, however, Kraus and Stoll found that prices
tended to fall in the hours immediately prior to block sales, that
the decrease accelerated in the last hour prior to the sale, and that
the price rose .713% before the end of the day. 35 Damm, Meyers,
and Rabb, using a different sample of block trades, found that price
declined at least 4.56% between the opening of the day's trading
and the consummation of the block trade.18 6 An investor who
131 Id. 207-9.
182 Id.
13 1933 Act, §§ 2(11) & 4(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(11), 77d(1) (1976).
134 See note 148 infra.
In another study often cited in support of the semi-strong ECMH, Wand
examined the effects on stock prices of discount rate changes by the Federal
Reserve. Waud found a statistically significant announcement effect on the next
trading day of as much as 0.5% in some cases, enough to support profitable trading
before transaction costs. Waud, Public Interpretation of Discount Rate Changes:
Evidence on the Announcement Effect, 38 Econometrica 231 (1970). See also
R. ROLL, THE BEHAVIOR OF INTEREsT RATES: AN APPLICATION OF TiE EFricmr
MAMET MODEL TO U.S. TREAsurtY BLs (1970). Cf. United States v. Peltz, 433
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.) (profitable trading on advance news con-
cerning Treasury financings), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
185 Kraus & Stoll, Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New York Stock
Exchange, 27 J. FInANcE 569, 575 (1972).
136 Damm, Meyer & Rabb, Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of
Adjustment, J. FNA=cAx ECON., Jan. 1977, at 3, 18.
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relied on a 4.56% filter rule to alert him to impending block trades
could in theory earn supracompetitive profits. If he participated
in every block in the sample, he could have earned a net annualized
return of 203%.~ z Even if he could not actually participate on
the purchase side of the block trade, the alert investor could never-
theless earn supracompetitive profits by purchasing immediately
thereafter. The market, however, reacts so quickly to the oppor-
tunity presented by block trades that supracompetitive profits net
of transaction costs normally disappear within fifteen minutes fol-
lowing the block sale.13 Except for those on the floor of the
exchange, sufficiently prompt action is impossible. The evidence
on block trades is nevertheless inconsistent with instantaneous in-
corporation of all public information into stock prices.
Studies of the performance of new issues provide even stronger
evidence against semi-strong efficiency. If the market generally
possesses accurate information about new issues, a strategy of in-
vesting in new issues should not produce supracompetitive profits.
Ibbotson, however, found from his sample that investing in new
issues and selling after one month outperformed the market by
11.4% per month and by over 350% per year.139 In an efficient
market, an annualized 350% return could not be achieved.
3. Strong Form Studies
The strong form ECMH asserts that not only public informa-
tion but also nonpublic information is rapidly incorporated into
market prices. According to this form of the hypothesis, even in-
siders with monopolistic access to nonpublic information, and out-
siders (such as security analysts) with their private information,
cannot realize superior investment results over the long run, be-
cause market prices will fully discount whatever information they
have. The strong form hypothesis has yet to receive any substantial
empirical verification. Indeed, the finding in some semi-strong
form tests that the market often anticipates important announce-
ments and transactions provides indirect evidence against the strong
137 Id. 18.
1s8 Id.
'3 9 Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, J. FhTANcrAL
Ecox., Sept. 1975, at 235. Ibbotson found that the market began to price new
issues efficiently one month after the offering, suggesting, contrary to the semi-strong
ECMH, that information about new issues is not incorporated instantaneously into
prices. The transition from over-pricing to efficient pricing entailed negative
returns for investors purchasing new offerings one month after issue, further con-
tradicting the ECMH assertion that prices are unbiased estimates of future returns.
Id. 254-60.
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form ECMH. Some anticipation can be ascribed to interim reports,
to announcements by company officials, and to other sources that
publicly disseminate important information. A portion of the
observed anticipation, however, can be explained only by trading
on inside or other nonpublic information. In the case of block
trades, for instance, there are no interim announcements leading
up to the trade, and much of the preceding price decline therefore
can be ascribed to trading on advance information. Consistently
with the evidence presented in the semi-strong form literature,
strong form tests suggest that some investors consistently use non-
public information not yet reflected in prices to outperform the
market.
Initially, strong form tests focused on the performance of
mutual funds rather than on corporate insiders. Mutual funds
devote significant resources to collecting and processing a wide
variety of securities information and employ the most comprehen-
sive and sophisticated forms of securities analysis. In addition, the
proximity of mutual funds' management to the nation's financial
centers, their connections to market and corporate sources of non-
public information, and the speed and expertise with which they
can execute transactions all suggest that if anyone can earn superior
profits by trading on nonpublic information, they can. Friend,
Herman, and Vickers, in the first rigorous test of mutual fund
performance, found that roughly half of 189 mutual funds out-
performed the market while half did not.140  In the second major
test, Sharpe found that 19 of 84 mutual funds outperformed the
Dow Jones Industrial average; after correcting for fund expenses,
however, only 1I of 84 outperformed. 41  In the third and best
known study, Jensen found that only 48 of 115 funds out-
performed the market between 1945 and 1964.Y4 He concluded
that the number of funds that consistently outperformed the
market was no larger than one would expect by chance. Although
some later studies tended to confirm Jensen's findings,143 others
140 HousE Com. oN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMmERCE, A STuDy op
MuTUAL FuNms, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (prepared for
the SEC by the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce). See also Friend &
Vickers, Portfolio Selection and Investment Performance, 20 J. FiNANcE 391 (1965).
341 Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119 (1966 Supp.).
142 Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J.
FMNANcE 389, 415 (1968). See also Jensen, Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets,
and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios, 42 J. Bus. 167 (1969).
143 See also McDonald, Objectives and Performance of Mutual Funds, 1960-69,
9 J. FNA=NC&L & QUANTA ANALYsis 311 (1974); Williamson, Measurement
and Forecasting of Mutual Fund Performance: Choosing an Investment Strategy,
28 F NaAJcAL ANALYSTS J. 78 (Nov./Dec. 1972).
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have not.144  The most recent data support the pro-fund
144 See, e.g., I. swND, M. BLTumm & I. CnociKz-r, supra note 9; Gupta, The-
Mutual Fund Industry and Its Comparative Performance, 9 J. FrNANCAL &
QuAN [TA=vE ArAnxsis 891 (1974); Mains, Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets,
and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios: Comment, 50 J. Bus. 371 (1977)
(finding that 80% of funds sampled outperformed market before transaction costs);
2 SEcuRrrIEs AND EXCHANGE CoImnssIoN, IrisTrrIuIONAL INVESTOR STUDY R-EPORT,
H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 327 (1971) [hereinafter cited as INsTI-
TUTIoNAL INvEsTOR S-rDY]. See also Cohen & Pogue, An Empirical Evaluation
of Alternative Portfolio Selection Models, 40 J. Bus. 169 (1967); Treynor, How to
Rate Mutual Fund Performance, 43 HAxv. Bus. Rxv. 63 (1965).
Even if we accept Jensen's results, a failure of mutual funds to consistently
outperform the market cannot show that nonpublic information provides no ad-
vantage. First, the presumption that mutual funds have nonpublic information has
not been verified. To a large degree, mutual funds rely on painstaking collection
of public information and the routinized application of the results to trading
strategy. An individual investor who carefully follows one stock will usually know
more about that stock than the mutual fund, which follows thousands. In addition,
mutual fund managers deny any possession or use of inside information, not only
because its use is illegal, but more credibly, because they can never be assured
of its reliability and can never know whether it has already been used and in-
corporated into market prices. See, e.g., Wall Street J., Aug. 13, 1980, at 29,
col. 3. Management of mutual funds requires selection of reliable routines, and
mutual fund managers say that collection of public information is a more reliable,
less costly, less risky, and more profitable routine than trying to chase down, verify,
and analyze inside information "leaks." Second, when management does receive
especially valuable information, whether public or nonpublic, it may trade ahead of
the fund, or share it with others who will. Third, even if management uses non-
public information only for the fund, the institutional routines that must be com-
pleted prior to trading take far more time than is the case with an individual
investor. Most decisions are made by committee. A trading decision may therefore
take several days, allowing maximum opportunity for prior trading by others.
Institutional decisionmaking, moreover, is notoriously public. The slowness with
which all bureaucracies move may explain better than any other reason why mutuals
may perform poorly as a group, and why the largest ones may perform the worst
of all. Fourth, because of the significant administrative resources devoted to mutual
fund decisionmaking, each trading decision must involve relatively large blocks of
shares. Lower level staff are not permitted to perform discretionary trading.
When higher level management reaches a decision, the decision must be major
enough to justify their attention. This built-in institutional bias in favor of large
block trades means that mutual funds must regularly offer discounts whenever they
buy or sell. The investor who consistently discounts on both sides of the market,
however, will rarely outperform the market. The alternative, spreading purchases
or sales over many transactions, merely increases the likelihood of imitation. Fifth,
mutual funds commonly share the same investment objectives. A trade meeting
one firm's objective is likely to meet other firms' objectives. When a mutual fund
decides to sell one particular stock because of changing industry conditions, it will
often find that other funds have also decided to sell the same stock, along with
close substitutes. Similarly, when one mutual fund buys in one industry, others
will as well. This continuous competition further reduces the return any mutual
can expect. Sixth, successful performance in one year attracts large numbers of
new investors to the mutual fund the following year, increasing market effects,
competitive imitation, and bureaucratic inertia, and, consistently with diminishing
returns to scale, decreasing the likelihood that such superior performance will be
continued commensurately with the increase in mutual share price caused by new
investors. Finally, mutuals make up such a large proportion of the market that it
is saying very little to assert that they do not outperform the market. Given the
institutional constraints burdening mutuals' performance, the real mystery is why
they perform as well as they do.
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position.145
Studies of the trading performance of corporate insiders also
suggest that nonpublic information at times can enable its possessor
to outperform the market. One set of studies analyzed insider
transactions disclosed in the SEC Official Summary of Securities
Transactions and Holdings, published pursuant to section 16(b) of
the 1934 Act. 46 The evidence consistently showed that securities
prices rose after periods of intensive insider buying and fell after
periods of intensive insider selling. These effects allowed insiders,
and those who observed insider transactions, to outperform the
market after transaction costs. 14 7 Even the trader who acts on the
An additional problem with the ECMH tests, particularly the strong form tests
which attempt to evaluate the performance of mutual funds, stems from un-
certainty regarding measurement. Where market indices are used, choice of the
relevant index determines the outcome of any comparison. In 1977, for instance,
the American Stock Exchange Index rose 16.4%; the NASDAQ OTC Composite rose
7.3%; the Value Line Composite (mostly comprised of NYSE companies) rose 0.5%;
the NYSE Composite declined 9.3%; the Standard and Poor's 500 declined 9.3%; and
the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined 17.3%. H. KYU'xu, supra note 48, at
325. Unless one arbitrarily chooses one index, or a composite of indices, as a
proxy for "market performance," one cannot specify what performance outperforms
the market. Even when researchers have not relied upon existing indices but have
instead constructed their own, problems with respect to the correct standard of
measurement persist. Friend, for instance, found that the average annual rate of
return (compounded annually) on investment in 136 mutual funds was 10.7% from
January 1960 through June 1968; equal investment in all NYSE listed stocks would
have earned a 12.4% return over the same period, while investment in all stocks in
amounts proportional to initial market value would have earned a 9.9% return. L
FmED, M. BLumE & I. CnocxETr, supra note 9, at 19. See also Murray, supra note
105, at 19 (large companies dominate market-weighted index and do better in
downturn, worse in upturn).
145 Elia, Mutual Funds' 10-Year Performance to Sept. 30 Outdid Industrials
and S&P 500, Survey Finds, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1980, at 27, col. 4. See also
Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 21, col 2 (Investment Company Institute report
that average gain on year for mutuals was a supracompetitive 31% to December 24,
1980). Compare studies suggesting that even if some mutual funds consistently
outperform the market, available statistical tools, including least squares regression
analysis, are too crude to discern them. E.g., J. VALENTE IT, INvEsTMENT ANALYSrs
AND CAPrrA. MumT THER Y 17 (1975) ("It is statistically impossible to deter-
mine the presence or absence of a small number of capable managers if the universe
of all other managers has random performance"); Hodges & Brealey, Portfolio
Selection in a Dynamic and Uncertain World, 29 FIANcrArA ALTsS J. 50
(March/April 1973) (even extra returns of 5% per year must be continued for 25
years to be detected at the 95% confidence level); Murphy, supra note 103, at 10
("the statistical tools generally used to search for consistently good performance
are too weak to find it"); Trieschman & Monroe, Investment Performance of
Property-Liability Insurers Common Stock Portfolios, J. Rlsx & INsUANCE, Dec.
1972, at 545 (unable to discern statistically significant performance differences
among different funds).
146 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
147 See, e.g., H. Wu, ConpoRaTE INssnxa TRaaNco, PaorrmAnnmr, AND SToCx
P cE MOVEumrr" (1963); Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider
Trading, 5 Bm.L J. EcoN. & MANAEmENT Sms. 93 (1974); Wu, An Economist
Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 CoLUM . L. Thv.
260 (1968); WiV, supra note 99, at 373.
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Official Summary two months after its release can earn abnormal
returns. 14 One could infer from this evidence that insiders have
nonpublic information which allows them to make more accurate
predictions about their firms' prospects than the ordinary outsider.
On the other hand, because the pattern of insider trades is officially
disclosed within six days following each trade by an insider, one
might conclude that outsiders imitate insider trading activities and
that news of insider purchases automatically will increase the market
price, just as news of insider sales automatically will decrease it,
whether or not the insider actually has any nonpublic information.
Scholes' study on the information content of secondary issues might
appear to support the imitation theory. 149 Scholes found, however,
that the information content of insider transactions led to price
variations of only one to two per cent,'"0 while the section 16(b)
studies have found price changes of up to ten per cent. 151 Accord-
ingly, these strong form studies suggest that insiders do earn superior
returns, beyond what can be explained by imitative trading, by
using nonpublic information before it is incorporated into market
prices. 52
Finally, a study of the marketmaking activities of New York
Stock Exchange specialists demonstrated that specialists possess non-
14 8 Boland, Canny Insiders: It Usually Pays to Follow Their Lead, BARRON'S,
Jan. 26, 1981, at 9 (highly profitable insider purchases of Bangor Punta, Chicago
Milwaukee, Clorox, Lear Siegler, Consolidated Foods, Collins Foods; "timely stock
accumulation by corporate insiders is one of Wall Street's perennial coincidences");
Wall St. ., Oct. 8, 1980, at 37, col. 4 ("analysts are watching the current selling
surge nervously because when the collective action of insiders is so one-sided,
it tends eventually to be right"); Zweig, Canny Insiders: Their Transactions Give a
Clue to Market Performance, BARRoN's, June 21, 1976, at 4. See also Jaffe, Special
Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974) (finding that price
residuals rose 5% in eight months after intensive insider purchases, with 3% occurring
during last six months; suggesting that market is not very efficient at incorporating
news of insider trades, and that it clearly does not do so instantaneously); Pratt &
DeVere, Relationship Between Insider Trading and Rates of Return for NYSE
Common Stocks, 1960-66, iN MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
268 (J. Lorie & R. Brealey eds. 1972).
149 Scholes, supra note 130.
150 Id. 200.
151 See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 148, at 427.
152 Reliance on the SEC's Of icial Summary of Securities Transactions and
Holdings, which reports transactions by insiders in their firms' securities disclosed
pursuant to section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, has caused these insider studies to
underestimate the potential gains from trading on inside information. Because of
the risk of liability under rule lOb-5 for use of inside information, and under
section 16(b) for short sales and short-swing profits, not all transactions by insiders
are reported pursuant to section 16(b). In addition, numerous transactions fall
outside the scope of section 16(b), such as transactions in which shares are
obtained by gift or in connection with a debt previously contracted and transactions
by tippees.
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public information before it is incorporated into market price and
that they use this information to earn superior profits. 153 Although
the specialist normally discloses his highest bid and his lowest ask,
he cannot disclose other unexecuted buy and sell orders. 54 He
can, however, use such information as a guide to the likely direction
of price changes when trading for his own account.155 Niederhoffer
and Osborne found that specialists sell above their last purchase
and buy below their last sale on more than 81% of their trans-
actions, suggesting that nonpublic information on the specialist's
book carries a significant potential for profit.'i 6
As attention shifts from the random walk or weak form ECMH,
through the semi-strong form, to the strong form, evidence tending
to show capital market inefficiencies grows. Although weak form
studies suggest that chartist methods, filter schemes, and other
methods of extrapolating from past prices cannot provide much
information beyond what is already reflected in market prices, even
in this area the evidence is not wholly conclusive; analysis of past
price trends can, in some cases, produce slightly supracompetitive
profits, at least before transaction costs.' 57 Much of the evidence
cited in support of semi-strong efficiency may be explained on other
15 3 Niederhoffer & Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Ex-
change, 61 J. Am. STATSTICAL A. 879 (1959).
'541934 Act, § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. §78k(b) (1976).
155 See text accompanying notes 294-99 infra.
1'6 Niederhoffer & Osborne, supra note 153, at 908. See also Eiteman, The
S.E.C. Special Study and the Exchange Markets, 21 J. FnANCrE 311 (1966) (supra-
competitive profits earned by specialists and floor traders).
157The failure of academic researchers to identify a method of profitably
analyzing historical price changes or newly-emergent public information, moreover,
does not prove that such methods do not exist or are not being used. See, e.g.,
J. LoRm & M. HAMImTON, supra note 70, at 82 (although researchers have not
found one, it is "quite possible that there exists some select method of looking at
these data which does produce superior investment results"). The ECMH, if
valid, implies that academic researchers could never identify a method of analysis
which consistently produces superior results, even if several existed. If, by chance,
a superior method of analysis became available to academic researchers for testing,
it would necessarily be a part of the public domain and its implications would
already be incorporated into stock prices. No one could earn supracompetitive
profits by using such a scheme even if the market is otherwise inefficient. Proof
that recognized trading schemes of sufficient standing to merit testing do not
produce a supracompetitive return therefore does not demonstrate that there are
no market inefficiencies, or that there are not less well-known schemes which do
produce superior results. Analysts who possess what they believe are successful
trading schemes know they can remain successful only so long as they are secret.
See, e.g., B. LEv, supra note 103, at 222 ("well-known" and "proved" analytical
tools, such as those suggested in security analysis texts or offered to the public
by investment houses, are probably useless by the time they are published). In
short, researchers will test only what cannot work. Cf. 4 J. PoaTFo.o MANAGE-
3MrIT (Fall 1977) (series of articles testing and verifying profitability of novel
technical and fundamental trading schemes).
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grounds. At most, the semi-strong form studies show that the in-
formation content of key disclosures, such as corporate earnings
announcements, normally reaches investors via more timely sources
such as extrapolation from interim reports or insider trading. They
do not show that the market is efficient with respect to all other
public information. Finally, the strong form tests have failed to
demonstrate that investors possessing nonpublic information can-
not earn superior returns. The strong form tests have shown in-
stead that insiders, specialists, and perhaps others use nonpublic
information to outperform the market and that the average investor
may earn supracompetitive profits merely by trading as they do.
In short, although the market appears reasonably efficient at reflect-
ing historical price information in current prices, the evidence
suggests that it is less efficient with respect to current developments,
and noticeably inefficient with respect to nonpublic information"'55
By relying largely on New York Stock Exchange price data,
moreover, the ECMH studies have necessarily overstated the rela-
tive efficiency of the national capital markets in general. The New
York Stock Exchange is the most efficient capital market in the
world, particularly with respect to major stocks that continuously
engage investor attention. The ECMH studies, however, do not
168 Given the varying routes by which valuable information makes its way to
market, the varying speeds with which it travels, and the varying ways it can be
analyzed, that different types of information are impounded into stock prices at
varying speeds and with varying degrees of accuracy accords with the common
sense of securities professionals. There is, in addition, considerable anecdotal evi-
dence confirming the existence of significant inefficiencies. See, e.g., Bernstein, In
Defense of Fundamental Analysis, 31 FINANCIL ANAYsTs J. 57 (Sept./Oct. 1975)
(balance sheet weaknesses that caused Consolidated Edison to miss a 1974 dividend
were evident for years; nevertheless, market reacted as if missed dividend were
new information); Smidt, A New Look at the Random Walk Hypothesis, 3 J.
FNANcIAL & QuANrrAN ET ANALysrs 235 (1968) (Control Data stock drops
11% two days after lower earnings announced at annual meeting); Williamson,
Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, in EcoNoMIc PoLicY AND TnE
R EULATioN oF CosuouATE SEcunarm, supra note 64, at 332 (market, and even
customer Ford Motor Company, failed to perceive supracompetitive profits earned
by Champion Spark Plug Company). Other well known.examples of inefficiency
are the market's failures to anticipate the collapse of the Penn Central, the bank-
ruptcy of W.T. Grant, and the near-bankruptcy of New York City, even though
the imminence of each of these events was apparent from a cursory perusal of
accounting information or the newspapers. As these cases indicate, the market
may be especially inefficient with respect to bad news, because the securities
industry is generally biased toward advising purchases rather than sales, overlooking
profitable opportunities for short sales. In addition, short-selling is more com-
plicated than buying and is in some cases prohibited. Because the sell side is
more inefficient and the opportunities for profit there are greater, the most
aggressive Wall Street hedge funds are often short sellers. See Ellis, The Loser's
Game, 31 FiNANCIAL ANALYsTs J. 19 (Mar./Apr. 1975); Miller, How to Win at
the Loser's Game, 4 J. PonTFoLo MANA EmENT 17 (Summer 1978); Miller, Risk,
Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 22 J. FNA CE 1151 (1977).
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show that the market for all New York Stock Exchange stocks is
equally efficient. The market is clearly less efficient with respect to
the shares of small issuers not closely followed by major investment
media.159 The relative lack of efficiency on regional exchanges, on
foreign exchanges, and in the over-the-counter market also have
attracted increasing investor attention. ECMH studies do not sup-
port the conclusion that the nation's capital markets are equally
efficient with respect to all types of securities, on all exchanges, at
all times. 160
15 9 The Financial Analysts Federation reported to the SEC in 1977 that
professional analysts were following only 10% of the companies reporting under the
1934 Act. H. Kirupx, supra note 67, at 85-86.
160Infirmities in the theoretical foundations underlying the ECMH further
undermine the conclusions of ECMH theorists. Samuelson and Mandelbrot showed
that a market will be efficient under conditions of perfect competition that con-
cededly do not fit reality. Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased
Markets, and "Martingale" Models, 39 J. Bus. 242 (1966); Samuelson, Proof that
Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INvUs. MANAGCEMENT REv. 41
(Spring 1965). Fama, however, has argued that these conditions are sufficient but
not necessary to guarantee efficiency and has suggested a diluted set of necessary
conditions. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, supra note 102, at 387-88. Even assuming Fama's theory to be correct,
several studies conclude that market activity does not conform even to these diluted
conditions. See generally, Downes & Dyckman, A Critical Look at the Eflicient
Market Empirical Research Literature As It Relates to Accounting Information, 48
AccoUmTING REv. 300, 309-16 (1973) (existence in capital markets of, inter alia,
monopoly power, information costs, taxes, and transaction costs).
Although Fama may have rescued market efficiency by substantially diluting
its factual predicates, no one has rescued by similar means the theoretical keystone
of the ECMH and all its tests-the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). See
Lintuer, The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REv. ECON. & STATSTICS 13 (1965);
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions
of Risk, 19 J. FINANCE 425 (1964). Each of the most sophisticated ECMH studies
has relied on the CAPM to compare returns for differing securities and portfolios.
Because perfect efficiency is one of the conditions required to validate the CAPM,
however, the CAPM in effect presumes efficiency. Perfect efficiency is also one
of the conditions required to validate the Markowitz-Sharpe Market Model
(MSMM), upon which the CAPM is based. See Sharpe, A Simplified Model for
Portfolio Analysis, 9 MANAGENMENT Scr. 277 (1963). According to Lorie and
Hamilton, the chasm between these necessary conditions and reality may
seem "so absurd that the model itself appears unworthy of serious consideration."
J. Lonm & M. HAmIrToN, supra note 70, at 200. See also T. CoPELAMW & J.
WESTON, supra note 103, at 210. Empirical tests of the validity of the CAPM have
shown that it cannot reliably measure investment performance. See, e.g., CAurs
RrVER AssocIAEs, supra note 47, at 309-22 (rejecting use of CAPM in venture
capital study); Black, Jensen & Scholes, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some
Empirical Tests, in Sr-rEs IN THEORY OF CAPITAL MAIETs, supra note 103,
at 79; Jackson, Market Psychology and the PSI Theory, 4 J. PORTFoLo MANAGE-
,MNT 35 (Summer 1978); Jensen, The Foundations and Current State of Capital
Market Theory, in STUDIEs IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MAmKETs, supra note 103,
at 3; Miller & Scholes, Rates of Return in Relation to Risk: A Re-examination of
Some Recent Findings, in STUDIEs IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKES, supra
note 10.3, at 47.
A similar source of bias in the ECMH tests is their reliance on a micro-
economic theory of pricing (of which the CAPM and the MSMM are merely two
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Although Professor Posner and others 161 have viewed the
ECMH studies as proof that aggressive trading schemes cannot out-
perform the market, leaving index funds that attempt to mimic the
market as the only prudent investment strategy, the evidence does
not fairly support that conclusion. While the ECMH studies have
demonstrated that potential gains from research, analysis, and quick
trading are greatly exaggerated in the popular literature, they have
not shown that such activities are a complete waste. Research
activity based solely on public information can under some circum-
stances pay for itself. The greatest gains, however, are likely to
come through possession of inside information or other forms of
nonpublic information, including outside information, that have
not yet been incorporated into market prices.
The existence of perfect efficiency normally creates an almost
irrebuttable presumption against regulation, because perfect effi-
ciency is more likely than regulation to provide pareto optimality.
If the ECMH were completely valid, and capital markets were per-
fectly efficient, there would be no need for regulation because the
existence of market prices incorporating all relevant information
would make manipulation and fraud theoretically impossible.
Where the market is not perfectly efficient, however, there is no
irrebuttable presumption against regulation. Regulatory action,
which in a perfectly efficient market would cause a net loss of ef-
ficiency, may be justified if it offsets existing inefficiencies. In a
monopolistic market, for instance, regulation may offset monop-
olistic inefficiency, leading to a more efficient result than would
obtain in the absence of regulation. 62
Given the existence of varying degrees of inefficiency in the
nation's capital markets, the ECMH studies do not support the
claim that the 1933 and 1934 Acts' system of compelled disclosure
of many implied conclusions), which must itself rely on an assumption of efficient
markets for its validity. Microeconomic theory posits that in a market with no
observable inefficiencies, equilibrium price will provide the best indicator of value.
Economists assume that price is always the best indicator of value and generally
incorporate other efficiency assumptions, such as the equivalency between price,
marginal cost, and expected return, in a variety of subsidiary calculations necessary
to design tests of any economic phenomena, including efficient markets. By the
time a test of inefficiency is constructed, it is built on many layers that assume
efficiency for their validity. The CAPM and the MSMM are only two components of
sophisticated economic analysis that take life from the assumption that markets are
efficient.
261 E.g., Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1 AM.
B. FOUNDATON tsu ncIr J. 1 (1976); Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and
Trust-Investment Law: 11, 2 Am. B. FouNDATIoN REsEARcH J. 1 (1977).
162 See, e.g., Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis
in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the
Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wrs. L. Rlv. 950.
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is superfluous. All available information does not reach the mar-
ket in advance of compelled disclosure. Trading on insider reports
filed pursuant to section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, for instance, can
lead to supracompetitive profits, suggesting that other reports also
may contain new bits of valuable information that otherwise would
not be disclosed. Even if it were shown that 1933 and 1934 Act
filings contained no new information, these filings nevertheless may
improve market efficiency by inducing and acting as a check on
other disclosures. Corporate officers know that at some point they
must provide accurate information in compliance with reporting
requirements. The incentive to delay disclosure of material infor-
mation or to disclose misleading information is therefore reduced,
as either activity soon would be exposed.1 3  If there were no re-
quired 1933 and 1934 Act filings acting as a check on earlier dis-
closures, investors could not place as much faith as they do in
.alternative and often more timely media. Even convincing proof
that investors do not rely directly on official filings, but instead
anticipate their content by seeking out other sources, cannot demon-
strate that compelled disclosure under the 1933 and 1934 Acts does
not indirectly contribute to market efficiency. Finally, the existence
of significant inefficiencies with respect to inside information and
other forms of nonpublic information belies the twin ECMH claims
that insiders do not possess a trading advantage and that outsiders
can never be cheated because the market price at which they trans-
-act will always reflect all information.
The 1933 Act registration requirements are a good example
of the way regulation aimed at a particular source of inefficiency
can produce a more efficient result. In the case of new issues, in-
formation about the issuer is not generally available. A new issuer
has not filed 1934 Act reports, may have no public earnings history,
and may not have received close attention from analysts. Without
registration, the new issuer comes to market as a mystery, holding
a monopoly on information about itself, a monopoly that can be
broken only if some investors are willing to incur substantial trans-
action costs. Because laissez faire here will lead to significant in-
efficiencies, the second best solution is to require registration and
disclosure by the issuer, who is the least-cost information gatherer
and discloser. Allowing investors to enforce these provisions creates
.a countervailing power that will offset the inefficiency arising from
the issuer's monopolistic control over information about itself.
Because the issuer ordinarily will possess information about itself
103 See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
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for other reasons, compelled disclosure will not reduce the total
amount of information produced. By restricting regulation to a
specific area of inefficiency, the 1933 Act registration provisions
neutralize that inefficiency without disturbing other areas of the
market that may be efficient.Y6
Although trading on outside information also involves exploita-
tion of an informational monopoly apparently inconsistent with
perfect information and efficiency, close examination of costs and
benefits does not support increased regulatory action in this area.
On the benefits side, requiring disclosure of outside information
will minimize or remove trading losses experienced by investors
who trade with persons possessing valuable outside information.
Because these trading losses are exactly counterbalanced by the
trading gains earned by those who possess outside information,
however, these losses are of no consequence unless the law, for
independent reasons, favors the uninformed or disfavors all such
transfers. Trading on outside information might, for instance,
offend established notions of fair play, thereby undermining in-
vestor confidence in the securities markets. The perceived need
to encourage investor confidence is generally cited as the most im-
portant justification for the prohibition against insider trading.
Yet the available evidence suggests that many investors trade on
inside information coming into their possession and that they expect
others to do so as part of the gamble of investing in the stock
market.165 One may reasonably ask whether the effort to instill
confidence actually misleads the unsophisticated by suggesting that
164 This analysis also applies in varying degrees to regulation of proxy contests
and tender offers.
165 See, e.g., Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 28 Mn. L. REv. 189, 190 (1968) ("great prevalence" of insider
trading); Pollack, Book Review, 90 Hsiv. L. REv. 482, 485 (1976) ("general
agreement" at securities conference "that insider trading is widespread"); BusnEss
Wx, Nov. 5, 1979, at 83, col. 3 ("insider trading goes on all the time"); Wall
St. J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 37, col 4 (SEC learns of and investigates "minuscule"
portion of insider trading); Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1980, at 29, col 4 (insider trading
"widespread").
In a Harvard Business Review survey on businessmen's ethics, 42% of the
businessmen sampled said they would trade on advance news of a merger, and 62%
believed that the average executive would. The author concluded that "[aictual
business practice . . . is probably closer to what respondents say 'the average
executive would do' . . . than it is to what they say 'I would do."' Baumhart,
How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HalV. Bus. RPv. 6, 16-21 (1961). Commis-
sioner Cary concluded from this evidence that there was a "surprising, and perhaps
shocking, number of executives [who] feel that it is perfectly reasonable conduct
to use inside information for their personal benefit." Cary, The Direction of
Management Responsibility, 18 Bus. LAw. 29, 33 (1962). See also sources cited
at notes 147-48 supra; Jaffe, supra note 148 (tightened enforcement of insider
trading rules after Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur had no statistically
significant effect on insider trading).
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the stock market is a more secure investment than it really is.160
In any event, the argument from fairness and confidence becomes
even more attenuated with respect to outside information, because
use of outside information presents less of a conflict with fiduciary
duties and investor expectations.
The costs of overbroad regulation of outsider trading, however,
are potentially more significant. The absence of perfect efficiency
implies that existing resource allocation can be improved. Capital
markets will be made more efficient and resource allocation will be
improved if information can be brought to market and incorporated
into security prices more quickly. Giving possessors of outside in-
formation a right to trade without disclosure will preserve the
necessary incentives. While corporations necessarily produce in-
formation about themselves, production of outside information de-
pends on the existence of sufficient rewards. If a general duty to
disclose valuable outside information were imposed on investors,
the problems associated with the public good aspect of outside in-
formation would threaten to extinguish the incentives necessary
for private analysis. Although making outside information freely
available would, in the abstract, maximize the increasing returns
to scale associated with information production, no outside infor-
mation will be produced without some financial incentive to the
producer.
1 67
166 Increased investor participation in the stock market benefits public corpora-
tions directly, by increasing the supply of capital available in the equity markets
.and thereby lowering corporations' cost of capital.
167 In addition, regulation of trading on outside information imposes on soci-
ety the usual administrative and enforcement costs associated with government in-
tervention in the economy. See, e.g., Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation,
-and the Stock Market, in EcoNomirc PoLicy AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE
SEftcurrms, supra note 64, at 1; Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework
for Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 107 (1979).
The theory of comparative advantage, and its derivative, the theory of least-
cost avoidance, see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAv. L. REv. 1089 (1972), do not
support increased regulation of outsider trading. Arguably, if one views outsider
trading as fraudulent and therefore costly, the person who possesses the outside
information should disclose his information and thereby avoid these ill effects more
cheaply than anyone else can by ferreting it out. Placing a burden of disclosure
on the possessor of outside information will also apparently minimize transaction
and negotiation costs, as the possessor can unilaterally disclose the information.
In determining the cost to the knowledgeable party of preventing error (by
disclosing information), however, the investment that has been made in acquiring
the information also must be counted. This investment will represent a net loss
to the possessor of outside information and an increase in transaction costs if the
other party can enforce a duty of disclosure. On this analysis, the possessor of
outside information is not necessarily the cheapest cost avoider. More importantly,
because outsider trading brings benefits that outweigh its costs, we should seek no
least-cost avoider. Imposing a duty to disclose on grounds of comparative advan-
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Trading on outside information does not create inefficiency;
rather, it is one of the ways in which the market removes informa-
tional inefficiencies and corrects itself. In theory, an efficient
market reflects all relevant information. In practice, an efficient
market preserves incentives for the collection and incorporation
into prices of all information. The available evidence suggests that
the most sophisticated trading strategy, and the one most likely to
contribute to efficiency, depends on exploitation of outside informa-
tion not so public as to be impounded into prices; trading on any
other information is either illegal or largely a waste of time. The
SEC, however, has sought to regulate and in many cases prohibit
use of outside information. The SEC contends that all traders must
trade solely on the basis of public information that, to varying de-
grees, is already incorporated into existing prices and therefore
offers little, if any, opportunity for gain. Ironically, the SEC would
permit only the least sophisticated form of trading and the one
least likely to contribute significantly to an efficient allocation of
resources.
tage in avoiding cost will instead interfere with a comparative advantage in cre-
ating benefits. Market incentives are the cheapest way to bring valuable informa-
tion to market. Rather than giving the nonpossessor of outside information a right
to require disclosure, efficient allocation requires recognizing in the possessor of
outside information a right to trade without a special risk of liability.
Although the Coase Theorem, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
EcoN. 1 (1960), states that an efficient allocation will result independently of the
location of property rights and the imposition of liability in a world with perfect
information and without transaction costs, the existence of informational inefficien-
cies and transaction costs requires that the property right in outside information
be left with its possessor. If there were perfect information and no transaction
costs, the location of property rights and potential liability for fraud would have
no effect because fully informed investors would freely transact at a market price
reflecting all information, making fraud impossible, even if it could be hidden
consistently with full information. In addition, in a market that is ex hypothesis
efficient there is no need for incentives to search out special information. But
where informational efficiencies and transaction costs exist and prices do not reflect
all information, investors will search out information necessary to reduce inefficiency
only if the search brings a return. The search will bring a return only if the
possessor of outside information has a right to trade on it. The structure of prop-
erty rights and liability rules therefore makes a difference. In addition, although
Coase acknowledged that perfect information and the absence of transaction costs
were essential predicates to his theorem, so are the other aspects of perfect com-
petition and efficient markets. If some actors possess monopoly power, for instance,
an efficient allocation will not result independently of the location of property rights
and liability; strategic placement of property rights and liability will in some cases
exacerbate and in other cases offset inefficiencies created by monopoly power and
other sources of inefficiency. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra (distribution
of initial entitlements and wealth may interfere with pareto optimality when market
is otherwise efficient); Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto
Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN.
L. tEv. 1 (1975) (externalities and consumer irrationalities may interfere with
pareto optimality when market is otherwise efficient).
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II. LEGAL APPROACHES TO OUTSIDE INFORMATION
In its approach to trading advantages based on inside and out-
side information, the SEC has traditionally focused on fairness and
equity, and has given these concerns at least equal weight with
efficiency. The SEC's emphasis on fairness appears most clearly in
its advocacy of a regime of equality, in which all investors trade on
the basis of equal information, or at least equal access to all avail-
able information. The SEC's advocacy of an equal access or parity-
of-information rule can be traced to Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,
the case in which the Second Circuit accepted the SEC's argument
that "[t]he essential objective of securities legislation is to protect
those who do not know market conditions from the overreaching
of those who do." "I" In Cady, Roberts & Co., SEC Chairman Cary
emphasized "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of [inside] information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing." 169 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
the Second Circuit endorsed the SEC contention that rule 1Ob-5 is
"'based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information .... ," 170 The
Second Circuit once again accepted this argument in Chiarella v.
United States.171 In its rule 19b-2 release, the SEC identified as a
major policy goal "the removal or limitation of the special trading
advantages which any one group or classification of investors holds
over another." 172 More recently, the SEC's tender offer rules seem
to proceed from a parity-of-information premise. 173 Although on
168 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
16940 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
170401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
171588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See
also Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 462 (2d
Cir. 1968) (Waterman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Birdman
v. Electro-Catheter Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Courtland v.
Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); Faberge, Inc., SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 10,174 (May 25, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 7 79,378; Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
172SEC Exchange Act Release 9950 (Jan. 17, 1973), [1973] SEc. REG. &
L. RPu. (BNA) No. 185 at 31. Cf. Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 648
(Commissioner Smith concurring) (focus of rule 10b-5 "should continue to be upon
the conduct of corporate insiders and their privies ... rather than upon a concept
of relative informational advantages").
173SEC Rule 14e-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,418 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3). See generally A. BromBmEG, FRAUD: SEC RuLE 10b-5 § 12.2 (1978).
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occasion there have been suggestions that the Commission has not
adopted a policy of absolute equality of information for all in-
vestors, 174 it has, particularly in litigation, consistently endorsed a
policy requiring equal access.
175
This parity policy has fueled the SEC's historic antagonism
toward the use of outside information. A policy which seeks
equality cares little whether inequalities stem from inside or out-
side information. Parity does not demand the existence of a
fiduciary or analogous relationship to require disclosure. 176 The
SEC, as a result, has sought to regulate the use of outside informa-
tion by tender offerors, specialists, floor traders, institutional in-
vestors, and other market professionals, and has sought to prohibit
certain uses by others, such as printers, government officials, and
columnists. If construed to prohibit all informational advantages,
however, the parity policy will lead to overregulation and inhibition
of the research and analysis essential to market efficiency. Even if
construed to require only theoretically equal access to relevant in-
formation, the parity policy risks overbreadth: the best proof of
unequal access is most likely to be unequal results. Commentators
have therefore viewed such a policy with caution, and the Supreme
Court has explicitly rejected it.
177
Although many economists have advocated a laissez faire policy
permitting unfettered exploitation of outside (and, in some cases,
inside) informational advantages, and the SEC has generally advo-
cated a policy of market egalitarianism and disclosure, legal scholars
174 See, e.g., P. Loomis, Some Reflections on Rule 10b-5 and Market Informa-
tion, supra note 41, at 12-13; Insider Trading: Some Questions and Some Answers,
I SEc. REc. L.J., 323, 335 (1974).
175 See, e.g., Lipton, Rule lOb-5: The End of Isolation and New Thresholds
of Materiality, in P EAcnmsm LAw INsTrrurE, SLXTH ANuAL hIsTrruTE ON SEcrum-
TiS EGULATION 311 (1974). Professor Loss has called this policy "market
egalitarianism." Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate
"Insiders" in the United States, 33 Mon. L. REv. 34, 35 (1970). See also
Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22
Sw. LJ. 731, 736 (1968) ("It is an egalitarian idea ... that all investors shall
'have relatively equal access to material information" ").
176 A variant of the parity policy is the special access test. Like the parity
policy, the access test is not sufficiently refined, since the question to be resolved
is when special access to certain non-issuer sources of nonpublic information creates
a duty to disclose.
177 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33. Perhaps because of the concerns raised in
the investment community by the SEC's advocacy of a parity theory, in 1973 the
Commission solicited comments with respect to "the appropriateness of utilizing
nonpublic material information directly related to the future market for a given
security, which does not emanate from or concern the issuer of that security." SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 10316 (August 1, 1973), [19731 214 SEC. REG. & L. RP.
(BNA) at D-1. Public response was almost uniformly negative. Commentators
argued that use of outside information should not be restricted, because of the
detrimental effects on market incentives and the impossibility of effective regulation.
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have tended to take a position somewhere in between. In their
groundbreaking 1973 article, Fleischer, Mundheim, and Murphy
suggested a modified "fairness" approach, which would require
balancing efficiency values against equality values implicated by
specific market activity.' s7 Looking to whether "it is fair for the
investor to trade on the basis of the superior knowledge he pos-
sesses," this approach would require "in each instance a careful
examination of the role of the party whose actions are complained
of, the nature of the alleged wrongdoing, and the expectations of
the aggrieved parties." 179 They recognized, however, that this
balancing approach would substitute for clear standards a "vague
guideline [which] . . . could place undesirable inhibitions on in-
vestor trading [and which] . . . easily blurs into acceptance of a
requirement of parity .... 1,"0 Accordingly, they concluded that
application of the fairness approach should require disclosure only
if such a duty is established by explicit legislation or a "special
relationship" between the parties.' 8 '
Two subcommittees of the American Bar Association articu-
lated a similar position in a 1973 "Comment Letter on Material,
Non-Public Information." 8 2 Rejecting at the outset "ultimate equal-
ity of information for investors," the ABA Comment Letter noted
that "not every failure to disclose material information constitutes
a violation of the antifraud rules." 's3 Rather than subject use of
outside information to a general duty of disclosure under rule 1 Ob-5,
the ABA Comment Letter concluded that "'a special relationship
between the parties' and an 'independent duty to disclose' is par-
ticularly important in imposing requirements or inhibitions to the
full utilization of 'outside facts.' " 18 Like the Supreme Court in
Chiarella, however, the ABA letter failed to indicate precisely what
relationships and circumstances would be sufficient to impose a
duty to disclose such outside facts.
More recently, Professor Brudney has advocated a rule barring
securities transactions whenever one party possesses an informational
advantage, regardless of the type of information or its source, that
178Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973).
179 Id. 817, 822.
180 Id. 817.
181 Id. 822.
182ABA Comment Letter on Material, Non-Public Information, reprinted in
11974] 233 SEC. P G. & L. REp. (BNA) D-1.
183 Id. D-2, D-6.
184 Id. D-6, quoting Landy v. FDIC, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP'.
(CCH) 794,094 (3d Cir. 1973).
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others cannot lawfully overcome11m Under this approach, investors.
cannot exploit "lawfully unerodable" informational advantages,
aside from information concerning their own actions.1 86 Possession
of any nontrivial outside information, however, confers what is in
effect an "unerodable" informational advantage.8 7 Brudney's ap-
proach, therefore, does little to advance analysis beyond the parity
position. Granted that use of public information is legitimate, the
question is whether and under what circumstances rule 1 Ob-5 should
prohibit trading on unerodable outside information. To the de-
gree that Brudney's formula suggests that an investor should never
be permitted to trade on outside information that others cannot
obtain through reasonable diligence, that formula is overbroad and
would interfere with the incentives necessary to maintain efficient
capital markets. Existing law permits, under specified circum-
stances, trading by stock exchange professionals, tender offerors,
institutional investors, investment bankers, and others despite their
possession of information the public could never duplicate by legal
means.1
88
Reliance on a concept of unerodable advantage introduces a
degree of uncertainty that exacerbates the overbreadth inherent in
this approach. Not only all nonpublic information, but also many
kinds of public information, once analyzed and refined, could be
construed to confer an unerodable advantage. Although Brudney
states that investment advice available only for a price is not for
that reason "lawfully unobtainable," 189 the investor who devotes
significant resources to market research, the airplane passenger who
sees a plant engulfed in flames, and even the inventor of a new oil
pump all possess informational advantages which in practice cannot
be lawfully overcome. For these reasons, among others, the
Supreme Court in Chiarella refused to endorse Brudney's analysis,
explicitly holding that rule lOb-5 does not prohibit use of all non-
public information or exploitation of all unerodable informational
advantages. 190
185 Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 H-Av. L. REv. 322 (1979).
186 Id. 357,376.
187 Brudney defines nonpublic information as "information that investors may
not lawfully acquire without the consent of the source." Id. 322 n.2. Nonpublic
information, however, may be both lawfully acquired and improperly used, as when
a corporate employee acquires corporate information for corporate purposes but
uses that information to obtain personal profits.
188 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233-34.
189 Brudney, supra note 185, at 361.
190 445 U.S. at 233. Justice Blackmun, however, endorsed Brudney's approach.
445 U.S. at 251-252 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code (the
Code) 191 has adopted a wait-and-see position with respect to outside
information, so long as it is not used by a corporate insider or his
tippee. Section 1603 of the Code makes it unlawful to trade on the
basis of any nonpublic information in the securities of an issuer as
to which the trader is an insider or tippee of an insider, whether
the information be inside information emanating from the issuer
or outside information obtained from other sources.192  Under
the Code, an insider trading in his company's shares can no longer
hope to avoid liability by showing that he obtained nonpublic in-
formation only from outside sources with no relation to his com-
pany. Although the Code apparently provides an expanded concept
of insider liability, it will in practice have a negligible effect, be-
cause insiders rarely obtain valuable information about their com-
pany's securities except by virtue of their position with the com-
pany.1
93
Although the Code imposes liability on insiders for trading on
any nonpublic information, it makes no provision for imposing
liability on outsiders for use of outside information beyond section
1602(a)(1)'s prohibition of any "fraudulent act." Professor Loss,
the Code's reporter, states in his commentary to section 1603 that
"it is hard to find justification today for imposing a fiduciary's duty
of affirmative disclosure on an outsider who is not a 'tippee.' . .
Section 1603 reflects no universally applicable theory of 'market
egalitarianism.' "14 Loss believed it would be "convenient" to
have a new category of quasi-insiders to cover persons with special
access to sources of outside information, but he found it "difficult
in the abstract to opine even on illustrative cases" and concluded
that "this area must be left to further judicial development." 195
Some development occurred with the emergence of the "market
insider" concept in the Second Circuit's opinion in Chiarella. The
Supreme Court's rejection of that approach, however, requires the
development of new principles to deal with the problems posed by
trading on outside information.
191 ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Mar. 1978 Draft) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
192 See also CODE, supra note 191, § 1603, Comment 2(j).
193 Even if the insider obtains information about his employer independently of
his relationship with the company, common law fiduciary principles may require
disclosure of all material information to shareholders when trading. See RESTATE-
mT (SEcoND) Or ToRTs § 551(2)(a) (1976).
194 CODE, supra note 191, § 1603, Comment 3(d).
195 Id.
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III. A PURPOSE TEST FOR OUTSIDER TRADING
A. The Common Law Approach
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, like other provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws, were designed in part to remedy perceived
defects in the common law. A plaintiff pursuing a common law
action for fraud or deceit was required to prove misrepresentation
of a material fact, as well as scienter, reliance, causation, privity,
and damages.19 Although there were exceptions, the early com-
mon law, grounded in an individualistic ethic and tradition of
caveat emptor, permitted exploitation of many informational ad-
vantages in trading, provided there was no affirmative misrepre-
sentation.197 According to Page Keeton, writing in 1936, "silence
or non-disclosure, however morally censurable it may be, cannot
constitute fraud." 191 Pure silence, as distinguished from a half-
truth, 99 is, even today, generally not actionable at common law,
unless one party "by concealment or other action intentionally
prevents the other from acquiring material information," 200 or is
under a duty to disclose "because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence .... ",201
196 Negligent misrepresentation did not support an action for damages. Derry
v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
19 7 See generally 1 F. I-IAnR & F. Jmss, TaE LAw oF TORTS § 7.14 (1956).
198 Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REv. 1
(1936). See also Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 E. & I. App. 377 (1873); 2 J. KENT,
COMmENTABIEs ON AMERICAN LAW *484-85 ("The common law affords to everyone
reasonable protection against fraud in dealing; but it does not go the romantic
length of giving indemnity against the consequences of indolence and folly, or a
careless indifference to the ordinary and accessible means of information"). Non-
disclosure was merely nonfeasance.
109See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus. Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (although there is no independent duty to
disclose in arm's length transaction, once defendant speaks, rule 10b-5 requires
that he speak the whole truth).
2 00RESTATEME-NT (SECOND) of TORTS § 550 (1976).
201 Id. § 551(2) (a). See generally G. BowEa, Tim LAw REI.ATNG TO ACToN-
ABLE NoN-DIsCLosURE (1915); J. KENT, supra note 198, at *482-92; W. STony,
A TREATISE oN = LAw OF CONTACTS §§ 516-24 (2d ed. Boston 1847). The
types of confidential or fiduciary relations that supported a duty to disclose were
confined within narrow limits, for example, principal and agent, trustee and cestui,
parent and child, guardian and ward, and attorney and client. The relationship of
tenants in common, for instance, did not in the absence of fraud carry with it a
duty of full disclosure. Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. 263, 27 A. 992 (1893). In
addition, certain types of contracts, such as those of suretyship and guaranty,
insurance, and partnership, were deemed to create confidential relations. See
generally G. BowER & A. TtmNE, Tim LAw OF ACTIONABLE IMISREPRESENTATION
102-03 (1974); W. PRossSE, Thm LAw oF TORTS 697 (4th ed. 1971). For addi-
tional isolated exceptions, see id. 697-98.
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In the well-known case of Laidlaw v. Organ,202 a New Orleans
tobacco merchant purchased a large quantity of tobacco at depressed
prices after receiving advance news of the Treaty of Ghent ending
the War of 1812. When the news of peace became public, and the
British lifted their blockade of New Orleans, the value of the
tobacco increased greatly. The Supreme Court held that failure to
disclose the news of peace did not constitute fraud. Similarly, if a
buyer knows that a railroad will soon be constructed near certain
property, failure to disclose this information when purchasing the
property is privileged.203 Another line of cases holds that a buyer
of real estate who knows of valuable minerals or other resources
underlying the property is not required to disclose his knowledge.2 4
Although a seller of real estate might be required to disclose to a
buyer latent defects,200 the seller is presumed to know what he is
selling and generally cannot enforce on the buyer any disclosure
obligation with respect to the property sold. Early common law
cases even allowed the seller to remain silent with respect to latent
defects, and in some states that doctrine has lasted well into this
century.
20
202 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
203 Boyd v. Leith, 50 S.W. 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899); Edwards v. Meyrick,
67 Eng. Rep. 25 (1842). See also Guaranty Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v.
Liebold, 207 Pa. 399, 56 A. 951 (1904) (information that a manufacturing com-
pany would locate nearby).
204 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Caples
v. Steel, 7 Or. 491 (1879); Fox v. Mackretb, 30 Eng. Rep. 148 (1788). See also
Hotchkin v. Third Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 329, 27 N.E. 1050 (1891) (buyer has no
duty to disclose insolvency when purchasing on credit). Cf. 3 S. Wrr.zusToN,
CoNTRAcTs § 1521, at 2707 (1920) (arguing buyer should have duty to disclose
insolvency when buying on credit).
205 See generally Gutelius v. Sisemore, 365 P.2d 732, 734 (Okla. 1961).
206 See, e.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d
808 (1942) (no duty to disclose termite infestation). See also Hendrick v. Lynn,
37 Del. Ch. 402, 144 A.2d 147 (1958); PBR Enterprises v. Perren, 243 Ca. 280,
253 S.E.2d 765 (1979); Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958);
Perin v. Mardine Realty Co., 5 A.D.2d 685, 168 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1957). By
contrast, the Roman law at one time apparently insisted upon full disclosure and a
strict equality of information. See G. Bowm, supra note 201, App. C, § 2. Cicero
cited a case where a trader sent corn from Alexandria to Rhodes where there was
a famine and sold the corn at vastly inflated prices, withholding the information
that he had passed on the way other ships loaded with corn heading for Rhodes.
Cicero argued that the law should not permit one to profit by such conduct because
it was against the law of nature for one man to profit by the ignorance of another.
See 3 M. Cicmo, DE OFricis (Loeb Classical Library 1975). The common law,
however, took a contrary view, and Cicero's theory was criticized by Pothier,
Grotius, Puffendorf, Kent, Story, and Fry. See G. Bowim, supra note 201, App.
C, § 2. Section 472(1)(b) of the REsTATEMuET oF CoTRcAvrs (1932), for instance,
provided that "there is no duty of disclosure, by a party who knows that the other
party is acting under a mistake as to undisclosed material facts, and the mistake
if mutual would render voidable a transaction caused by relying thereon . . . "
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Although the early common law permitted exploitation of a
variety of informational advantages, the later common law per-
mitted rescission in most cases of mutual mistake, 207 and also in
some cases of unilateral mistake where one party was mistaken and
his mistake was known (or should have been known) by the other
party.208 Kronman has suggested economic efficiency as a means of
rationalizing the common law privilege of nondisclosure with the
duty of disclosure in certain cases of unilateral mistake.20 9 He
argues that nondisclosure was permitted when the knowledge in-
volved was the product of a costly search, such as would normally
be the case when the information concerns market conditions or
the value of securities. 210  Allowing nondisclosure under these cir-
cumstances preserves incentives for desirable entrepreneurial ac-
tivity. By contrast, in cases requiring disclosure, such as cases
involving a unilateral mistake known to the other party or the
failure to disclose latent defects in real estate, the knowledgeable
party's informational advantage usually is not the fruit of a deliber-
ate search. Because such information typically emerges as the result
of mere chance, or would be acquired despite the imposition of a
duty to disclose, a disclosure requirement in these cases will con-
tribute to better informed transactions and efficiency without re-
ducing the amount of such information actually produced. 211  In
cases of unilateral mistake known to the other party, the party who
is aware of the mistake is the "last clear chance" cheaper-cost
avoider because he has made no investment in the information,
which will be produced whether or not there are legal incentives. 212
This analysis distinguishes insider trading from most cases of trad-
ing on outside information. Kronman does not examine common
law cases permitting rescission on the basis of mutual mistake, but
these cases also confirm the efficiency principle, because a transaction
in which both parties are under a misapprehension concerning the
true facts is likely to be an inefficient one. While this analysis does
not adequately explain the tendency of the common law to permit
2 0 7 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 502 (1932).
2 0 8 See 3 S. WLSTON, CONTRACTS § 1548 n.47, § 1557 n.89 (1920). See also
RESTATEMENT OF RIESTITUTION § 12 (1936). But see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§472 (1932).
209 Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. LE AL STUn. 1 (1978).
210 Id. 18. See, e.g., Leitch Gold Mines Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 1
Ont. 2d 469 (1969) (defendant, after discovering fabulously rich sulphide deposits
in Timmins, Ontario, privileged to buy adjoining land).
211 Kronman, supra note 209, at 9.
212 Id. 8.
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nondisclosure in situations where the knowledgeable party obtained
information fortuitously,2 1 3 it does suggest that efficiency concerns
played an important role in creating and limiting whatever dis-
closure duties were imposed. 14
Although the common law tolerated exploitation of many in-
formational advantages, it never condoned informational advantages
obtained by a tortious or illegal act, but denied to the wrongdoer
the fruits of his wrongdoing even if he otherwise would have been
permitted to exploit the type of informational advantage at issue.
According to Bower and Turner, "suppression by a purchaser of
facts affecting the value of the property which are not merely
within his own knowledge, but [are] the issue of his . . .wrongful
action, is equivalent to a misrepresentation." 215 In an early English
case, a purchaser of a mine concealed from the vendor information
he had obtained by secretly trespassing on the property and mining
the coal.216 Although ordinarily the purchaser would not be re-
quired to disclose what he knew about the value of the mine, the
court held that the trespass created a duty to disclose any informa-
tion so obtained. According to Keeton, "[a]ny time information is
acquired by an illegal act . . . there should be a duty to disclose
that information .... ,,217
In an analogous area, common law trade secret cases granted
relief when information was tortiously acquired, as by theft or
bribery. In Tabor v. Hoffman, a manufacturer wrongfully induced
a contractor possessing plaintiff's machinery patterns to allow him
to copy them. The court denied the manufacturer the benefits of
the information and awarded damages. According to the court,
"because this discovery may be by fair means, it would not justify
the use of unfair means, such as the bribery of a clerk." 213 In
213In Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817), for instance, the
Supreme Court found the nondisclosure to be privileged even though the information
was obtained by chance rather than through a costly search. Kronman suggests that
this result can nevertheless be justified on the ground that the type of market
information at issue in Laidlaw usually was obtained through a deliberate effort
and that a case-by-case analysis of market information cases to separate out instances
where the information was obtained fortuitously would not be worth the effort.
Kronman, supra note 209, at 17-18.
214 See generally M. HORWnIz, THE TIIANSFOMATION OF A_,mEHICaN LAW
(1978).
215 G. BowER & A. TuRNm:, supra note 201, at 107.
216 Phillips v. Homfray, L.R. 6 Ch. 770 (1871).
217 Keeton, supra note 198, at 25-26. Accord, 1 F. I-aPR & F. JAMES, supra
note 197, § 7.14, at 590.
218 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).
1981] 1363
1364 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp219 the court held that a third party who had
induced a geophysicist to disclose confidential information concern-
ing an oil company survey was a constructive trustee. According
to the Restatement of Torts, "[a]mong the means which are im-
proper are theft, trespass, bribing or otherwise inducing employees
or others to reveal the information in breach of duty, fraudulent
misrepresentations, threats of harm by unlawful conduct, wire tap-
ping, procuring one's own employees or agents to become employees
of the other for purposes of espionage, and so forth." 220
Prohibiting use of information obtained by an illegal or tortious
act is consistent with the common law's concern to promote eco-
nomic efficiency. A privilege to exploit information improperly
obtained would reduce the incentive to invest in legitimate infor-
mation production by exacerbating free rider problems and by
placing on producers the risk of misappropriation. Less informa-
tion would be produced, because at least some producers would
shift resources from additional production to theft of what others
had produced. In addition, tolerance of theft offends common
morality and undermines confidence in the fairness of the securities
markets, further decreasing economic efficiency.
Because officers, directors, and controlling shareholders do not
normally obtain inside information through illegal or tortious acts,
and were not, until recently, treated as fiduciaries, insiders who
purchased or sold stock in their corporation were generally not
subject to a duty to disclose at common law. The "majority," or
"strict," common law rule imposed on insiders a fiduciary obliga-
tion only to the corporation and not to its stockholders; insiders
could therefore trade in the securities of the corporation without
disclosure so long as there was no misrepresentation, half-truth, or
219 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943). Courts also have found for plaintiffs in
unfair competition cases in which defendants used knowledge that they themselves
did not obtain illegally or tortiously, but which they knew was revealed by mistake
or in breach of obligation. In Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co.,
210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904), for instance, the court held a manufacturer to be a
constructive trustee when a railroad that received blueprints from one of its sup-
pliers revealed them to the manufacturer in an effort to foster greater competition.
Even when disclosure was received innocently, and notice of breach of duty was
received only at a later time, the information was held to be inequitably retained.
See Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 542, 73 A. 603 (CL
Err. & App. 1909). See generally RESTATECENT OF REsnOrunoN § 201(2) (1936).
2 2 0 RESTATEMrr OF ToRTs § 759, Comment c (1939). See also Jackson v.
Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1920); In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F.2d 944, 951 (2d
Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949);
Midstate Amusement Corp. v. Rivers, 54 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Wash. 1944);
REsTATzmENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY §§ 388, 395 (1957) (agent must account to
principal for use of confidential information); REsTATmEMET OF REs 0UoN
§§ 200, 201 (1936); RE A TEMNT or To Ts § 757(a) (1939).
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active concealment.22 1  The "minority," or "fiduciary," rule, how-
ever, imposed on insiders a fiduciary obligation to both the corpo-
ration and its stockholders; in jurisdictions adhering to this newer
rule, insiders were treated as trustees and were required to disclose
all material facts before purchasing their company's securities.
2m
In Strong v. Repide, the Supreme Court adopted an intermediate
position, holding that the insider's duty of disclosure depended on
the existence of "special facts." 223
B. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Until recently, legal commentary, SEC administrative actions,
and decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary have charted an
almost unbroken expansion of the reach of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. Recent Supreme Court decisions cutting back on this trend,
however, have required closer attention to both the legislative his-
tory and language of these provisions. Neither give any indication
that these provisions were intended to expand upon the most pro-
gressive common law rules. Rather, the available evidence suggests
that section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 were intended to remedy perceived
deficiencies in the less restrictive common law rules by federalizing
the most progressive, without going beyond them to reach all out-
side information.
224
Section 10(b) was designed to deal primarily with manipulative
and deceptive devices that artificially affect stock prices, and not
221 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933);
4Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); Shaw v. Cole Mfg.
Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S.W. 479 (1915). The "strict' rule is, at least formally,
still the law in England. See Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421 (1920); Hull, Insider
Trading: An End to the Debate in Britain?, 17 Am. Bus. L.J. 85, 88 (1979).
222 See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Stewart v.
Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904).
223 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In Strong, the defendant was the controlling stock-
holder and general manager of a corporation that owned land in the Philippines.
Because of the government's failure to police guerrilla activity, the land was believed
virtually worthless. Defendant, however, had entered into negotiations to sell the
land to the United States government. Before the negotiations were completed,
he employed an agent, who did not disclose his principal, to buy the plaintiff's
shares for what proved to be one-tenth their value after the government purchase.
In the Court's view, although a duty of full disclosure would not be imposed on
all insiders, in Strong the insider's responsibility for the negotiations to sell the
corporate assets, his special knowledge of the company, and his efforts to conceal
his identity as purchaser were sufficient "special facts" to trigger a duty to disclose.
224The Administration's spokesman, Thomas Corcoran, devoted one sentence
in his congressional testimony to what is now section 10(b): "Subsection (c) says,
'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices."' Stock Exchange Regulation:
Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934). See also 6 L. Loss, supra
note 6, at 3528.
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with nondisclosure when trading on the basis of outside information
that does not artificially distort stock prices. The language now
comprising section 10(b) initially was included as section 9(c) of
the bills introduced in the Senate and House.225 Section 9 deals
with puts, calls, straddles, price pegs, short sales, wash sales, matched
orders, stop loss orders, and other devices that were commonly used
to manipulate prices.226  The original section 10(b) was aimed at
unforeseen means of achieving the same results. 227 Trading with-
out disclosure of outside information, by contrast, will move market
prices in the right direction rather than distort them. Although
there is evidence suggesting that Congress intended section 16(b) of
the 1934 Act 228 to be the exclusive sanction against insider trad-
ing,229 the judicially implied extension of section 10(b) to cover
insider trading does not expand on the common law, but is con-
sistent with reading section 10(b) as a federalization of the most
progressive common law rules.
Rule lOb-5 was adopted in response to an SEC Regional Ad-
ministrator's report regarding a corporate president who, while
misrepresenting that the corporation was faring poorly, purchased
shares shortly before the announcement that the corporation's
profits had quadrupled. The misrepresentation was fraud at com-
mon law. Realizing that the antifraud provisions contained in
section 17 of the 1933 Act applied only to the "offer or sale" of
securities, and not to their purchase, the Commission staff drafted
rule lOb-5 to close this perceived loophole. When the staff pre-
sented the new rule to the Commission, the only comment came
from Sumner Pike, who said "Well . . . we are against fraud,
aren't we?" 230 The explanatory SEC release stated that rule 10b-5
was adopted to close "a loophole in the protections against fraud
administered by the [SEC] by prohibiting individuals or companies
from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." 231
Nowhere did this release suggest that trading without disclosure of
225S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934); H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
22615 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
227 See Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d.
Sess. 115 (1934).
22815 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1976).
229 See generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 652-54 (1963).
230 ABA Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAw. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton Freeman, one of the rule's co-drafters).
231 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
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outside information might violate rule 1Ob-5 when it did not violate
any common law fraud rule.
If the wording of section 10(b),2 2 which is aimed at "manipu-
lative or deceptive" devices, suggests that its reach is limited to stock
manipulations and other devices that are deceptive within the mean-
ing of common law fraud or deceit, the wording of rule lOb-5 sug-
gests even more clearly an intent to proscribe activity unlawful
under the most progressive common law rules without going beyond
them. Rule l0b-5(a) and (c) prohibit "fraud" and "deceit." Rule
lOb-5(b) does not by its terms refer to fraud or deceit, but proscribes
misrepresentations and misleading half-truths which were illegal in
every jurisdiction at common law. No section of the rule explicitly
prohibits silence or pure nondisclosure of material facts. The
wording of rule lOb-5 states only that acts amounting to common
law fraud or deceit violate the rule.
The common theme running through this legislative and ad-
ministrative history is a desire to establish comprehensive federal
sanctions against "fraud." Fraud was a term of art, the meaning
of which could be determined at that time only by reference to
common law standards. Although there may be some doubt as to
which common law fraud standard was intended to be federalized,
there is no evidence suggesting any intent to define fraud more
broadly than the special facts or fiduciary rules.23 3 Dissatisfaction
with common law standards focused on the majority rule, which
imposed no duty of disclosure on insiders. While the antifraud
provisions were designed to incorporate the most progressive com-
mon law fraud rules, the explicit and repeated use of the word
"fraud" in key provisions suggests that they were designed to go no
further.234 The Supreme Court, moreover, has endorsed the prin-
ciple that rule lOb-5 and other antifraud rules incorporate the most
progressive common law fraud rules without enlarging them. In
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court held that use of the words
"manipulative or deceptive device" imported into section 10(b)
common law standards of scienter.215 Similarly, in Chiarella v.
232 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
233 Professor Loss has argued that construction of rule 10b-5 according to
federal law creates a presumption in favor of the "special circumstances" doctrine
of Strong v. Repide. 3 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1448-49 n.10; 6 L. Loss, supra
note 6, at 3587. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); N. LA.wnr, Trz
LAw oF COBPORATiONS 275 (1959); Ruder, supra note 229.
234 Cf. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (rule 10b-5 requires
"manipulation" or "deception").
235 425 U.S. 185, 204-06 (1976).
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United States, the Court relied on the common law standard con-
tained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding that "Section
10(b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it catches
must be fraud." 236 Even the most progressive common law fraud
rules do not impose a general duty of disclosure on outsiders.
Uses of outside information in connection with a securities
transaction that were illegal at common law, however, are presump-
tively illegal under rule 1Ob-5. The common law did not sanction
all uses of outside information but inquired into the purpose for
which the information was created and the means by which it was
obtained. No expansion of existing common law doctrine is re-
quired to hold impermissible all uses of nonpublic information,
including outside information, obtained through fraud or by tor-
tious or criminal acts. Because of its history, the common law rule
is relatively well defined and predictable in its application, ensuring
dependable guidance for private conduct. The common law rule
also conforms to the efficiency principle, by preserving incentives
to legitimate production and use of valuable information, while
discouraging activities that impair public confidence in the secu-
rities markets.
23 7
Applied to transactions involving outside information, the
common law approach directs attention to the purpose for which
the information was created. Although such a purpose should be
construed liberally, it cannot include illegal acts. If the informa-
tion is used consistently with the purpose for which it was created,
the common law generally does not impose a duty to disclose.
Most inventors, for example, intend for any information they create
236445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting section 551(2)(a) of the EEsTATEmExT
(SECqON) OF TORTS (1976)). See also 445 U.S. at 229 (reference to common
law rule); id. 228 n.9 (reference to common law authorities); id. 228 n.10 (refer-
ence to "special facts" doctrine of Strong v. Repide); id. 233 (reference to "estab-
lished, [common law] doctrine").
237 Allowing investors a cause of action against a defendant who trades without
disclosing information obtained in violation of law solves the problem that otherwise
would arise if the party from whom the information were misappropriated decided
not to sue, as might often be the case. When an employee misuses corporate
information, the corporation itself rarely will take any action beyond dismissal.
The corporation's damages usually will be too small to justify a civil action, and
the attendant negative publicity may greatly outweigh the value of any recovery.
In addition; the buyer-seller requirement of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), may leave a corporate employer who has not traded
with the defendant without a remedy under rule 10b-5. In Chiarella, the 'employer
did no more than discharge the defendant. Although the SEC could be given an
exclusive power to proceed against such a defendant, those who trade with him
also should be permitted to recover their losses, not only because the defendant
should in equity make them whole, but because enforcement would be more effec-
tive if private investors have an incentive to add their efforts to the resources of
the SEC.
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uses that fall generally under the rubric of personal profit, whether
it be earned by selling inventions, by speculating on their results,
by selling information, or by other means. Investors who analyze
public information intend the same.
By contrast, when a corporation employs agents to produce
information, the corporation normally does not intend that the in-
formation be used by its employees to generate personal profits.
Because profitable but unauthorized uses of corporate information,
such as disclosure of confidential information to a competitor or
buying ahead of a tender offer, risk interfering with corporate in-
terests, corporations can be presumed not to intend such uses. This
presumption might be rebutted by evidence such as an employment
contract indicating that the right to use corporate information in
trading was intended as partial compensation. In the absence of
due authority, however, the common law approach prohibits use of
corporate information for personal trading profits. This prohibi-
tion extends to employees, executives, and officers of a corporation
who properly receive corporate information when they use that
information in unauthorized ways, and a fortiori to persons who
improperly obtain information by theft, bribery, duress, fraud, or
under circumstances inconsistent with the purpose for which the
information was created. Application of this common law test to
uses of outside information would not be new to the jurisprudence
of rule lOb-5. Instead of focusing on the parity theory adumbrated
in the second part of the Cady, Roberts test,233 application of the
common law rule to outsider trading would direct attention to the
first part of that test, which prohibited misuse of "information in-
tended only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone .... ,29
C. Tender Offers
Tender offers present the prototypical uses of outside informa-
tion. Not only the corporation making the tender offer, but also
its officers and employees, other agents such as bank depositories,
and institutional allies that provide financing, may seek to exploit
advance information concerning the tender offer. Following the
Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella that possession of outside
information is by itself insufficient to trigger a duty to disclose
under rule lOb-5, the SEC has promulgated a series of detailed rules
pursuant to section 14(e) of the 1934 Act which prohibit trading on
23840 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
239 Id.
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material nonpublic information concerning tender offers obtained
from either the tender offeror or the target. These rules, however,
do not cover all possible uses of outside information even in the
tender offer context. The common law approach will therefore be
important not only with respect to uses of tender information fall-
ing outside the reach of the SEC tender offer rules (or in the event
those rules are limited or declared invalid), but also with respect to
uses of corporate-sourced outside information in other contexts.
Under the common law approach, a corporation planning a
tender offer (or other market action) can exploit in trading what-
ever information its agents have developed from public sources.240
This information, when combined with the tender offeror's knowl-
edge of his own plans, is clearly outside information giving him a
significant advantage over those with whom he trades prior to an-
nouncement. Yet the common law approach does not prohibit
exploitation of this advantage. The tender offeror has developed
the information without violating recognized duties or any other
provision of law, and can be presumed to have intended to use it to
purchase target shares at prices that may not reflect his plan to
make a tender offer. Where information is used consistently with
the purposes for which it was created, the common law approach
merely implements other provisions of law and has no independent
effect. An executive of the tender offeror, legal counsel, under-
writers, the depository bank, a financial printer, or any other agent
or employee who uses such information without authority to trade
for his personal account, however, violates rule lOb-5 because, while
each has legitimately come into possession of the information for a
proper purpose, each has used the information for unauthorized
purposes.241 Breach of this duty to use the information only for an
240 See, e.g., Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275
(2d Cir. 1975); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,
384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Gulf & Western Indus. Inc. v. Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Brascan Ltd. v. Edper
Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no obligation to disclose existing
holdings or future intent); Jacobsen Mfg. Co. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 282 F.
Supp. 598 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (no obligation to disclose intent to control in tender
offer); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955) (no obligation to
disclose planned sale of assets after tender offer). Purchase by a corporation of
its own shares, however, like any insider trading, requires full disclosure. See
Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HAnv. L. REV. 1146,
1166-67 (1965); Kennedy, Transactions by a Corporation in its Own Shares, 19
Bus. LAw 319 (1964); Lipton, supra note 175.
241 See Brudney, supra note 185, at 353-67. But cf. Fleischer, Mundheim &
Murphy, supra note 178, at 822-23 (fairness and expectations theory leads to
conclusion that unauthorized purchases of target stock by executive of bidder are
not actionable under rule 10b-5).
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authorized purpose, whether such a duty be explicit in a contract of
employment or be implied in law, violates the common law rule
and therefore triggers the disclose or abstain mandate of rule lOb-5.
A defendant charged with unauthorized use of outside infor-
mation might avoid liability under the common law approach by
showing, inter alia, lack of scienter or due authority. The common
law scienter requirement, which the Supreme Court in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder 242 reaffirmed as an essential component of rule
lOb-5, could allow a defendant to avoid liability on the ground
that he did not know his use was unauthorized and had no intent
to defraud.2 43 A defendant claiming that his use was authorized
might show that his conduct was in conformity with the pur-
poses for which information was created, in conformity with duly
authorized expansions of those purposes, or in conformity with a
discretion in himself to determine the contours of authorized use.
Alternatively, he might point to the terms of a contract. Because
information is created for a variety of often vaguely defined pur-
poses that do not exclude other purposes, there is no reason to
restrict the creator's authority to define the legitimate purposes for
which information is created and can be used. Although creators
of information will rarely, if ever, create information for the use of
anyone for any purpose, and will rarely delegate to another person
unlimited authority to expand legitimate uses of information to
encompass personal trading, some may wish to add to employees'
compensation by explicitly authorizing use of information created
by the employer and its agents. A corporation pursuing an aggres-
sive plan of acquisitions, for instance, may believe that it will ob-
tain better performance from certain executives if it pays them
only a nominal salary but allows them free use of information that
the corporation and its agents assemble. A tender offeror may
believe that such an agreement allows it to save more in compen-
sation than the increased cost of making tender offers caused by
pre-tender employee purchases.
A corporate decision to maximize the return and minimize the
costs of any information created by sharing the information with
designated employees is consistent with economic efficiency, because
it minimizes the resources expended in achieving a more efficient
result. If the corporation minimizes the cost of assembling the
information, the economic benefits accruing from impounding
valuable information into stock prices are obtained at minimum
242425 U.S. 185 (1976).
243 Id. See also SEC v. Monarch Fund, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fim.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ff 97,148 (2d. Cir. 1979).
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cost in private and social resources. Uninformed investors have
no reason to complain, because they are in the same position
whether the corporation or its agents, pursuant to due authority,
use the information. Whereas other approaches to rule lOb-5 either
proscribe such agreements or place them in a twilight zone, the
common law approach gives to the creator of information the right
to exchange it for other consideration and does not interfere with
such agreements so long as they do not violate independent rules
of law.
244
The common law approach resolves many of the questions that
have recurred with respect to the application of rule 1Ob-5 to tender
offers. Relying on authority to regulate tender offers provided to
it by section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, however, the SEC has promul-
gated a series of detailed rules that supplement the common law
approach. 245 The new SEC regulations require full disclosure of
any tender offer plans whenever a potential bidder does anything
more than "test the market" 246 in purchasing target stock. The
new regulations also forbid even duly authorized use of advance
information concerning a tender offer by agents and employees of
the tender offeror, such as an executive or printer, by their tippees,
by institutional allies, or by anyone else.247  These rules will end
244 See Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (officer of tender
offeror acquires targets stock with consent of employer; held no violation of rule
10b-5). But see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blaclmun, I.,
dissenting).
Private regulatory organizations have restricted trading on outside information
in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Options Rule 4.18 (rule against
exploiting nonpublic information concerning block trades) & Rule 4.19 (rule against
"tape racing," or trading on basis of telephonic information concerning NYSE
trades before they are registered on the Chicago tape); SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 2, pt. 1, at 435 (NYSE disciplined broker who traded on advance information
about tender offer divulged by president of company).
245 SEC Rules 14e-1 to 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e (1980).
246 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15548 (Feb. 5, 1979), [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1181,935.
247SEC Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 24a.14e-3 (1980). Although unnecessary
under the common law approach, these regulations henceforth will provide addi-
tional authority for proceeding against illegitimate uses of outside information by
employees and other associates of tender offerors. Prior to the Supreme Court
decision in Chiarella, the SEC had relied primarily on a parity theory under rule
10b-5 in proceeding against tender offeror executives who misused information
about the planned tender offer, see SEC v. Stone, SEC Litigation Release No.
8527, 15 SEC Docket 1101 (Sept. 11, 1978) (SEC complaint against executive of
subsidiary of bidder who purchased target stock for his own account); SEC v.
Healy, SEC Litigation Release No. 6589, 5 SEC Docket 524 (Nov. 18, 1974)
(employees of bidder), and printers, see SEC v. Manderano, [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 196,357 (D.NJ. 1978); SEC v. Primar Typographers,
Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FE. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 95,734 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); SEC v. Ayoub, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REPn. (CCH)
1195,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binderl
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not only certain compensation agreements, but also a financing
practice known as "warehousing." In the past, a tender offeror
without sufficient funds to cover the cost of a major acquisition
might obtain needed financing by sharing advance information
with institutional lenders who purchased target stock and later
tendered it. In exchange for paying institutional "allies" a profit
equal to the tender price less the price they paid for their shares,
the tender offeror obtained financing and assured itself that suffi-
cient shares would be in friendly hands and tendered at the right
moment. Although the common law approach does not proscribe
such arrangements, rule 14e-3 clearly does. Because rule 14e-3 ap-
plies only to tender offers subject to the Williams Act, however,
warehousing arrangements should be valid in other contexts under
the common law approach.2sS
Fre. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1195,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Wall St. J., Nov.
12, 1980, at 37, col. 4 (SEC action against attorney who allegedly purchased target
shares on the basis of information obtained from a client planning a tender offer).
248Because warehousing and similar practices can be an efficient means
of financing, the result under the common law approach is consistent with
economic efficiency. Thomas, however, has argued that warehousing should
violate rule 10b-5 independently of rule 14e-3. Thomas, Warehousing, 3 REv. SiC.
REG. 975 (1970). Wander has argued that sharing such information amounts to
waste of a corporate asset in connection with a securities transaction and therefore
should be actionable in a derivative suit brought under rule 10b-5. Wander,
Takeovers: Preparing the Attack in PrACMIING LAw INsvrru-r, SECOND
ANNUAL INsTIraTE ON SEcuRIT-Es REGuLAiON 7 (1970). When Wanders argument
was made in litigation, however, the district court held that there was no deception
between the tender offeror and the warehousers, and therefore no violation of rule
10b-5. Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 300 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Cf. Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (acquiring corporation can
enlist aid of board of directors by encouraging them to purchase target stock).
See generally E. ARANow, H. EmnoRN & G. BzsmnS, TENDER OMMs FoR
CoRPoRAE CONrOL 24 (1973); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 178,
at 811-17 ("fairness" approach does not permit warehousing); 1 INsTrruroNAL
INVEsTOR STUDY REPORT, supra note 144, at xxxi-xxxiii (rule lOb-5 should not be
construed to prohibit warehousing, which should instead be dealt with by specific
rules); Sandier & Conwell, Texas Gulf Sulphur, Reform in the Securities Market-
place, 30 Omo ST. LJ. 225, 254-55 n.145 (1969) (warehousers are agents of bidder
and have no greater duty of disclosure than he does).
On the other hand, unauthorized use of tender offer information by a ware-
houser's agents and employees should trigger a duty to disclose under rule 10b-5
for the reasons stated in the text. Warehousing activity by the target and its allies
also may violate rule 10b-5 because the target will owe a fiduciary duty to those
from whom stock is purchased and because knowledge of the tender offer received
by targets management is inside information. A target executive who trades on
news of an imminent bid almost certainly will have received that information by
virtue of his corporate position. The ALI Federal Securities Code makes this
presumption irrebuttable. See generally Flom, Warehousing, in PaAgrrsrnq LAw
lNsTirrrx, SzcoND ANNUAL INs==orrE ON SEcunrrras REcuLArrON 79 (1970)
(post-Institute textual volume) (potential risks to warehouser under 1933 and 1934
Acts). See also Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959) (improper
for insider to purchase stock without disclosing intention of financier to purchase
large blocks of stock) (dictum); In re Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623, 626 (1946)
(dictum).
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Because the new SEC rules cover only uses of outside informa-
tion obtained from the tender offeror or the target, they do not reach
all possible uses of outside information even in the tender offer
context. For instance, the new rules do not by their terms prevent
a depository institution that receives shares as they are tendered
from trading on information obtained pursuant to its official func-
tions. Under the common law approach, however, a depository
institution cannot use such information absent contractual provi-
sions permitting such use. A depository that knows from its count
of tendered shares that shares sufficient to mature the bidder's duty
to buy at a specified price will soon be collected cannot exploit
that information by buying and tendering target shares. Neither
can a depository that knows the offer will fail sell its shares. The
depository agreement does not contemplate such use. The common
law approach therefore proscribes unauthorized use of tender in-
formation by depositories, even though the SEC has not promulgated
a rule explicitly prohibiting such activity.249
D. Government Officials
The common law approach to rule IOb-5 resolves cases involv-
ing use of outside information by government officials into questions
of due authority. Government officials enforce a wide range of
compelled disclosure designed to serve the public good. It scarcely
needs mentioning that the purpose of this regulatory system is not
to make profits for government officials. Most government employ-
ment contracts specifically proscribe use of official information for
personal gain. Administrative regulations and conflict-of-interest
statutes, as well as case law, add a further layer of prohibitions
against personal use of information collected pursuant to official
authority. 50 Accordingly, a public official using official information
249 See generally Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 178, at 821 (use
of tender offer information by depository is "unfair"). A stock exchange specialist
may also become aware of the expected success or failure of a tender offer by
means of his knowledge of trading activity in target shares. Although the SEC
has not promulgated a tender offer rule explicitly dealing with specialists, for a
number of years the American Stock Exchange enforced a rule preventing the
specialist from tendering more shares than he held when the offer was announced.
ASE Rule 187(2)(a) (commentary), 2 Am. STocK Ex. GumnE (CCH) 119327 (1965)
(rescinded 9/29/76). Violation of rules of this type might also trigger a violation
of rule 10b-5. Cf. In re Herbert L. Honahan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943) (a broker-
dealer, having learned maximum price at which bond sinking fund would accept
tendered bonds, purcbased bonds in the market and tendered them at maximum
acceptable price; held defendant defrauded other bondholders in violation of rule
10b-5). See also note 265 infra.
250 See, e.g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910) (conspiracy to obtain in-
formation from employee in Department of Agriculture); United States v. Keane,
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for private gain violates a panoply of legal restrictions that trigger a
disclose or abstain obligation under the common law and rule
lOb-5. 251 Because these rules of law also prohibit unauthorized
disclosure, their effect is to proscribe any use beyond that contained
in the purpose for which the information was collected.
In United States v. Pelt, 252 an attorney conspired with an
employee of the SEC to trade in the stock of a company on the
basis of confidential information concerning imminent SEC litiga-
tion against that company. The Second Circuit held that the at-
torney's use of information improperly revealed by a government
employee violated a federal criminal statute condemning conspir-
acies "to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose . ... ,, 2 The federal conspiracy
statute invoked in Peltz might not confer standing on an investor
injured by improper use of official information. The common law
approach to rule lOb-5, however, would confer standing, because
the use of information in violation of the conspiracy statute would
trigger a disclose or abstain obligation under the rule enforceable
by anyone with whom the official and his co-conspirators trade.
In Blyth & Co.,24 a broker improperly obtained confidential
information concerning the terms of new Treasury Department
financings from an employee of the Federal Reserve. The broker
exploited this information by effecting a series of transactions in
outstanding government securities whose value was certain to be
affected by announcement of the terms of the new offerings.255
Because the defendant used information improperly obtained from
522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975) (government official's personal use of official informa-
tion in violation of mail fraud statute).
251See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1902-1903, 1905 (1976) (illegal for government
official to use for personal trading information received by Department of Agricul-
ture); 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 205, 208, 371 (1976) (illegal to use government informa-
tion for private benefit); Prescribing Standards of Ethical Conduct for Government
Officers and Employees, Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-65). Viewing
government officials as public fiduciaries would provide an additional ground for
imposing a common law duty of disclosure. Despite these prohibitions, substantial
evidence indicates that government officials and their tippees trade on official in-
formation. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1980, at 31, col. 4-6 (attempts by Labor,
Commerce, and Agriculture Departments to "plug ... leaks of economic data").
252433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955
(1971).
25318 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See also § 24(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§78x(b) (1976) (making unlawful any personal use by an SEC employee of con-
fidential information filed with the Commission).
25443 S.E.C. 1037 (1969).
255 Cf. Wand, Public Interpretation of Federal Reserve Discount Rate Changes:
Evidence on the "Announcement Effect", 38 EcoNoimTmcsA 231 (1970) (profits
can be earned with advance knowledge of changes in the discount rate).
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the issuer to trade in the issuer's securities, the SEC could have
rested its holding that such trading violated rule lOb-5 solely on
accepted insider trading principles. Yet the SEC opinion also
suggested that any use of material nonpublic information, whether
it be inside or outside information, would violate rule lOb-5.
Reliance on a broader-based parity theory stemmed at least in part
from concern that the insider trading rules alone would not reach
the situation where a defendant used confidential information about
imminent Treasury offerings to trade in securities of other issuers
that are directly affected by the terms of any new Treasury offer-
ings. The common law approach, however, reaches both situations,
making unnecessary invocation of a parity approach which threatens
to chill information production and trading. Because official in-
formation will necessarily be produced and disclosed pursuant to
government mandate even when it cannot be used for private profit,
the common law approach closes off improper use without threaten-
ing legitimate information production.
E. Columnists
In Zweig v. Hearst Corp., plaintiffs alleged that financial
columnist Alex N. Campbell had failed to disclose in a column
recommending certain stock that he had purchased the stock for
himself immediately prior to the column's publication and planned
to sell immediately thereafter.257 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint. Although there was no
allegation that Campbell used inside information, the Ninth Circuit
held that his position nevertheless imposed upon him a duty to
disclose under rule 1Ob-5, citing the Second Circuit's opinion in
Chiarella.21  The court found further support for this duty by
analogizing to cases involving explicit statutory duties or fiduciary
relationships.2 9 No prior decision, however, had ever imposed on
a columnist a duty of disclosure in the absence of explicit statutory
256 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
2 7In its earlier action for an injunction, the SEC had proceeded on a simple
parity theory. See SEC v. Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] F M. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 193,580 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
258 594 F.2d at 1266-67.
259 E.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)
(duties imposed by Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Lewelling v. First California
Co., 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977) (duties imposed by Section 15 of the 1934
Act); Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (duties
imposed by Section 15 of the 1934 Act). See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (implication of fiduciary duty and application of
holding in Chasins, supra, to non-statutory marketmakers).
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command, and the Ninth Circuit conceded that Campbell's "re-
lationship to the public was not a fiduciary one .... ,, 260 The
court nevertheless concluded that "Campbell's duty to his readers
is well established." 261 Having created a duty of disclosure to the
column's readers, the court extended this duty of disclosure to
persons, like the plaintiffs, who had neither read the column nor
acted in reliance on it, but who could show pecuniary damage
from its publication.26 2 These expansions of existing doctrine were
required because the court believed that "in traditional common-
law terms it is difficult to make out a duty owed by Campbell to a
[plaintiff] that did not . . . read his writings .... it 263
The common law approach, however, provides abundant means
of redress against Campbell's conduct and against other instances
of "scalping" which require no expansion of existing law. First, as
the Zweig court noted, scalping may violate a variety of independent
rules of law, depending on the particular factual situation, which
could under the common law approach trigger a duty to disclose or
abstain. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,264 for instance,
the Supreme Court held that an investment advisor's failure to dis-
close his intent to scalp amounts to a "fraud or deceit" within the
meaning of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.265
260 594 F.2d at 1269. See generally sources cited in note 265 infra.
261 594 F.2d at 1269.
262 A duty of disclosure to readers would in any event provide little protection,
because disclosure in the column of an intent to scalp would come too late for
investors who had sold to the columnist before publication.
263 594 F.2d at 1270.
264 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
265 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). See also In re Steiner, Rouse & Co., SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 8723 (Oct. 23, 1969), [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FD.
SEC. L. RPlm. (CCH) 177,754 (scalping by editor of newsletter held to violate
rule 1Ob-5); In re Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8426
(Oct. 16, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fa. SEc. L. RP. (CCH) 1177,618
(undisclosed buying or selling in advance of recommendation by investment adviser,
even without scalping, violates section 206 of Investment Advisers Act). Pre-
recommendation purchases, unless disclosed, will also violate more specific SEC
rules requiring that partners, officers, and directors of the investment advisor and
employees involved in the making or communication of recommendations file
quarterly reports with respect to their personal securities transactions. SEC
Investment Advisers Act Rule 204-2(12), 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(12) (1979). Al-
though pre-recommendation purchases and sales would not be actionable under the
common law approach if there were full disclosure and no manipulation, in 1973
the SEC proposed rule 17-j, which would have prohibited investment company
"insiders" from trading securities that were being recommended or were being
considered for purchase or sale by the investment company. SEC Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 7581 (Dec. 26, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fia. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 179,157. The SEC withdrew the proposed rule in 1976 after it
was criticized as cumbersome and overly restrictive of independent directors. SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 9169 (Feb. 19, 1976), [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fa. SEc. L. EPl. (CCH) g 80,537. Both the New York and American
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Although Campbell arguably was acting as an investment advisor
within the meaning of the Investment Advisers Act, plaintiffs in
Zweig did not press such a claim. 266 Second, plaintiffs could have
argued, but did not, that Campbell's purchase of the subject stock
at a bargain price from the company amounted to receipt of con-
sideration prohibited by section 17(b) of the 1933 Act.26 7 Third,
plaintiffs did not allege that Campbell had deliberately manipulated
the market in violation of section 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act,268 per-
haps because that section applies only to manipulation of securities
listed on a national securities exchange.269 Even in the case of un-
listed securities, however, section 10(b) proscribes the use of "any
manipulative or deceptive device .... ," 270 Fourth, plaintiffs
could have alleged that Campbell's publication of his recommenda-
tion without disclosing other material facts amounted to a half-
truth, actionable at common law even in arms-length transactions.
Finally, Campbell's use of information obtained from corporate
officials to trade in the issuer's stock before publication may have
constituted insider trading simpliciter, but this too was not alleged.
In short, existing rules of law are more than sufficient to handle
the facts in Zweig.2
71
Stock Exchanges, however, prohibit personnel of member firms from exploiting
information about the firm's plans "until the market effect of the recommendation
Is spent." NYSE, Member Firm Circular No. 170, at 5 (1962). See also ASE
Information Circular 51-71 (1971). In addition, many investment advisors have
promulgated policies restricting such trading, as by requiring that personal trading
by officers and employees be executed through an affiliated broker. See note 244
supra. While information obtained in violation of state and federal statutes and
applicable regulations clearly triggers a duty to disclose under the common law
approach, information obtained in violation of regulations promulgated by private
organizations may present a closer question. Compare Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,296 (9th Cir. 1980)
(no implied right of action for violation of NYSE rules) with Buttrey v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 838 (1969) (private action under NYSE rules requires fraud).
266 See 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(11) (1976) (definition of investment advisor).
See also SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1377 n.10 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1398; Loomis, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo.
WAsa. L. 1Ev. 214, 245 (1959).
267 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1976).
26815 U.S.C. §78i(a)(2) (1976). See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
269 ALI FED. SEc. CODE, supra note 191, § 1710, would remove this lacuna.
270 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d
341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976) (criminal conviction under rule
10b-5 for market manipulation by outsider). See also SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co.,
362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
271 The lack of reliance in Zweig, however, may create an insurmountable prob-
lem under any approach. See 594 F.2d at 1271-77 (Ely, J., dissenting). Zweig
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Although the Zweig court purported to follow the holding of
the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,272
Capital Gains did not expand on the common law rule as Zweig
did. In Capital Gains, an investment advisor several times had
purchased stock immediately before publishing a favorable recom-
mendation in an investment newsletter and in each case had sold
out immediately after publication.273 The district court held that
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act 2,4 did not expand on
common law fraud concepts and that mere nondisclosure of the
intent to scalp was therefore not actionable.27 5 The Second Circuit
also read section 206 "as confined by traditional common law con-
cepts of fraud and deceit," and affirmed.276
The Supreme Court reversed. Although there was at common
law no general duty of disclosure, a fiduciary's failure to disclose
all material facts in his dealings with his cestui was fraud at com-
mon law. The Supreme Court found that the Investment Advisers
Act created a federally recognized fiduciary relationship between
the investment advisor and his customers.277  Accordingly, the Act
imposed upon the investment advisor a fiduciary obligation to
make full disclosure, breach of which was fraud at common law and
under the Act.278  Because fiduciary relations can be created by
statute as well as by private contract, and in either case give rise to
a duty to disclose at common law, Capital Gains is fully consistent
with the common law approach. 27 9 Because there is no statute or
also stretches beyond recognition the purchaser-seller requirement of Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
272375 U.S. 180 (1963).
2 73 The defendant in Capital Gains was concededly an investment advisor within
the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1) (1976).
274 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
275 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
276 306 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1962).
277 375 U.S. at 189, 191, 194-97. See also SEC Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 40 (Feb. 5, 1945), 5 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) f17 56,374-77 (investment ad-
visor is a fiduciary under federal law). The common law had already recognized the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between an investment advisor and his clients.
See, e.g., Ridgely v. Keene, 134 A.D. 647, 119 N.Y.S. 451 (1909) (fraud where
investment advisor did not disclose side payments for recommendation of certain
stock). Cf. Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1963) (imposing federal fidu-
ciary duties on brokers enforceable under the 1934 Act).
278 Justice Harlan dissented. Although he agreed that a federally mandated
fiduciary obligation required full disclosure of all material facts, he believed that the
facts defendant failed to disclose in Capital Gains were not material. 375 U.S.
at 203.
279 The existence of a fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act also
renders the purchase or sale of a security in advance of a recommendation or dis-
cretionary transaction fraudulent unless disclosed when dealing with customers, even
in the absence of scalping. In Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release
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other rule of law creating a fiduciary relation between a columnist
and his readers, Capital Gains does not support the result in Zweig.
Even assuming that a defendant could implement a scalping
scheme without directly violating a federal or state statute, under
the common law approach a plaintiff nevertheless could proceed on
a theory alleging that the information at issue was received im-
properly or used inconsistently with the purpose for which it was
created. Ordinarily, corporate officials who speak to columnists
provide information for publication and not for the columnist's
personal profit. To do otherwise would risk liability for tipping
inside information in violation of rule lOb-5. When a columnist
exploits such information for personal profit before publication, he
has used it inconsistently with the purpose contemplated by its
transfer, aside from any tippee liability for use of inside informa-
tion. On the other hand, if a corporate official intends personal
use by the columnist, the columnist becomes an accomplice in the
official's manipulative scheme. When a columnist consults only
public sources, allegations of improper use and scalping will focus
on his employment agreement and the publication's articulated
policy.2 0 Arguably, any information obtained within the scope of
employment by a columnist or investment advisor belongs to the
employer and cannot be used for the personal profit of the employee
absent explicit authority. Scalping may also breach an implied
obligation to the employer to the degree it devalues the advice to
the employer and those to whom he sells it.
Several commentators have suggested implication of a warranty
of disinterestedness under federal securities law that would require
a columnist to disclose his interest in any stock he writes about.
281
No. 8426 (Oct. 16, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. EP'. (CCH)
177,618, the manager of an investment advisory service allegedly purchased or sold
securities for his own and his relatives' accounts shortly before executing similar
transactions for his clients at slightly less favorable prices. The Commission held
nondisclosure of this practice fraudulent under the antifraud provisions of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act and the Securities Exchange Act.
280 See, e.g., SEC SPECIAL STurY, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 76 n.130 (Tnvm
magazine policy statement).
281 For commentary on the scalping question, see SEC SPECIAL SrUDY, supra
note 3, pt. 3, at 73-76; Ferber, Short-Run Effects of Stock Market Services on Stock
Prices, 13 J. FINANCE 80 (1958); Greer, Cases on Tips Smudge Street's Image
Further, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1972, § D, at 11, col. 1; Leavell, Investment Advice
and the Fraud Rules, 65 MicH. L. BEv. 1569 (1967); Peskind, Regulation of the
Financial Press: A New Dimension to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 14 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 80 (1969); Welles, The Short Sellers and the Press, 11 INsTItrIONAL
INVEsTOR 27 (July 1977); Note, Stock Scalping by the Investment Adviser: Fraud
or Legitimate Business Practice?, 51 CAI.i. L. PEv. 232 (1963); Comment, The
Regulation of Investment Advice: Subscription Advisers and Fiduciary Duties, 63
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Although the common law approach does not imply a warranty of
disinterestedness, its effective prohibition of a variety of improper
uses and manipulative schemes produces much the same result,
contributing to the reliability of available information and to the
overall level of market efficiency. This contribution to efficiency
more than compensates for any marginal diminution in the incen-
tive to search out valuable information caused by removing the
opportunity to scalp, which produces gains entirely apart from the
validity of any underlying research, and even when there is no
underlying research.2s2
F. Market Professionals
More difficult problems arise when outside information is used
for personal profit by stock exchange professionals such as specialists,
marketmakers, block traders, arbitrageurs, registered floor traders,
and others. The position which some have on the floor of the ex-
change, their minute-by-minute knowledge of developments concern-
ing major transactions by significant market actors, their familiarity
with plans of their own which may have a market impact, their
knowledge of the activities of and constraints operating on other
market professionals, their continuous awareness of even public de-
velopments before they are disseminated via the media or the tape,
and their ability instantaneously to execute transactions without pay-
ing broker fees, all combine to give these market professionals an
incalculable advantage over the average investor.2 3 Specialists, for
instance, might earn over $100,000 in a series of nearly risk-free
transactions within the space of a few hours.2814 The price of a seat
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), now roughly $250,000,
represents in part the net discounted value of the superior access to
outside information which a seat provides.
MIcE. L. REv. 1220 (1965); Note, Investment Advisers and Disclosure of an Intent
to Trade, 71 YALE LJ. 1342 (1962).
282 In other actions brought against other financial columnists, plaintiffs have
alleged that the columnists' sources rather than the columnists themselves bene-
fited by trading on advance information concerning the content of particular
columns. See, e.g., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980); Welles,
supra note 281, at 27-28.
283 See generally SEC SpnraL STUDy, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 238-46; SEC
SEGE AmiON REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-51; SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950
(Jan. 16, 1973), [1973] SEC. PEk. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 185 at 31; SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964), [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FE. SEC. L.
RnP. (CCH) 176,989.
284 See generally Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5,
42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 695, 708 (1967). See also sources cited in note 293 infra.
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By acting as the nerve center of the organized stock exchanges,
specialists solve two problems.285 First, specialists acting as brokers
provide a means of handling orders "away from market"--i.e.,
orders that are below current asks or above current bids but that
can be executed when prices change. If a customer gives his broker
an order to sell when and if the price of a particular stock falls by
two points, the broker's agent on the floor of the exchange need
not wait at the specialist's post until the hoped-for fall occurs, but
can leave the order with the specialist who enters it on his "book"
for execution at a later time. Second, specialists acting as dealers
for their own account provide continuity and liquidity in the
market, and reduce random price fluctuations unrelated to changes
in the intrinsic value of securities, by trading at narrower spreads
than customer orders provide. For instance, if the lowest ask is $25
and the highest bid is $24, there would be no trading. Orders to
trade "at market," however, would create a situation in which the
"market price" continually gyrates between $25 for "market" pur-
chases and $24 for "market" sales, without any change in the under-
lying value of the stock. The specialist ameliorates this problem
by dealing for his own account at narrower spreads-for example,
by buying at $24/8 and selling at $24 .
The specialist's book, which lists all unexecuted orders and the
prices at which each can be executed, enables the specialist to gauge
the degree of buying and selling interest at prices "away from
market." 285 Private access to his book, together with his power to
administer prices and his position on the floor of the exchange, gives
to the specialist a unique informational advantage over other in-
vestors when he deals for his own account. When the lowest ask
is $25 and the highest bid is $24, for instance, he may sell from his
inventory at $241 with the knowledge that there are few, if any,
buyers at $24 or higher, but many sellers at lower prices; and
the price of the stock may drop precipitously as a result of his
decision to sell off a large portion of his inventory. Similarly, he
may buy for his own account at $25/ when he knows that higher
prices will soon unleash buying activity by customers who are
waiting for the price of the stock to rise to $2 53/ or more. If a
285 For more detailed descriptions of specialists' activities, see generally Gold-
man & Beia, Market Prices vs. Equilibrium Prices: Returns' Variance, Serial Cor-
relation, and the Role of the Specialist, 34 J. Fn ANcE 595 (1979); Wolfson &
Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970
D=mE L.J. 707; Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 1ob-5,
42 N.Y.U. L. Itav. 695 (1967).
286 The specialist's book is "an indicator of public interest in a particular
security." SEC SPEcrAL STUDY, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 76.
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.specialist acts as broker in a particular transaction, fiduciary obliga-
tions could provide some ground for requiring disclosure of any
material information he possesses, but federal law explicitly pro-
-hibits disclosure of information on the specialist's book.
287
Congress and the SEC, however, have regulated specialists in
-other ways. Section 11(b) of the 1934 Act and Commission rules
promulgated thereunder require that the specialist's transactions for
his own account be "necessary to . . . maintain fair and orderly
markets." 28 In theory, the specialist cannot trade as principal for
-any other purpose.2 9 Rule 1lb-1 provides that stock exchange
rules governing specialists include, inter alia: (1) requirements that
the specialist's trades as principal assist maintenance of a "fair and
,orderly market"; (2) provisions defining the responsibilities of
.specialists acting as brokers, and (8) procedures for surveillance.29
Existing NYSE rules governing a specialist's trading as principal
.also generally prohibit (1) purchases above the last sale price in the
same session; (2) purchase of all stock offered on the book at a price
.equal to the last sale ("cleaning up" the book); (3) supplying as
.dealer all the stock bid for at a particular price (liquidating inven-
tory in preference to offers of sale by customers); and (4) opening a
.stock in a way that manipulates the price.291 When acting for his
,own account, the specialist is generally restricted to "stabilizing"
287 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1976).
288 Id. Section 11 of the 1934 Act generally prohibits a member of a national
.securities exchange from trading on the exchange for its own account. 15 U.S.C.
§78k(a)(1) (1976). Congress, however, specifically exempted specialists from this
prohibition, as well as marketmakers, block positioners, registered odd-lot dealers,
bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1976).
See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), [1973] SEC. REc. & L.
REar. (BNA) No. 185 at 31; SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15533 (Jan. 29, 1979),
.2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 722,808B (effect of electronic market on advantages
possessed by market professionals).
The "quid pro quo" for permitting exploitation of outside information by
market professionals "has been the imposition of regulation to ensure that in trading
for his own account [the market professional] uses those privileges for the benefit
.of the market generally .... ." Albert Fried & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 15293, 16 SEC Docket 100, 104 n.7 (Nov. 3, 1978). See also SEC SPECIAL
STuDY, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 78-83, 90-94, 123-28, 135, 220-25; HousE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE AND FoREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT or TnE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE
OPTIONS MAmxETs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (Comm. Print 1978) ("traditionally,
market professionals have been permitted to enjoy these market information and
competitive advantages because they have an obligation to the markets . . . and
have made a significant contribution to the continuity, liquidity and depth of the
,-markets .... ).
289 See SEC SEGREGATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 63.
290 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (1980).
2 9 1 NEw YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE (NYSE) Rule 104, 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH)
',f2104 (1980). See also NYSE Rules 98-127, 2 NYSE GumE (CCH) 77f 2098-2127
.< 1980).
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transactions, and cannot buy on an uptick or sell on a downtick in
the absence of special circumstances.
Despite their detail, these regulations do not remove all op-
portunity to exploit outside information. A specialist who wishes
to liquidate his inventory of a particular stock during the course of
a steep market decline can unload an amount equal to half of all
bids at his price on the appearance of a momentary uptick. Simi-
larly, he can purchase during the course of a major rally an amount
equal to half of all offers at his price on the appearance of the first
downtick.292 Even sustained changes in prices do not occur with-
out numerous reverse ticks.293  The specialist can therefore exploit
whatever outside information his position brings him so long as he
engages in a sufficient percentage of transactions which are at least
in form "stabilizing."
Floor traders also are subject to detailed regulations.294  Yet
they too can exploit outside information obtained on the floor of
the exchange.295  Historically, floor traders could trade for their
own account without restriction. In 1964, the SEC required that
seventy-five percent of a floor trader's transactions be "stabilizing,"
in terms of the tick test, but this stabilization requirement does not
remove all opportunities for exploitation of outside information,
and it does not apply to block trades.296 The Securities Act Amend-
ments of 1975 prohibit floor trading except as permitted by the
292 NYSE Rule 104.10, 2 NYSE Otmn (CCH) f 2104 (1980).
293 See SEC SPEcIAL STUDy, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 101-06, 112-13,. 122-25
(specialists generally trade with trends; over 80% of their trades in steep market
declines were found to be sales). The Special Study also suggests that specialists
often used their informational advantages to help preferred customers. Id. 159.
See also Horror Stories, FORBS, Sept. 14, 1971, at 43-44 (specialist sells short to
fill order then covers at lower price).
The proposed electronic "composite book," however, will gather limit orders
from all sources and exchanges and will be an "open book." It will therefore
eliminate much of the specialist's informational advantage over other traders and
may someday replace the specialist with a computer. See, e.g., SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 11942 (Dec. 19, 1975), [1975] 333 Sc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
F-1. Increasing competition among specialists has already somewhat reduced the
power of individual specialists. See Wall St. J., June 15, 1977, at 20, col 3;
1978 NYSE Rule 107, 2 NYSE GUmIE (CCH) f 2107 (1980) (establishing "com-
petitive market makers").
294 See, e.g., NYSE Rules 110-112, 2 NYSE GumE (CCH) f f2110-12 (1980)
(establishing minimum capital requirements, requiring that priority be yielded to
off-floor orders, prohibiting domination of one stock, segregating functions of floor
trader and floor broker in the same session, and requiring that 75% of the floor
trader's trades be stabilizing).
295 See, e.g., SEC SP-EcAL STuDY, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 208-40; SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964), [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 76,989.
296 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964), [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) IT 76,989.
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• Commission, which has recently moved to end all floor trading
.-solely for personal accounts. 297 Floor traders who qualify as "com-
petitive traders" by earning fifty percent of their income from
.-commissions, however, can continue to trade for their own account
,on the floor of the exchange for the other fifty percent, providing
,ample opportunity to exploit outside information.29
Despite the limitations apparent in existing regulations, the
Commission has, until recently, hesitated to announce broad-based
-rules under section 10(b) which could affect adversely delicate mar-
ket mechanisms on the floor of the exchanges. Attempts to apply
,a generalized parity theory to stock exchange professionals would
require restructuring of the exchanges or restructuring of the theory.
For instance, requiring a specialist to disclose his book would merely
.add to the sum of outside information available to market pro-
fessionals and available to the public only after delay. Newspapers
_would not carry such information, inclusion on the tape would add
to existing delays, and requiring the specialist or his agents to re-
.spond to inquiries by telephone would be cumbersome and of lim-
ited utility. Disclosure to other market professionals at the time
trades are effected would not reach the principal until too late, if
.at all.
In Chiarella, however, the SEC relied on its parity principle
in pressing criminal charges against the defendant, and argued that
.application of that principle was made especially appropriate by
the defendant's regular access to outside information concerning
market conditions. Perhaps the SEC intended to apply the parity
principle to market professionals who were not yet subject to de-
tailed regulation. The Second Circuit accepted the SEC's invita-
tion to announce a broad rule and held that a duty to disclose out-
.-side information applies to all "market insiders." 299 On certiorari,
the Securities Industry Association-a trade association representing
brokers, dealers, and other market professionals-filed a brief as
297 Wall St. J., May 1, 1980, at 4, col 1.
298 d& See also Eiteman, The S.E.C. Special Study and the Exchange Markets,
-21 J. FIrAN CE 311 (1966) (supra-competitive profits earned by floor traders and
specialists). Similar advantages are enjoyed by other exchange members, particu-
larly in connection with their knowledge of impending block trades. 4 INsTrru-
-IIoNAL INVEsTOR STuDY, supra note 144, at 1603-07, 1732-35. See also SEC
SPEcLr STUnY, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 208-12. AMECAN SToCK EXCHANGE (ASE)
Rule 24, 2 Am. STocx Ex. GumE (CGH) If9242B (1979), and NYSE Rule 112.10,
.2 NYSE GumE (CCH) ir 2112 (1979), however, have severely restricted full ex-
ploitation of such information by generally requiring, inter alia, that exchange
-members wait until two minutes after block trade information has appeared on the
-,tape before attempting to exploit such information.
299 588 F.2d at 1365-66.
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amicus curiae arguing that the standard articulated by the Second
Circuit was "overly broad" and "could adversely affect the trading
activities of market professionals." 300 In reversing the conviction,
the Supreme Court stressed that "neither Congress nor the Com-
mission has ever adopted a parity-of-information rule," but had
dealt with market professionals by means of "detailed and sophisti-
cated regulation." 301
The questions left open in Chiarella with respect to market
professionals are largely answered by the common law approach.
Market professionals can trade on outside information so long as
they do not violate applicable regulations and rules of law. The
existence of regulations explicitly contemplating use of outside in-
formation for personal profit will tend to rebut any claim that use in
conformity with those regulations was inconsistent with the purpose
for which the information was conveyed to the market professional.
Investors who place orders with specialists will be presumed to
know that Congress and the Commission do not consider improper
the specialist's personal use of the information in conformity with
regulations. Such regulations, however, cannot override other rules
of law, such as the insider trading rules in the event that the special-
ist knew the information was inside information, 30 2 or laws against
theft in the event he knew the information was stolen, or existing
fiduciary obligations. A block trader who receives a large sell
order, for instance, cannot sell ahead of his customer.303 So long
as market professionals do not obtain outside information by im-
proper means and have no reason to believe that it was improperly
revealed to them, use in conformity with existing regulations and
rules of law is presumptively valid.
On this analysis, Chiarella presents an easier case. Chiarella
appropriated information from his employer in violation of his
employment agreement, company policy, and laws condemning
theft. This theft not only gave rise to a cause of action by the
employer for damages under the common law; it also triggered a
duty under rule 1Ob-5 to disclose or abstain from trading on the
basis of that information. Enforcement under these circumstances
should not depend on the employer, which may lack both incentive
300 Memorandum of the Securities Industry Association, Amicus Curiae, at 10,
United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
301445 U.S. at 233.
02 See generally Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5,
42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 695 (1967).
303 See Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
NYSE Rule 92,2 NYSE GumE (CCH) 92092 (1979).
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and standing to sue under rule 1Ob-5. 304 Although the Supreme
Court considered this theory, and Chief Justice Burger relied on it
in voting to affirm, a majority of the Court held that the common
law approach had not been adequately presented to the jury.
G. Broker/Advisors
Wall Street broker/advisors have considered several ways to
minimize free-riding and maximize the return on their investment
recommendations. When a broker/advisor devotes resources to
market research and publishes the results in a market letter, the
client who attempts to use that information frequently discovers
that the price of the recommended security has been bid up to
reflect the value of the recommendation before he can trade on it,
usually even before he receives the letter. Ironically, in many cases
it is market professionals and other competitors of the broker/
advisor who benefit most from these recommendations. Many
broker/advisors therefore view investment research as a loss-leader,
a necessary activity whose cost can be recovered only indirectly.
This inability to appropriate directly the value of investment re-
search implies that a socially suboptimal amount of resources is
being devoted to such research.
Just as the eighteenth century lighthouse builders devised
solutions to free-riding on their services, however, broker/advisors
have considered various strategies for more completely appropriat-
ing the value of their investment research. After completing some
research, but before announcing any recommendation, the broker/
advisor might accumulate an inventory of the stock it plans to
recommend. After making the recommendation, he may sell some
or all of the stock. Alternatively, the broker/advisor might hold
this inventory primarily for sale to its customers, at market prices,
or at prices somewhere between its purchase price and the post-
recommendation price.305 Some -writers have questioned the use of
these strategies.
The common law approach, however, resolves any uncer-
tainty here. Investors who sell, even to the broker/advisor, before
publication, will have no claim under the common law approach.
The broker/advisor has gathered and analyzed public information
for legitimate purposes-to sell it to clients and perhaps to trade on
304 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
305 Cf. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 245-48 (brokerage firms
frequently use research reports to invest for own account or for accounts of
individual members).
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it as principal-and has used the information consistently with
those purposes. He has violated no independent rule of law and
he stands in no relationship to any seller that requires disclosure-
of his research and plans. Permitting purchases of stock on the-
basis of this research before it is publicized provides a just return
for legitimate industry and encourages economically efficient be-
havior. Investors who buy after the recommendation is published
also have no claim. So long as there is no manipulation, they are-
buying at market prices that reflect research and recommendation,
as do all market prices to varying degrees.
Purchases from clients before publication may present a closer
question. Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act and section
15(c) of the 1934 Act place the broker/advisor in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with his clients under federal law. Such a relationship,
requires full disclosure of all material facts and the utmost good
faith.306 A client who sold to his broker/advisor after the research
was completed and before publication might allege breach of this
duty on the ground that the results of the forthcoming report were
material information. A broker/advisor might seek to avoid this
problem by purchasing only from sellers who were not clients,
but this strategy would not be possible with respect to exchange
transactions. Attempts to disclose the potential existence of the-
inventory strategy and to obtain waivers from clients in advance
would be cumbersome, and any waivers received might not be en-
forced because of a lack of full information or for other reasons.
A client who purchases after publication, however, will have
difficulty showing damages. In addition, if the broker/advisor dis-
closes before or at the time of sale the results of his research and
his inventory strategy, he has made full disclosure. A client never-
theless may argue that the broker/advisor has not shown the utmost
good faith because he is dealing with clients and others in a way
which will almost always earn profits regardless of the validity of
the research-and which may do so at the client's expense if the
value of the stock falls after the market impact of the recommenda-
tion is spent. A client might contend that the broker/advisor can
comply with the standard of utmost good faith only by selling the
stock to clients at the same price for which it was purchased. Even
at common law, however, a fiduciary can engage in profitable trans-
actions with his cestui provided there is full disclosure and no
substantive unfairness. Otherwise, a trustee could not charge for
306 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963); Hanley
v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
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his services and a broker could not sell stock at a mark-up. Because
there is nothing inherently unfair about the terms of the broker/
advisor's offer to share potential research gains with clients, full
disclosure is enough under the common law approach.3 07
Inevitably, the price rise following publication of the recom-
mendation will result both from the validity of the research effort
and from the market impact of publication entirely apart from the
soundness of the research. Although the common law approach
and considerations of economic efficiency would allow the broker/
advisor to appropriate whatever value inheres in bona fide research
activity, a closer question may arise concerning the component of
the price rise attributable solely to publication. One might argue
that earning profits from this component of the price rise rewards
market power and influence, and not research or other economically
beneficial activity. On this view, the component of the price rise
attributable solely to publication is an exercise of a power to
influence stock prices. A cautious broker/advisor who wishes
to avoid charges of manipulation might therefore attempt to sell
stock after publication at prices reflecting only research value and
not publication value. But even if such a calculus were possible,
the broker/advisor might conceivably risk liability to others who
had transacted with third parties at prices that did not reflect this
adjustment.308
The common law approach, however, does not support liability
under these circumstances. To do so would remove the incentive
to research by threatening every investment advisor with incal-
culable liability to unknown investors whenever a recommendation
affected prices. The broker/advisor, moreover, has a legitimate
claim to appropriate the increase in price attributable solely to
publication. The size of the market impact will depend on the
size of the audience, the strength of the recommender's reputation,
and the inherent credibility of the report, all of which depend in
307 When, however, an investment banker possesses inside information con-
cerning a particular issuer, such as a client planning a new offering, accumulation
of an inventory position in the stock of that issuer could lead to litigation charging
use of inside information. Proprietary trading might weaken the credibility of any
chinese wall defenses. See generally Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution
to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 459 (1975).
30s See also Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). Zweig
and other cases involving columnists, however, present a different question, because
those defendants are in a position analogous to employees of the broker/advisor.
Their employment agreements and company policy ordinarily do not permit ex-
ploitation of the publication value of any recommendations made. By contrast a
broker/advisor who publishes an investment newsletter is not restricted by employ-
ment agreements, company policy, investor expectations, or common law rules
where there is full disclosure.
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part on the validity of previous research activity and recommenda-
tions. An investment advisor with a poor reputation for accuracy
will soon discover that his recommendations exert no discernible-
impact. The market impact of publication is therefore a delayed
return for earlier research activity that properly belongs to the-
advisor if he can devise a means to appropriate it.
When a broker/advisor sells recommended stock immediately
after publication, however, an inference of purely manipulative
activity could arise. Immediate sale may weaken the claim that
pre-recommendation purchases demonstrate a good faith belief in
the value of the recommendation. True, once the recommenda-
tion is published, the broker/advisor may believe that both research
value and publication value are fully impounded into existing prices
and that no additional gain is likely in the near future despite the
validity of the research and recommendation. Although this reason-
ing would explain the sale of recommended stock shortly after
publication, so would a belief that the recommendation was worth-
less. In addition, sale immediately after publication will tend to
depress price, further strengthening a claim of manipulation. Even
sales solely to clients could be consistent with such a charge. Ac-
cordingly, in order to avoid triggering action by the SEC, or by
others who might claim to be damaged by manipulative activity,
the cautious broker/advisor may choose to hold a portion of recom-
mended stock for a reasonable period after publication.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, registered its
concern with the expanding range of liability possible under rule
lOb-5. The limitations on liability inherent in the common law
approach are responsive to this concern. If any additional limiting
principles are required, they should not exclude from the reach of
rule 1Ob-5 uses of information in securities trading that are fraudu-
lent at common law. Instead, the creation of certain evidentiary
presumptions should sufficiently curb the frequency and costs of
baseless or vexatious litigation. Use of outside information to
effect long-term transactions eligible for capital gains treatment
under the Internal Revenue Code, for instance, might support a
rebuttable presumption that such information was not obtained or
used improperly. The common law approach suggests a rebuttable
presumption in favor of proper use by the creator of outside in-
formation and against improper use by one other than the creator.
Such a presumption would require employees and persons who had
[Vol. 129:130'r
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received information from others to justify their use, but would
place on the plaintiff the burden of showing impropriety if a cre-
ator, such as an inventor or researcher, traded on his own informa-
tion. Although such a presumption may place an unwarranted
burden on defendants who are not creators, this approach is su-
perior to a parity approach, where such a presumption applies to
all investors and is in effect virtually irrebuttable. Other limita-
tions on the scope of rule lOb-5 will appear as the courts fine tune
the law of damages. 0 9
309 See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,.
429 U.S. 1053 (1977). See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979) (suit alleging violation of section 206 of the Investment Ad-
visers Act, ithout alleging violation of rule 10b-5, limited to equitable relief);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (suit alleging violation of
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, without alleging violation of rule lob-5, limited to
equitable relief).
